October-December 1960

SOVIET SURVEY

A Quarterly Review of Cultural Trends

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34 October-December 1960

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Editorial and business offices, Summit House, 1–2 Langham Place, London, W.1.
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D I S S E N T

RIENTALISTS IN MOSCOW

W. Z. Laqueur

Eastern Reproaches

ROM 9 to 16 August, in Moscow Univer- sity — or, to give it its full title, the cow State University named after Lomo- v—the 25th International Congress of ntalists held its meeting. The contributions uch meetings deal by and large with such tions as 'Suffixes to the accusative case in Uzbek language', 'Work in progress on Coptic Manichaica', or at best the Indian le industry in the seventeenth century, all doubt of considerable interest to the ialist, but matters of more or less indif- nce to the general public.

ut great expectations were entertained of congress, which was after all the first to eld in the USSR, and the Russians them- s had declared that it would be essentially rent in character from its predecessors. ical questions, above all the liberation ggle of the Afro-Asian peoples, would py the centre of deliberations, and Soviet lars would demonstrate 'the invincible er of Marxist-Leninist theory as the odological foundation of Soviet science'. t important of all, the orientalists of the nt itself—Soviet Central Asia, India, a, Africa, would for the first time play a ng part. Gafurov, the leading Soviet ntalist (and at one time first secretary of Communist Party in Tajikistan) explained among Western orientalists there were two encies—those, allegedly a minority, who y the spiritual values of the East from a anitarian point of view, and the ideolo- of colonialism, who deny the achieve- ts of the Eastern peoples.

rticular importance was attached to the cipation of Communist China. Last sum- the conference preparatory committee d: 'It is a matter of particular importance Chinese scholars will take a worthy place e congress. Their presence means that in e conferences of orientalists will be truly national in character. Their papers and rts will show what splendid progress the great Chinese people has made in science and culture.'

Western observers also awaited with great interest the appearance of the Chinese. It was no secret that over the past year there had been disagreements between Moscow and Peking, and that China was not on the best of terms with India, Indonesia, and other countries. How would the relations between Chinese and Russians, and between Chinese and other scholars from Asia, work out at the congress? But the question was not answered, for the Chinese did not turn up.

Their absence was a pretty severe blow for the hosts, who apparently thought it unnecessary to provide any explanation. Moreover, another conference of Sinologues, which was also to have been held in Moscow in August, had to be abandoned, on the pretext that not enough reports on research work had been received from the intending participants. The Soviet hosts tried to get out of having to give an official explanation; at one time it was unofficially put out that the Chinese refused to regard Oriental studies as a separate discipline, and had therefore not come; another time they simply said, 'You know, the Chinese don't like coming to international conferences anyhow. There are so many complications—Formosa, the Americans, and so on'. But in Moscow there were no representatives of 'Formosa'; the excuses offered were thin, and probably it was not even expected that they would be believed.

The course of the dispute can only be surmised, but its effects are visible. There are some Chinese goods on sale in Moscow—chiefly cheap textiles and shoes—but fewer than one would have thought. Soviet tourists go to Europe, India, Africa, even to America, but one never hears of their going to China. A couple of years ago there were a fair number of Chinese students in Soviet Universities, now they are very few and they keep very much to themselves. The Soviet Press gives relatively

little space to events in China, and as for articles by Chinese journalists and writers, there have in recent months been none at all. A Chinese film festival in Moscow last winter was a failure, and although a fair number of American and other Western films are now being shown in the USSR, none of the cinemas, as far as can be ascertained, is presenting the output of the Chinese studios. Books are being translated from the Chinese but very few in comparison with English, French, or German, and in small editions. An illustrated periodical published in Russian in Moscow by the Chinese recently ceased to appear.

The display of Chinese cultural achievements which the foreign visitor was promised did not materialise; there were some Mongols, North Koreans, and a Vietminh delegate at the orientalists congress, but they were not markedly in the foreground, and they did not make up for the absence of Mao's representatives. Of the twenty sections into which the work of the congress was divided, one was devoted to Chinese history and philology. At its closing session an American scholar, whose 'progressive' sympathies are known, put forward a resolution in which regret was expressed for the absence of the Chinese. At the final plenary session all the section resolutions were read out and approved, except this one. Gafurov must have overlooked it.

Russia Studies Asia

THE address of the Oriental Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences is 2 Armianski Pereulok, a small street to the east of Moscow's centre. The building is old and dilapidated, but Turgenev and Stanislavski lived there, and in Tsarist times it housed the Lazarev Institute, the centre for the study of Oriental languages. Today it is the centre for Soviet Oriental studies, the place where the training of academic and non-academic cadres is planned and in part carried out.

In recent years, more precisely since 1954, Soviet oriental studies have been greatly expanded, and it is freely admitted that this is connected with the 'decisive changes in world affairs', particularly in Asia and Africa. There has of course been, since the beginning of the nineteenth century, a school of Russian orientalists, including scholars of world renown like Rosen and Oldenburg, Krachkovski and Kokovtsev, Turayev and Bartold. And in the first twenty years of the Soviet regime there were research institutes and journals concerned with contemporary developments in Asia and the Middle East.

The purges of the years 1936–38 brought these activities to an end. The institutes were closed down and most of their staff arrested, and the journals ceased publication. The 'academics' got off more lightly; if they had not been politically active they were left in peace, and continued as before to investigate the use of the particle 'ma' in Chinese and similar studies, which even in the totalitarian state seldom arouses excitement. But the Second World War thinned their ranks, too; a number of the younger and highly promising scholars of the Leningrad School (where, until 1956 Soviet oriental studies were concentrated) lost their lives.

In the early post-war years Soviet oriental studies were but a shadow of their former self; after a fashion, it is true, they still went on, but apart from a few professional colleagues in the USSR and abroad scarcely anyone took notice of them; neither the party nor the state thought of them as especially important. Practically nobody was concerned with contemporary questions, Soviet orientalists had neither a journal of their own and but a few other publications. The number of those who chose this as their field of study was few. There were no Africa specialists among historians or economists—the dark continent was left to a small group of ethnographers and philologists.

The big change came in 1955, as part of the general change and relaxation after Stalin's death, when it became less risky to show interest in the recent history of the East. Indeed the orientalists were frankly invited to do so. At the twentieth CPSU Congress in 1956 Mikoyan said that while in Africa and Asia

decisions of universal significance were being made, Soviet oriental studies were hibernating. It must be admitted that the Russians don't often do things by halves; every possible encouragement was given to young scholars to enter this field of study. Research institutes and academic faculties sprang up like mushrooms after rain, not only in Moscow and Leningrad but also in Baku, Tiflis, and Tashkent. In regard to China and India there was something to go on, but for the Near and Middle East, South-East Asia and Africa, a virtually clean slate had to be filled, and a good deal of care was given to this. New specialised periodicals were started, and by now new books on these subjects are appearing every few days. In a number of Moscow and provincial high schools the teaching of Hindi and Urdu, Persian and Arabic was introduced, and hundreds if not thousands of young people are now bent on becoming experts on India, China, Africa, or the Near East.

The idea was not to turn out a large body of philologists and medievalists. These of course were useful, but the main purpose was to train personnel as quickly as possible for practical assignments. The same process, though on a more modest scale, occurred after the Second World War in the United States. Both countries await impatiently the first crop of Africa experts.

Five years have passed since it was decided to give high priority to Soviet Oriental studies, and the new cadres are already at work, in Cairo and New Delhi no less than in Moscow. There are first the classical, academic orientalists, whose representatives were well in evidence at the congress, and who have done considerable work, particularly in Altai and Turki languages and literature, a field in which there was an excellent Russian tradition. Of more recent origin is the intensive study of Indian and Afghan languages and literature, and the first steps to start a school of Africanists, which appear to have been taken in close collaboration with East Germany, more advanced in the study of contemporary African questions than any other Soviet bloc country. Egyptology and the Biblical age attract, as might have been expected, little interest.

Where real progress has been made, however, is in the study of contemporary questions. There are dozens of books being produced on such subjects as landholding in Syria, the struggle of the Afghan people against the British aggressors, and even 'the struggle of the Matabele and Mashona against British Colonialism'. The level of these books is somewhat higher than it was ten years ago, when the few books and articles that were published were based almost entirely on secondary sources. To write a book on Syria today, the Soviet student has to know the Arab sources and not just cut what he wants out of the *Daily Worker* or *L'Humanité*. The tone and tendency have not, it is true, changed much; the authors are still expected to produce useful and not 'objectivist' work.

Considerable stress is laid on the mastery of oriental languages; at the congress there were young Soviet specialists with a command of fluent Hindi, Arabic, or Korean (they are more behind with African languages because of the shortage of qualified teachers). The syllabus of the oriental languages department of Moscow University provides for the first year 16 hours weekly instruction in the structure and grammar of the language, and the student has to study two oriental languages, and in addition either English or French. Recordings and tape recordings are used to assist accent and pronunciation. The students have to put out their own news-sheets in their chosen languages, and have intensive conversation exercises with teachers whose mother tongue they are learning. Then, whenever possible, they are sent for one year to the country where that language is spoken. Although they all take courses in dialectical materialism and the history of the CPSU, there seems to be an essential difference between those now graduating from Soviet Universities, and those who got their education in the twenties and early thirties at the University of the Toilers of the East and similar institutions. The graduates of those times had far less command of the languages, and far less knowledge of history and economics than the graduates of 1960. But they were revolutionaries, whereas their successors today seem to be concerned chiefly with their own advancement. Perhaps that is not wholly just;

perhaps it is merely the prejudice of a visitor from the West, who is rather struck by the sight of a young girl with manicured nails and high heels lecturing on the proletarian revol tion. For her, and for her entire generatio that is something in the pretty distant past.

Orientalists in Session

THE congress thus gave the visitor an insight into questions connected with Soviet policies in Asia and Africa, as well as into Moscow's technique of organising international congresses. A great many Western participants expected it to be a purely political affair, and were therefore surprised when, as an American delegate put it, there were so few fireworks. Of the roughly 800 reports submitted to the twenty sections, only a few handled explosive material, that is, oriental history and culture in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The great majority treated such themes as 'The Arab Shadow-play of Mohammed Ibn Daniyat' (an Egyptian eye doctor of the thirteenth century), and the Soviet representatives were reasonable enough not to subject them to agitprop techniques. This field was left to the East Germans, whose contributions on recent history were as radical as they were primitive. The Japanese, too, followed this line, their delegation seeming to be heavily overweighted with communists. In the African section a number of Soviet scholars, and communists from other countries, set out to show that in studying African history the methods of historical materialism were far superior to any 'idealist' or 'eclectic' method. The result in most cases was not, to put it mildly, highly convincing, though this was less the fault of historical materialism (which has no doubt a significant contribution to make to the study of African social and economic history), than of the immaturity of most communist Africanists, too recently in the field to allow themselves with impunity the luxury of doctrinaire declarations.

But apart from that, the Russians were more concerned to put up a show of respectability than to conduct propaganda which might well have missed its mark. Of course, politics was never far from the scene, as in Mikoyan's opening address ('In Uzbekistan there are five times as many students as in France'), or in the fine exhibition at the University, which w to show foreigners how much progress ha been made in Soviet Central Asia in the la four decades. Occasionally, a paper by a no communist delegate was criticised on Lenini lines; but in only two or three instances did foreigner criticise a communist paper for on sided political emphasis. The visitors from t West made every effort to keep out politic debate, and even the Russians were on t whole concerned to do the same. And perha that was all to the good, for it is more tha doubtful whether such a debate would ha served any purpose.

'We do not doubt,' wrote Professor Belaye a leading Soviet orientalist, on the eve of t congress, 'that this world congress will help further the development of oriental studie But it is highly questionable whether inte national scientific congresses really can ha this effect. For the most part such congress —and the Moscow one was no exception— not discuss the cardinal problems of a subje but listen to papers on subsidiary and high specialised themes of interest only to ve small circles, and sometimes of no interest all. Of course there were happy exceptions, b they were few. That was not the fault of t Russians, who in this respect have only carri on the Western tradition, which has little recommend it. The real value of such co gresses today is that they bring together eve two or three years the specialists from differe countries who can then talk to each oth But the conversations of value take place n in the congress hall but in the corridors. T contention that the official side of the congr promotes science is for the most part a pic lie. Outside the congress there were a numb of interesting affairs. Aged men in nation costume recited the epics of the Central Asi peoples which have been handed down ora from past ages; there were concerts of orien music, films about Tajikistan and Uzbekist

book exhibitions, and visits to museums. There was a reception in the Kremlin; the members of the presidium were, it is true, otherwise engaged, and the orientalists had to be content with the deputy chairman of the Academy of Sciences, Ostrovityanov; and there were receptions for the national delegations at the House of Friendship.

The congress closed its proceedings with the usual resolutions, but behind the scenes there was a bitter fight to settle the place for the next congress. At first it had been assumed that the Chinese would insist on their claim, but they were not there to do so. Then there seemed to be a majority for the American invitation to hold it in the United States, but the Egyptians, supported by the Russians, held out for Cairo, and in the end agreement was reached on India, a choice received with general satisfaction.

The congress was held in the new university building on the Lenin hills. It is an imposing structure of 32 storeys, 23 large lecture halls and 125 small ones, and hundreds of laboratories; there are 20,000 students (of whom, it is true, only half study there) and 2,500 teaching staff. About 2,000 students live in the *obshchezhitye* accommodated in the wings, and although their quarters are simple enough, they are far better than the housing most of the students can expect to find when they leave. The university therefore exercises an irresistible attraction for students throughout the country, and the conditions of entry have become steadily more stringent. In some faculties students are admitted only if they have already done two years practical work, in a factory or elsewhere. Once they have graduated, they show no desire to leave Moscow. 'Young man, go east,' say the authorities, but there is little enthusiasm to follow this advice. Where else will they find such amenities—clubs and libraries and swimming pools and theatres and cinemas all on the premises, not to speak of intellectual attractions.

In Tsarist Russia Moscow University, then in its old building on the Mokhovaya, was the centre of discontent, the heart of the movement against the autocracy. Benckendorff, head of the 'third division', the Tsarist secret police, wrote to Nicholas I that many of the students were infected with liberal ideas, dreamed of a revolution, of the possibility of a constitutional government. The Tsar then visited the students' quarters in secret and introduced stricter regulations.

In what do the students of 1960 believe? They are the generation who were twelve or thirteen years old when Stalin died. They differ in many ways from their predecessors, but it will be twenty years or so before the representatives of the present generation of students come to occupy leading positions in public life, and only then will it be possible to say how deep the break went. These and similar idle speculations force themselves on the visitor, and so induce him to miss the only opportunity he will ever have of hearing Professor Pevsner of Moscow read a paper on 'The growth of labour productivity in the production of textiles in Egypt from the end of the twelfth to the fifteenth century: A contribution to the study of the techniques of decorating fabrics'. It is unforgivable.

FRIENDSHIP UNIVERSITY

Alvin Z. Rubinstein

(The University described in the following account had its predecessors. Shortly after the Bolsheviks established their power in Central Asia they opened in Tashkent a propaganda school for training students from the East, Soviet and foreign, and in April 1921 the Central Executive Committee published a decree establishing a Communist University of Toilers of the East (KUTV) in which instruction was given in the languages of the non-Russian-speaking students. There were said to be 700 students of 57 different nationalities in the first year, the number rising to 895 by the beginning of 1923; its first director was Broido, deputy Commissar for Nationalities. When the Commissariat was abolished the University was handed over to the Communist International. In the autumn of 1925 the Sun Yat-sen University was opened, primarily for Chinese students; its first director was Karl Radek. It had a two-year course which covered the natural sciences as well as Marxism-Leninism and the history of the communist movement.)

ON 24 February 1960, Nikita S. Khrushchev announced the intention of the Soviet Union to establish a new University, the University for Friendship of Peoples designed to provide higher education for students from the countries of Afro-Asia. On 1 October 1960, the Friendship University, as it is more commonly known, will open its doors to approximately 500 students from more than 90 countries. This unique experiment in education has considerable political significance for Soviet relations with the underdeveloped world; its progress and problems merit careful attention. The decision to create an institution to train students from the countries of Africa, Asia and the Middle East was a bold political move. If successful, it will not only materially enhance the image of the Soviet Union as the benefactor of the underdeveloped countries, but also will help to provide the USSR with cadres trained in the languages and customs of these crucial areas. The information about the organisation, planned operations and problems of the Friendship University given here was obtained during a meeting with the Rector and Vice-Rector. The meeting was arranged by the Organisation Committee of the 25th International Congress of Orientalists which met in Moscow from 9 to 16 August 1960.

The present plan calls for the creation of six separate faculties with the following areas of specialisation: (1) Faculty of Engineering: construction and operation of machinery, mining, and the extraction and utilisation of mineral resources; (2) Faculty of Agriculture: agronomy; (3) Faculty of Physics, Mathematics, and Natural Science: mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology; (4) Faculty of Medicine: medical treatment and pharmacy; (5) Faculty of History and Philology: modern history and the Russian language; and (6) Faculty of Economics and Law: economic planning and international law.

These faculties, however, are not scheduled to commence full-time operations during the 1960–61 academic year. This year foreign students will undergo a form of pre-University prep-school training. The Rector indicated that this preparatory period is necessary because few, if any, of the students know Russian, the intended language of instruction. It will also help to raise the education levels of the entering students closer to those required of Soviet students. This measure was decided upon when it became apparent that most of the applicants from the Afro-Asian countries either had not completed their formal secondary school education or had come from schools of inferior performance. Students will be admitted even without a formal certificate of completion of secondary school, if they show talent and capacity for development. In addition to extensive preparation in varied subjects, the students will follow an intensive language training programme. The pre-University-level course may be extended to two or three years, depending on the needs of the individual student. Throughout the course of study, particular emphasis will be placed on the acquisition of a reading, writing, and speaking knowledge of Russian. Approximately 900 of the 1,218 proposed classroom hours will be devoted to language instruction. According to the Rector of the Friendship

University, Professor Sergei Rumyantsev, the idea for the University originated in early February 1960, with a committee representing three organisations: the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS), and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. The committee recommended to the government the establishment of a new university to help increase the number of professionally trained personnel available to the underdeveloped countries. The government's favourable response was made public for the first time on 24 February 1960 by Khrushchev, during his visit to Indonesia.

A University Council of 10 members was set up to determine the institution's educational policies. The present members of the Council include representatives of the three founding organisations, as well as representatives of the USSR Committee of Youth Organisations and the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialised Education of the USSR. The Rector and Vice-Rector are also members. Once the University is in operation, the Council plans to expand its membership to include 5 student and 2 faculty representatives. The Rector stressed that, unlike other Soviet institutions of higher education which are responsible to the Ministry of Higher Education, the Friendship University will be directed only by the Council, notwithstanding the fact that the financing of the institution will be undertaken through the Ministry of Higher Education.

THE recruitment of students was a complex and trying job. Of the 25,000 applicants, 500 were accepted for the first year. The eventual enrolment goal is 4,000. None of the foreign students now studying in Soviet Universities will be transferred to the Friendship University. They will continue their current programme, since these Afro-Asian students were admitted under special intergovernmental agreements. On the other hand, students for the new University may apply directly to the Friendship University or through Soviet embassies abroad. There will thus be two distinct systems in operation for the recruitment of students from underdeveloped countries: one, governmental; the other, individual.

The Enrolment Committee was faced with the task of evaluating the qualifications of applicants coming from widely disparate educational systems. With the quality of secondary schools differing markedly from country to country, and, indeed, within individual countries, the Committee took into consideration the letters of recommendation, the grades on the certificates of completion submitted by the applicant, and his general academic promise. If a student showed great proficiency in his preferred field of specialisation, but did poorly in other subjects, the Committee tended to admit him.

After the applications were evaluated, the committee invited approximately 600 applicants to appear in Moscow in early September for further examinations, with all expenses taken care of by the University. (This unusually expensive recruitment programme may be motivated by a desire to ensure the selection of only the most 'politically promising' applicants.) During the meeting, Professor Rumyantsev was asked to comment on the rumour that certain governments, notably the Indian government, had refused visas to prospective candidates. He denied that there had as yet been administrative interference by any Afro-Asian country, adding that it would be unfortunate if qualified students were prevented from obtaining an education because of differences in national policy.

In making its selections, the Enrolment Committee maintains that it was guided by the following criteria: first, the number of applications sent from each country; second, the availability of higher educational facilities in that country; third, the educational promise of the applicant. Unusually large numbers of qualified applicants from particular countries presented problems. In the case of Japan, for example, the Committee decided to limit the number of those accepted because it considered educational opportunities there to be adequate. The Rector also acknowledged that more interest was shown in applicants from Africa than from Latin America (approximately 1,000 applications were received from

African countries). This interest will undoubtedly grow as political conditions in Africa become ripe for international communist activity. Meanwhile, the Soviet government is moving to develop its reserve of African area specialists.

According to the Rector, it is University policy not to admit students from any of the other communist countries on the ground that ample facilities are available there. But the decision to admit 60 Soviet students to the entering class (at the time of the meeting it was not yet clear whether this would be in addition to, or included in, the entering class of 500), suggests another possible reason, namely, the desire of the Soviets to develop their own area specialists while, at the same time, not aiding the training of bloc personnel, especially the Chinese. The University will more than repay politically the financial investment if the Soviets can, during the next decade, expand their supply of experts trained in the languages of the critical Afro-Asian areas, particularly in African dialects, Burmese, Indonesian, and Indian languages. Judging by information acquired at the Orientalists Congress, the Soviets have fewer experts trained in these languages than is usually thought to be the case.

All students are provided with free tuition, books, living accommodation, and 900 roubles a month for food and miscellaneous expenses; transportation from and to their native country is paid for by the University. All students will live in a hostel about a mile from the University, which is housed in a building formerly used as a military academy. During the first term, instruction in courses other than the Russian language will be given in the students' native language. However, after January 1961, in all courses only Russian will be used. While foreign students are devoting 900 classroom hours of their first year to the study of Russian, Soviet students will be spending a similar portion of their time studying the language of one of the foreign groups attending the University.

Recruitment of a teaching faculty posed another problem for the administrators. The Friendship University will have its own permanent staff and employ visiting part-time professors only in specialised fields. The combination of several factors—a sense of challenge, new opportunity, and perhaps civic duty—has induced enough professors to join the faculty to take care of the first year's need. Moscow University, for example, has relinquished 40 Russian language teachers, of a total of 80, all especially experienced in teaching Russian to foreigners. For the planned first-year enrolment of 500 students University officials expect to have 216 faculty members of various ranks; when the enrolment reaches its planned level of 4,000, there will be about 800 faculty members, an unusually high faculty-student ratio.

What was at first regarded by many Western observers as essentially a propaganda proposal and received with understandable scepticism must now be viewed with respect. Moscow University students have cynically dubbed this new institution 'Apartheid University'. However the Soviets are providing ample resources, both in personnel and money, to assure its success. The Rector, Professor Rumyantsev, was Deputy Minister of Higher Education from 1955 to 1959, and then Deputy Minister of Higher and Secondary Specialised Education prior to his present appointment; the Vice-Rector, Professor P. D. Erzin, is also an experienced educator. Both are men of energy and ability, serious about their responsibility to make the University a well-functioning institution.

If the Soviet government maintains its present determination and willingness to expend considerable resources over the next five years it will stand to gain much. It may enhance its prestige among the Afro-Asian countries by this timely educational venture; it will be training many of its own students in languages currently in short supply in the USSR; over the next decade this could constitute an important addition to the reservoir of scholars and specialists trained in Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Middle Eastern, and Central Asian languages. Finally, the Soviet government may well be able to develop a considerable number of pro-Soviet Afro-Asians from among the students, many of whom may return home ideologically committed to the Soviet camp.

ISLAM IN THE SOVIET UNION, 1917-1960

Walter Kolarz

> . . . with false arguments the unbelievers seek to confuse the truth, scoffing at My revelations and My warnings.
>
> *The Koran*

OF the numerous religions practised in Soviet Russia, none is so difficult to evaluate in its importance as Islam. According to the Soviet census of 1959 there were over 24,000,000 persons in the USSR belonging to nationalities traditionally professing the Islamic faith. What this figure means in terms of religious allegiance and religious observance cannot be answered even approximately. The Moslems of the Soviet Union live in areas which foreigners are either not allowed to visit or where they are usually permitted to stay only for a very short time. Most of their impressions are superficial and refer to a few administrative and tourist centres. The Soviet Moslems themselves make hardly any contribution to our knowledge of their problems; they have produced no informative literature in any way comparable to that issued by the Russian Orthodox Church, the Council of Evangelical Christians (Baptists), or the Armenian Church. As a result, highly contradictory opinions have been put forward about Soviet Islam. Some have considered it a *quantité négligeable*, no longer to be reckoned with; others have regarded it as a powerful anti-communist force. What we do know about Soviet Islam from communist sources would tend to prove that institutionalised Islam has declined in the years of Soviet power, but this is not tantamount to a weakening of the Moslem religion. Mohammed did not found a Church; he gave birth to a faith. Islam can and does exist quite independently of all institutionalised forms. Questions of hierarchy and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, so important to most Christians, have been immaterial to the survival of the Islamic religion. The history of the Catholic Church could not be written without fullest mention of the Popes, nor the history of the Orthodox Church without its Patriarchs and Metropolitans. With Islam it is different. Mullahs and Sheikhs, however distinguished, are of little relevance, and in describing the fate of Moslem religion in the USSR we must look for the most part beneath the surface, where Islam survives without registered mosques and officially approved mullahs. It continues to live in the faith in the basic tenets of the Koran, in the observance of holy-days, in the cult of saints and in many other ways. Islamic and pre-Islamic beliefs may often exist side by side, but there is no contradiction between them, for the people have always reconciled one with the other, notwithstanding the opinions of theologians and anthropologists. The division between official and unofficial Islam in the Soviet Union seems to be the only one which is of decisive importance; the customary divisions on theological lines have much less significance for Soviet Russia.

The presentation of the Soviet case against Islam always undergoes some slight changes in accordance with the tactical switches in communist policy towards the Islamic nations inside and outside the USSR. What can never be a question of discussion is the fundamental ideological incompatibility between Islam and communism. The day-to-day attitude which the communists observe towards Moslems is, however, quite a different problem. During the years of Soviet power, the communists have applied the most contradictory policies; some situations required an attitude of toleration and friendly understanding towards the Moslem religion; others dictated an all-out offensive against Moslem religious 'prejudices'. In their Moslem policy the Soviet communists were guided by their usual system of priorities, putting the general cause of the proletarian revolution first and the fight against any particular ideology second. Bearing in mind that Soviet atheism is not a concept complete in itself, but only part of a wider ideological system—Marxism-Leninism—there is nothing surprising in even the most sensational tactical volte-face on the Moslem front.

WHEN the Bolsheviks took over the government of Russia, they were anxious to postpone the unavoidable conflict with the Moslems of the Soviet East. Too preoccupied with establishing their power in Europe to tackle the question of Islam, they set out to break the influence of the Russian Church before turning to Moslem religious law or Moslem religious education in the North Caucasus and Turkestan. They also lacked allies within the Moslem camp. The number of Moslem communists in the first few years of Soviet power was minute, and those prepared to conduct anti-religious, i.e., anti-Moslem propaganda was even smaller. Moreover, the Russian communists expected the revolution to extend to other countries with a Moslem population. For all these reasons, religious tolerance towards the Moslems was the only conceivable policy during the first years of the Soviet regime.

This initial communist approach towards Islam also suffered from a certain confusion of terminology. Originally the Russian communists used the word Moslem in a secular sense—a meaning which it has also acquired in other parts of the world. Moslems, as the Soviets understood it, were simply people belonging to the Moslem world in a historical and cultural sense; they were not necessarily believers in Mohammed's religion. For instance, when in November 1917 Lenin and Stalin appealed to the 'Moslems of Russia' and the 'Moslems of the East', asking them for their 'fullest moral and material support in the rebuilding of the world', they thought of them as oppressed colonial people, not as devout sons of the prophet. But it is not unlikely that the religious Moslems gathered from the appeal that the communist leaders were their friends.

To Lenin, in particular, Islam and the Moslems were an unknown force for which he showed the grudging respect which the unknown so often receives. His attitude was shared by Zinoviev, the first president of the Communist International, and Mikhail Kalinin, a man who, for a communist, had a most cautious and tolerant attitude towards religious problems. At the eighth congress of the Russian Communist Party in March 1919, Lenin formulated Soviet policy towards Islam. It can be summed up in a single word: Wait! 'What can we do in relation to such people as the Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turkmenians who are still under the influence of their mullahs? Here in Russia, the people's memory of their unhappy experience of the "popes" has helped us to throw these off. But you know how badly the decree about civil marriage is still being carried out. Can we go to those nations and tell them "We shall get rid of your exploiters"? We cannot do that because they are completely subservient to their mullahs. We just have to wait for the development of each particular nation and for that differentiation of the proletariat from the bourgeois elements which is inescapable'.[1]

Lenin, of course, identified religion with exploitation, and the clergy and the mullahs with 'bourgeois elements'. But the meaning of his words was nevertheless clear. He admitted that in the first years of the Soviet regime the communists had neither the power nor the opportunity to tackle the problem of Islam. Some communist leaders went a step further than Lenin. They thought the fight against Islam had to be postponed to a later date, and that there could even be co-operation between the Soviets and the mullahs. So a rather absurd situation developed. In the Christian areas of Russia an all-out struggle against religious institutions was waged, whilst in some Moslem areas, for instance in Daghestan, the communist authorities were prepared to recognise the Shariat courts. Abroad, the Russian communists were attacked for this opportunist attitude, for example by that most orthodox Marxist Party, the Independent German Social Democrats (USPD), whom Moscow wanted to recruit to the Third International. Zinoviev himself went to a congress of that party in Halle in October 1920. The German left-wing extremists reproached the Soviets for their softness towards the 'mullahs of Khiva', a term which must be understood metaphorically rather than literally. But Zinoviev insisted, in the face of a hostile audience, that the 'prejudices of these peoples' (meaning the Moslems

[1] V. I. Lenin, *O natsionalnom i natsionalno-kolonialnom voprose* (The National and National-Colonial Question), Moscow, 1956 edition, p. 478–479.

of Soviet Asia) had to be respected; communists would bring enlightenment also to the 'mullahs of Khiva' and lead them.[2]

It was easy for the German Marxists to decry the 'mullahs of Khiva'. For the Soviets, they were a most difficult problem, both in the metaphorical and literal sense, and even more so the 'mullahs of Bokhara', which was the most important centre of 'religious obscurantism' in the whole of Moslem Central Asia. It was the mullahs of Bokhara who supported the armed struggle against Soviet rule almost to the bitter end. It is hard to say when this end came. Large-scale fighting went on until 1924, especially in the eastern part of the former Emirate of Bokhara. Dyushambe (Stalinabad), which later became the capital of Tajikistan, was still in anti-communist hands in the summer of 1922. Smaller skirmishes between Soviet forces and nationalist Moslem bandits occurred until 1928, when the band of the Khivan Dzhunaid Khan was routed.[3] There was a last flare-up of fighting in 1931, when a force of Bokhara Moslem refugees invaded Tajikistan from Afghan bases.

ALTHOUGH the situation in the Moslem parts of the Soviet Union greatly differed from that in the Christian areas, there were also certain similarities. One was the divisions inside the religious camp. The split between the 'Old Church' of Patriarch Tikhon and the 'Living' or 'Renovated' Church within Russian Orthodoxy had an almost exact parallel within the camp of Soviet Islam. On the one hand, conservative Moslem dignitaries continued to fight stubbornly against the atheist regime, whilst 'progressive' Moslems called for its support, often in a demonstrative and enthusiastic way. The conservatives were as extreme in their hostility to communism as the reformists were in their servility to the new rulers and their policy, but both invoked the Koran in favour of their attitude. The North Caucasus region remained for a long time the main bulwark of the conservatives—and in some areas, such as the Karachai territory and the Chechen-Ingush Republic, the intransigent anti-Soviet Moslem trends were not vanquished until the Second World War. The reformists were most influential in Tataria, Bashkiria, and other areas of the Russian Federation more strongly exposed to European and communist influence. In Azerbaijan at an early stage there emerged a collaborating Moslem faction. In the Central Asian Republics, the two trends existed side by side and the attitude of the local Moslem dignitaries varied from one town to the next. In Fergana, the chief of the Moslem ecclesiastical administration still urged believers as late as 1927 to boycott Soviet medical services, whilst in the same year the Moslem religious dignitaries of Kokand wanted to take part in the communist demonstration celebrating the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution.[4] Even among the Ismailite religious elders, there were some who said that the Soviets came from God and that Lenin was a son of the Aga Khan.[5]

From the point of view of the Soviet regime the conservatives were a major menace. They incited the people against the government and fomented disobedience or even outright revolt. But neither were the 'reformists', or people of the New Mosque (Novomechetniki) as they were nicknamed, an unmixed blessing. It was, of course, pleasing to the party that authoritative Moslem bodies issued statements endorsing various aspects of Soviet policy and thus helped to consolidate communist rule. The Soviet authorities also welcomed the fact that these same bodies put on record their hostility to British imperialism in the most outspoken manner. With the support of the Moslem clergy, England was to be built up as the main enemy of Islam, whilst Soviet Russia was to appear as the saviour of the Moslems. Indeed, a statement by the Baku Moslem clergy in 1923 praised the Soviet regime for having saved Persia and Turkey from 'predatory England' and appealed to the Moslems of the world not to yield to 'English intrigues'.[6] A Moslem ecclesiastical conference held in Tashkent in the following year adopted a similar

[2] G. Sinowjew, *Die Weltrevolution und die Kommunistische Internationale* (Berlin, 1920), p. 37.
[3] L. Klimovich, *Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo na Vostoke i Religiya* (Socialist construction and religion in the East), Moscow, 1929, p. 50.
[4] *Bezbozhnik*, 1927, 4.
[5] Klimovich, *op. cit.* p. 95.
[6] *Zarya Vostoka*, 17 August 1924.

declaration, asserting that the Soviets would bring liberation to the peoples of the East, whilst the imperialists of England were sucking the blood of the oppressed people and bringing slavery.[7]

The New Mosque people also proved their usefulness to the authorities when the latter carried out land reform in Soviet Central Asia in the winter of 1925-26. A number of mullahs declared that the measure was compatible with the Islamic religion and the teachings of Mohammed. Even the Moslem Ecclesiastical Administration of Turkestan issued a statement to this effect, but it could hardly have been wholly to the liking of the communists, for whilst advising people to obey the government decree, it urged landowners to anticipate the reform ' by a voluntary hand-over of land and property '; he who followed this advice would be treated as a ' benefactor in the world beyond '.[8] This statement, which transformed a communist reform into a religious gesture, showed that a Moslem supporter of the Soviet regime was not less dangerous than a Moslem opponent. On the latter punishment could be inflicted; against the former there was no protection. The New Mosque Moslem was an awkward ally, for he gave a religious motivation to the actions of the government and so caused tremendous confusion among the first Moslem communists who, politically, were almost completely illiterate.

THE MOSLEM communist of the first years of the Soviet regime was a strange phenomenon. He still believed in Allah and he observed religious rites. At first it even happened that regional party conferences in Central Asia were interrupted at prayer-time, and even later, members would walk out of party meetings in order to pray. The very idea of anti-religious propaganda horrified the first Moslem communists. When the question was raised for the first time before the Communist Party organisation of Tashkent in 1923, the Uzbek communists showed themselves more perturbed than even the mullahs themselves. They asked the atheist lecturer such questio as ' Who created you if not God?', or ' How ca one live without religion ? ' They also said th an Uzbek opposing religion was selling hi self to the Russians and demanded a brand communism ' compatible with Islam '.[9] As la as 1927, Yaroslavsky, the chief of the Leagu of Militant Atheists, stated that a substanti part of the communists of Moslem origin (Daghestan, Bokhara, and other areas) co tinued to carry out religious rites and we members of religious organisations.[10] H thought that after ten years of Soviet pow the time had come to enforce stricter rules f the Communist Party branches in the Mosle areas, and to demand from every party me ber a clear break with religion, but the ti was not yet ripe. In the North Caucas region even atheist communists posed devout Moslems and went to the mosque order to maintain their authority among t population.[11] In the Pamir mountains, Co munist Party members continued to pay t gold tribute (*Zakat*) to the Aga Khan, like the other Ismailite faithful throughout t world.[12]

Those who wanted to be Moslems and co munists at the same time stubbornly adhere to the theory that communism and Islam we really identical, notwithstanding all the pr nouncements made by authoritative part spokesmen. This view coincided with that e pounded by the New Mosque people, of who some went so far as to equate the Koran wi the Communist Manifesto.[13] Quite naturall there existed a kind of alliance between t religious Moslem communists and the Ne Mosque clergy. The ' anti-religious ' activity some Communist Party branches in Centra Asia simply consisted of appointing ' progre sive ' mullahs in place of reactionary ones.

[7] *Pravda*, 28 December 1924.

[8] Statement of 20 December 1925, quoted in B. Havit, *Turkestan im 20. Jahrhundert* (Darmstadt, 1956), p. 270.

[9] *Pravda Vostoka*, Nr. 277, 1928.

[10] Yaroslavsky, *Protiv Religii i Tserkvi* (Again Religion and Church), vol. II, 1933, p. 219-220.

[11] *Pravda*, Nr. 200, 1926.

[12] The continued collection of this tribute after t establishment of the Soviet regime was one of t strangest things which happened in the Islamic ter tories of the USSR. The collectors travelled fro India to the remotest villages, first with fronti passes, later illegally. The authorities tried to di courage the payment of the tribute by denouncing t collectors as spies. *Antireligioznik*, 1937, No. 8, p. 3

[13] Yaroslavsky, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 373.

This peculiar frame of mind considerably delayed the introduction of a fully fledged Soviet system in the Moslem territories. It also delayed the annihilation of Islam, which confronted the regime not only as a religion but also as a legal framework, a way of life, and an entire network of institutions. In fighting Islam in all its manifestations the Soviet regime was unable to proceed at the pace at which it usually tackled social, economic, and ideological problems. It had to choose a slow and gradual approach. This applies particularly to the way in which the regime wrested from the Moslem peoples their three main institutional, and at the same time religious, assets, namely, the Vakufs, or religious endowments, mostly in the form of church land, which provided the means for the upkeep of mosques and religious schools; secondly, the Koranic schools, and thirdly, the religious and Shariat courts.

The Vakufs were, in theory, abolished by the Soviet decree of 23 January 1918, which separated the Church from the state, but their last remnants continued to survive until the end of the twenties. In fact, the Vakufs were needed as long as Koranic schools or 'old method' schools, as they were officially called, were allowed to remain in being. The Soviet regime obviously could not afford to disband these schools before being able to provide a secular alternative. In Turkestan, the authorities even saw themselves compelled to authorise the establishment of a special Moslem educational society called 'Makhkamai Shariya', which worked for a compromise between religion and communism in the sphere of education. It was entitled to own Vakufs for financing its activities. Both clergy and parents fought hard for the preservation of the Koranic schools, but in vain. As for the Shariat courts, their competence was steadily curtailed and their number reduced from year to year. In 1925, as many as eighty-seven such courts were still in being in Uzbekistan alone. By 1926 this number was reduced to twenty-seven. In 1927, only seven Shariat courts were left and in the next year not a single one remained in the whole of Soviet Central Asia.[14] The official abolition of Moslem schools and courts did not mean that they passed out of existence altogether. In the more remote parts of the country, for instance in the Daghestani mountain regions, they continued to survive for a certain time.[15] Even secular education in the Moslem areas was originally not necessarily atheist. Some of the textbooks used in the Soviet state schools were compiled by religious-minded people and there were many mullahs among the first Soviet 'secular' teachers.

The liquidation of the Moslem religious schools was part of a series of measures designed to bring the situation in the Moslem territories of the Soviet Union into line with that prevailing in the rest of the country. In the long run the centralised Soviet empire could not afford to have two religious policies: one, more lenient, for the Moslems and another, most intolerant, for the Christians. In the large-scale atheist offensive which began in 1928 and reached its full force in 1929, a very large number of mosques were closed, destroyed, or secularised, and the Moslem clergy was drastically reduced in numbers. Proportionately, the Moslems suffered more heavily than the Christians, since before the religious persecution there were considerably more mosques and mullahs per head of population than there were Christian churches and priests. The way in which the Moslem houses of worship were taken away from the believers hardly differed from the manner in which the churches were confiscated. Meetings of citizens were convened in towns and villages and were bullied into deciding 'voluntarily' that the local mosques should be converted into schools, clubs, cinemas and reading rooms. Other mosques were transformed into prisons and hotels, whilst the most ancient and artistically most remarkable ones became museums.

The Moslem clergy, having already lost much of their income through the nationalisation of the Vakufs, were now largely redundant. Some were persuaded to resign their office in a dramatic way by publicly denouncing themselves 'deceivers of the working people'. Others, especially the members of the higher clergy, were put in prison, as for

[14] Klimovitch, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

[15] *Bezbozhnik*, 29 September 1929.

instance the entire supreme ecclesiastical administration of Central Asia, headed by its Chairman and Chief Shariat Judge. Their arrest was carried out under article 156 of the Uzbek Penal Code which did not figure in the Penal Code of Russia proper and was especially designed to fight Islam. The article dealt with: 'Exploitation of religious prejudices of the masses with the aim of overthrowing the Workers' and Peasants' Government or of provoking resistance against its law and decrees'. The punishment envisaged for this crime ranged from three years imprisonment if there were mitigating circumstances, to the 'highest measure of social defence', namely, death by shooting.[16]

IT is difficult to give any figures as to the precise extent of the havoc caused to Islam by the atheist campaign which began in 1928–29 and went on for several years, but it is certain that it reduced the numbers of both the mosques and the Moslem clergy to insignificance. In Bashkiria, for instance, the number of mullahs declined between 1929 and 1932 from 3,000 to 300.[17] Such a drastic decrease must also have taken place in other Moslem areas of the USSR.

The Soviet Moslems did not capitulate easily. There was a good deal of local resistance of every kind. Illegal religious-inspired organisations were founded and in some places armed revolts broke out. The fight for the preservation of the Moslem faith was probably the most important single motive of these anti-Soviet movements and activities, although they also pursued political and economic objectives. In Tataria, the mullahs founded a religious Youth League called 'Star of the Truth' (*Zvezda Pravdy*), which even published a newspaper, *Child of Islam*. The leaders of the organisation were arrested and put on trial in 1929.[18] A particularly original form of religious opposition was discovered in Bashkiria. There, devout Moslems propagated a so-called 'Testament of Mohammed'. This was a skilful device whereby local Moslem leaders tried to war the people against the anti-religious policy o the communists. Mohammed's 'testament' wa of an apocalyptic nature; it forecast the com ing of doomsday, and predicted that the Kora and faith in God would be taken from th people. These misfortunes would reach thei culminating point in 1937, but Mohamme would protect those who carried his testamen from town to town, village to village, mosqu to mosque. The 'testament' had its effect More people went to the mosques, a numbe of young Moslems left the Komsomol an some parents even stopped sending their chi dren to the Soviet school.[19]

In the Caucasus, Moslem resistance too particularly violent forms. In the Kabardino Balkar Autonomous Province, a rising brok out in June 1928 and lasted five days, th district of Baksan falling into the hands of th insurgents. Officially the insurrection was attri buted to the 'Kulaks and the reactionary mu lahs of the Baksan district', some of whon were alleged to have been in contact with 'th centres of militant Moslem reaction abroad'.[2 Another rising took place in the Adzhar Auto nomous Soviet Republic in April 1929. Th Moslems of Adzharistan, which lies on th Soviet-Turkish border, were exasperated b Soviet anti-religious policy and attacks o Islamic customs. This led to guerrilla fightin which had to be put down by Russia troops.[21] Much fiercer still was the Mosle opposition in Chechnia. Various anti-com munist Imams made their appearance and pro claimed a Holy War against the enemies o Allah. The last religious rising of this kin recorded in the Soviet press was that of Iman Saadtsev, whose base was in the *aul* (mountai village) of Cheberda. The authorities seize and imprisoned the Imam and his principa associate, but the hillmen refused to believe tha a man who held his commission from Alla could be taken away so easily. So the rumou spread that he had evaporated. Thereupon th authorities took several hundred hillmen to th town of Grozny to see that the Imam really wa

[16] *Ugolovnyi Kodeks Uzbekskoi SSR* (Penal Code of the Uzbek SSR), Tashkent, 1954, p. 66, p. 28.
[17] *Antireligioznik*, 1932, 9, p. 35.
[18] *Ibid.*, 1929, 4, p. 63.
[19] *Bezbozhnik*, 12 May 1929.
[20] *Istoriya Kabardy* (History of Kabarda), Moscow 1957, p. 243.
[21] *The Times*, 11 April, 14 May 1929.

in their power. He was tried and sentenced to death.[22]

In Central Asia the act of Moslem resistance which the communists still denounced three decades after it had happened was the violent death of the communist leader Hakim Zade (1889–1929), who became the first and principal martyr of atheism in Russia's Moslem territories. In August 1928 he was sent by the party to stamp out religion in a picturesque Uzbek village high up in the mountains, which was then called Shah-i-Mardan. According to a popular legend the Moslem saint buried in the village is none other than Calif Ali.[23] Hakim Zade, the rare type of communist fanatic who had severed every tie with Islam, went out to transform the holy place of Shah-i-Mardan into a bulwark of atheism. He campaigned for the closing of the local mosque and the stopping of all pilgrimage to the village. To provoke devout Moslems even more he had a monument to Lenin erected in the very centre of Shah-i-Mardan. In March 1929, Hakim Zade was killed by 'mullahs and sheikhs' who literally tore him to pieces.[24] As many as fifty-four people were put on trial for being implicated in the murder of Hakim Zade, whose fame as a Soviet hero has increased with the passing of the years. Shah-i-Mardan, the scene both of his atheist outbursts and of his assassination, was renamed Hamzabad, Hamza being the literary pseudonym under which he became famous. His reputation as a writer and poet is largely posthumous: in his lifetime he was primarily known as a schoolteacher. The strongly anti-religious bias of his work makes him the first atheist writer of Soviet Central Asia.

MUCH of the Moslem resistance to communist atheism was a reaction to the campaign, which started in the spring of 1927 and became known as 'Hudjum' or 'attack', for the emancipation of Moslem women, and which developed largely into a campaign for the discarding of the veil. The question of the veil was not equally important in all Moslem territories of the Soviet Union but it had quite exceptional significance for Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Transcaucasia.

In 1927 the eighth of March, International Women's Day in the communist calendar, marked the actual beginning of the Hudjum. Big women's meetings were organised at which a large number of Moslem women took off their veils, which were then solemnly burnt. For a moment, but only for a moment, it seemed as if the campaign was eminently successful. In Uzbekistan alone, as many as 100,000 women renounced the veil—but most of them did so for a single day only. Once the celebration of International Women's Day was over, all but 5,000 of them resumed the veil. The whole action provoked fanatical opposition among the Moslem population. Fourteen Uzbek women pioneers of the communist-directed emancipation drive were killed. Others were attacked and raped; there was a widely held opinion that simply equated unveiled women with prostitutes.[26]

On 8 March 1928 the performance of the preceding year was repeated on an even larger scale. Again there were big women's demonstrations and unveiling meetings. But the violence of the popular reaction was even greater; the number of officially registered anti-feminist murders in Uzbekistan in 1928 exceeded 200, and forty-five death sentences were imposed for terrorist attacks on women.[27] The victims were, in the main, women who had accepted posts in village councils and so had identified themselves with the regime which had challenged conservative religious feelings. They included not only women, but also a few men who had approved the unveiling of their womenfolk. How general the resistance to the unveiling was may be gathered from the fact that in 1928 an unveiled woman communist was still unable to walk unmolested across the Registan, the famous central square of Samarkand, then the capital of the Uzbek Soviet Republic. The Moslem militiamen not only did not protect

[22] *Bezbozhnik*, 15 October 1930.

[23] According to Shiite Moslem tradition Ali was buried in Najaf, south of Baghdad. Najaf has therefor become one of the great Holy Places of Shiah Islam, if not the greatest. Cf. D. M. Donaldson, *The Shiite Religion* (London, 1933), p. 64.

[24] *Bezbozhnik*, 28 April 1929.

[26] Fannina W. Halle, *Frauen des Ostens* (Zürich, 1938), p. 150-152.

[27] *Istoricheskie Zapiski*, No. 48 (1954), p. 189.

the women but even encouraged the crowds in their hostility to 'the unbelieving she-dogs'.[28] One can well imagine the situation in small Moslem townships, not to speak of the remoter villages, if this happened in the capital city.

Again there came an eighth of March, International Women's Day, with new unveiling ceremonies which were soon to demand new victims. In the first half of 1929 the number of anti-feminist murders soared to 169 in Uzbekistan alone.[29] It almost looked as if the initiators of the Hudjum derived a kind of perverse satisfaction from the large number of casualties which the unveiling of the women provoked. The victims were useful to the government and the party, because they provided them with ammunition against the religious Moslem opposition. At the Second Congress of the League of Militant Atheists in 1929 these unfortunates were listed among the 'many fighters of the anti-religious front' who had 'fallen in battle'.[30]

In official Soviet accounts it was the mullahs who inspired or instigated the assassinations, and the accusation may well be true, though only in an indirect sense. To take off the veil was a deliberate affront to religion, but in those parts of Moslem Russia, such as Bashkiria and Tataria, where the wearing of the veil was not customary, the mullahs acted much more shrewdly. Far from opposing emancipation, they proclaimed that it would come not from the Soviet power but from Islam itself.[31] In practice a great deal was done to show that this was not an empty claim. The Moslem Central Administration in Ufa co-opted a woman member. Throughout Tataria and Bashkiria women were admitted into mosques, and special women's meetings were organised either in the homes of mullahs or in the mosques themselves.

THROUGHOUT the Hudjum the organisers of the emancipation campaign were handicapped by the unco-operative attitude of a section of the Communist Party and Communist Youth League membership. The Central Asian Bureau of the party, the North Caucasian Territorial Committee, and the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Party made it incumbent upon all party members to take off the veils of their wives, their sisters and the other female members of their family. Instead the members often agitated together with the mullahs against the discarding of the veil,[32] and many communists recruited in the Moslem areas failed to support the party with regard to the wider problems of anti-religious propaganda and action also. It was the fault (or, from the point of view of the believers the merit) of the Moslem communists that the League of Militant Atheists in Soviet Russia's Moslem territories remained a farce. Membership figures produced from time to time by branches of the League in Moslem areas could hardly be taken seriously, for they showed tremendous and quite inexplicable fluctuations from one year to the next. A sensational membership boom was often followed by a disastrous decline or by a statement that the branch in question had altogether ceased to exist. In Azerbaijan, for instance, League membership increased from 3,000 in 1930 to 70,000 in 1931; at the beginning of 1936 the League had virtually closed down, but at the end of the same year it boasted 15,000 members, and by the end of 1938 membership had gone up to 85,000.[33] In Daghestan, the country par excellence of Moslem fanaticism, the League claimed 49,000 members in 1931, over 5 per cent of the population, whilst it was admitted six years later that membership was below 1,000.[34] These ups and downs are hard to explain, but it seems fair to assume that its members, and even the native Moslem Soviet officials, were not fully aware of the League's real significance and programme. Indeed, in 1929 the Commissariat of the Interior of the Daghestan Autonomous Soviet Republic made an official enquiry as to whether the League was a religious or a scientific organisation.[35]

Moscow, and in particular the police and security services of the NKVD, probably had

[28] *Bezbozhnik*, 6 January 1929.
[29] T. N. Kary-Niyasov, *Ocherki Istorii Kultury Sovetskovo Uzbekistana* (Essays on the History of the Culture of Soviet Uzbekistan), Moscow, 1955, p. 159.
[30] *Pravda*, 12 June 1929.
[31] *Kommunisticheskoe Prosveshchenie*, 1927, 4, p. 76.
[32] *Bezbozhnik*, 3 February 1929.
[33] *Antireligioznik*, 1931, 8, p. 101; 1936, 6, p. 3; 1938, 12, p. 56.
[34] *Caucasian Review* (Munich), 1958, 7, p. 48.
[35] *Bezbozhnik*, 10 October 1929.

an even poorer opinion of the local Moslem communists than they deserved. By the second half of the thirties quite a number of native communist officials in Central Asia and Transcaucasia had not only severed every external connection with Islam, but in all probability had broken away from Moslem religion altogether. The NKVD, however, always suspicious, did not entirely believe in the sincerity of these conversions. It considered that the continued existence of religious life in the Moslem territories was due to the connivance of government and party officials of Moslem origin who took mullahs and sheikhs under their protection and secretly favoured the survival of religious superstitions which they publicly condemned. In the end, practically all the prominent leaders of the Soviet Moslems, including the Prime Ministers of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Bashkiria, and the Party Secretary of Daghestan were accused of serving foreign intelligence services, and moreover of working hand in glove with mullahs and ex-mullahs. They were charged with having appointed these religious men to leading posts, sabotaging the work of the League of Militant Atheists, and building and repairing mosques out of official funds.[36] Some of these charges bore not the remotest relation to reality, but they indicated the anger with which the Kremlin regarded the unsettled situation in the Moslem areas and the survival of Islam. Scapegoats were called for, and the police found them in vast numbers. Throughout 1937 and into 1938 the NKVD discovered one nationalist-clerical conspiracy after another and the alleged conspirators disappeared for ever, notwithstanding the high posts they occupied.

The purge of 1937-38 not only served to eliminate those communist leaders who had shown themselves too lenient in the fight against the Moslem religion, but was also directed against certain officials who had gone too far in the anti-religious struggle and so helped to discredit it. This was one of the crimes imputed to Akmal Ikramov, the First Party Secretary of Uzbekistan. He and his associates were accused of offending the toiling Moslems by their atheist extremism, particularly by resorting to administrative measures when fighting against the veil.[37] Nearly twenty years after his execution, which took place in March 1938, Ikramov was rehabilitated; if he was ever over-zealous in his anti-religious campaign, this is now posthumously condoned. Nevertheless, it is significant that the regime found it necessary to pin the excesses of the anti-veil campaign on Ikramov, for this alone would show that ten years after the launching of the Hudjum its success still remained in doubt.

On this point there is a good deal of evidence, going right up to the Second World War, from Soviet sources. Whenever in 1937, 1938, and even 1939, the League of Militant Atheists or the Communist Party examined the situation in the Moslem areas, especially in Soviet Central Asia, it found that the emancipation of women had suffered setbacks or was entirely fictitious. Even the Moslem women working in the largest industrial undertakings of Central Asia could not be considered emancipated. The 2,000 Tajik and Uzbek girls in the Leninabad silk combine nearly all wore the veil.[38] In the Tashkent textile plant things were little better. There the women workers took off the veil in the factory itself but put it on again when returning home.[39] Complaints that husbands forced their wives to wear the veil never ceased, and attacks on women who had discarded the veil continued to be reported from Uzbekistan, Turkmenia and especially Tajikistan, where ten emancipated women were killed in 1939, including the woman activist Rafieva, murdered in Stalinabad by her own husband.[40]

THE purge of 1937–38, as far as it affected the Moslem problem, was directed not only against communists whose attitude towards religion was too mild or too extremist, but also against many members of the Islamic clergy. Humble mullahs in the Moslem villages of Daghestan, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan were as savagely victimised as the sheikhs and

[36] Boris Kandidov, *Tserkov i Shpionazh* (Church and Espionage), Moscow, 1938, pp. 94–96.

[37] *Antireligioznik*, 1938, 12, p. 14.
[38] *Pravda*, 15 September 1937.
[39] *Antireligioznik*, 1938, 12, p. 15.
[40] *Ibid.*, 1939, 12, p. 31.

imams who occupied leading positions in the Moslem ecclesiastical administration. The mullahs were charged with sabotage of Soviet agriculture, instigating anti-feminist murders, and joining anti-Soviet bands. The higher Moslem leaders were denounced for much more hideous crimes, such as collecting secret information for the Japanese and German intelligence services, preparing terrorist and diversionist acts, infiltrating the defence industry for the purpose of sabotage, and collusion with the communist inner-party opposition.[41] These and similar accusations were made against Mufti Tardshimanov, the head of the Moslem ecclesiastical administration, which had its headquarters in Ufa, as well as against the Moslem religious leaders of Azerbaijan and the Northern Caucasus.

The communists probably over-rated the significance of the persecution of the Moslem clergy as much as they had over-estimated the lasting impact of the closing of the mosques. They are naturally inclined to measure the strength of an opponent by the 'cadres' at his disposal and the institutions over which he holds power. A few shrewder Soviet observers, mostly ethnographers familiar with Islamic society, had given a timely warning that the hold of religion on a Moslem country could not be measured in terms of numbers of mosques and mullahs.[42] By the beginning of the Second World War the Soviet authorities were perhaps able to manipulate the younger generation in the Moslem territories more easily than before, but the middle-aged and older people for the most part still remained under religious influence and observed religious holy days and fasts. Islam survived in many ways, tangible and intangible. Traditional places of pilgrimage in the open air replaced the mosques, and ordinary farmers and craftsmen were venerated as 'religious elders' and took the place of mullahs. As religious life could find no normal outlet, devout Moslems became more and more interested in miraculous visions and apparitions.

The League of Militant Atheists has always been much less well informed about religious life in the Moslem territories than about the situation in the Christian territories of Russ but occasionally it has made disclosures wh showed how strong religious Islam was in v tually every part of Moslem Russia. Fr Tataria there came news that religious inf ences were very much alive among the 'ba ward sections of the population,' whether M lem or Christian,[43] and from Kazakhstan was reported that there was underground a tation for the reopening of mosques.[44] Kirg zia in 1938 had as many as 106 mosques, addition to 43 churches and 102 sectari houses of prayer, and even in places witho mosques or churches there were still groups faithful.[45]

From the remoter parts of Moslem Rus there came strange tales bearing witness to failure of anti-religious propaganda and co munist indoctrination efforts. In the Pam mountains, there was widespread unrest 1939-40 because the local Ismailite Mosle believed that the Aga Khan, their leader, h appeared among them, and one young m even claimed that the Aga Khan, the 'Livi God,' as he is also called, had appointed h his deputy.[46] An anti-religious conference h in Khorog, the Pamir capital, in 1940, look into this matter, and came to the conclusi that the autonomous Pamir province contain 'hundreds of holy places, mosques and shri visited by both young and old.'[47]

The lowlands of the Tajik Soviet Repub which includes the Pamir province, a showed great religious fervour right up to beginning of the war. Bobozhdan Gafur Secretary for Agitation and Propaganda of Communist Party of Tajikistan, revealed 1938 that in one small district of the Ta Republic, that of Ura Tyube, as many as fi mosques had been counted; of these o twenty-nine were registered with the autho ties, whilst twenty-one were illegal.[48] H many such illegal mosques must there ha been in all the forty-nine districts of Taji stan, throughout Soviet Central Asia, a

[41] *Ibid.*, 1938, 8-9, p. 66.
[42] *Sovetskaya Etnografiya*, 1932, 5-6, p. 190.
[43] *Pravda*, 19 July 1940.
[44] *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, 17 May 1940.
[45] *Antireligioznik*, 1938, 7, p. 23.
[46] *Ibid.*, 1939, 12, p. 31.
[47] *Kommunist Tajikistana*, 22 October 1940.
[48] *Antireligioznik*, 1938, 12, p. 32.

roughout all the Moslem territories of the oviet Union?

In 1942, when it was in the Soviet govern-ent's interest to give a favourable picture of ie religious situation in the USSR, it was ated that there were only 1,312 mosques in ie whole territory of the USSR.[49] This was ss than half the number of mosques before 927 in the small territory of Bashkiria alone. his figure of 1,312 mosques in all likelihood ferred to officially registered mosques only. he figure, given in the same year, of 8,872 for ie number of mullahs, sheikhs, and other loslem religious dignitaries in the USSR, was so far too low, since there were 9,000 clergy Bashkiria alone before the religious persecu-on of the twenties, whilst the clergy of aghestan numbered 40,000.[50] But again the oviet government was in no position to pro-ice any reliable data, for it could speak only those of the clergy who were officially regis-red, not of the *de facto* and clandestine clergy. It knew little, for instance, of the *seyyids*, who ist all over the Moslem world. They are a ass of people who consider themselves to be scendants of the prophet and who are there-re held in especial honour. The ordinary oslem regards them with awe and values eir advice and their services as peacemakers. fter their death they are frequently venerated saints.[51] Seyyids usually live together in llages. Such seyyid villages still existed in e thirties in Soviet Azerbaijan, and this fact ompted an anti-religious writer to say that t the mullahs, but the seyyids were the curse the country.[52] The mullahs, being class-en elements, could easily be outlawed, dis-nchised, and supervised. Against the seyyids, o lived the lives of ordinary peasants, the regime was more or less powerless. The autho-rities resented, in particular, their habit of mov-ing about the country; they even had the temerity to appear in the proletarian city, Baku, itself. Nobody in Soviet Russia, whether chief mufti or police chief, could have said even approximately how many seyyids and other clandestine Moslem clergy there were in the country at any given moment.

The attempt to estimate the strength of the Moslem religious front is also hampered by the strange Shiah Moslem principle of *takiya*, namely, the obligatory concealment of religi-ous opinions to escape harm, even at the price of assenting to improper words and actions. Whatever the moral objections to *takiya*, it is certainly a useful weapon in dealing with a hostile secular power and it may have served Moslem believers well under the Soviet regime.

Realising the strength of religious survivals in Russia's Moslem areas, the League of Mili-tant Atheists, in the months before the German invasion, made unprecedented efforts to in-tensify its work among the Islamic population. New branches of the League were founded wherever possible. In Uzbekistan, as many as 100,000 new members were recruited within two years,[53] and in Tataria membership went up from 26,000 in 1938 to 45,000 in 1940.[54] An anti-religious museum was opened in Tash-kent 'containing interesting material on the reactionary role of the Moslem priesthood in Central Asia and their slavish subservience to the Tsarist colonisers.'[55] This new anti-Mos-lem offensive might have gone to great lengths had not the Nazi invasion of 22 June 1941 forced the Soviet government to put a stop to all anti-religious propaganda.

(This essay is a slightly shortened version of a chapter in Mr. Kolarz's book *Religion in the Soviet Union*, to be published by Macmillan (London) and St. Martin's Press (New York) in the spring of 1961. It will be concluded in our next issue.)

[49] *Soviet War News*, 16 May 1942.
[50] Klimovich, *Sotsialisticheskoe stroitelstvo na itoke i religiya*, p. 57.
[51] Samuel M. Zwemer, *Heirs of the Prophet* (Chi-go, 1946), p. 112.
[52] *Sovetskaya Etnografiya*, 5-6, p. 190.
[53] *Pravda Vostoka*, 16 February 1941.
[54] *Pravda*, 19 July 1940.
[55] *Ibid.*, 22 March 1941.

LITERATURE IN THE CAUCASUS

The Thaw and After

Armand Gaspa

THE thaw which took place in the cultural life of the USSR after Stalin's death has been very thoroughly investigated in its manifestations in Russian literature. This is perfectly natural. However, manifestations were also apparent in the non-Russian republics, particularly in the Ukraine, in the Baltic countries, and in Caucasia, but in these cases the phenomenon is much less well known. We propose to deal only with the results of the thaw in the Caucasian republics.

As in other non-Russian republics the thaw in Caucasia was mainly characterised by certain concessions in favour of local patriotism, notably by the rehabilitation of writers either deported or executed for 'bourgeois nationalism' during the great purge of the thirties. The liberalisation following Stalin's death opened channels to a freer development in national cultures and languages, and through these channels they found the opportunity to assert their particular values as against Moscow. But the drying up of the USSR thaw, starting from 1957, shows itself by a return to the past. The primacy of Russian was restored and there was a gradual return to the old approach, in which the affairs of non-Russian nations are treated from the Russian point of view.

Armenia

It is in Armenia that the most numerous and interesting manifestations of the Caucasian thaw are to be found. Although the smallest of the Soviet federal republics, it has an abundant literary output, the result in part of a very brilliant literary tradition, and in part the reflection of a diaspora throughout the world of nearly one-and-a-half million Armenians.

The thaw started with a certain number of rehabilitations. A heavy price was exacted from the Armenian writers in the purge of 1936–38. The main victim was Elysée Charentz, a talented revolutionary poet and member of the Communist Party who was convicted on a charge of nationalist deviati and executed in 1937 at the age of forty. I poetry is a happy medium between that o Maiakovski and that of an Omar Khayyan a synthesis giving a good picture of Arme where the cultural influences of Russia a Persia cross.

Some time before his arrest Charentz h written a poem called 'Message', a wo practically devoid of any literary value a which, to top all, contained no message wh soever. But one day it was discovered tha one read vertically the second letter of ea verse one obtained a significant senten People of Armenia, your salvation lies in union of your own forces.

Amongst the other well-known victims the great purge one can mention Ak Bakuntz, who started his literary career un the Soviet system, Norentz, Totoventz, Ala and Gourgen Mahari. These writers w accused of reactionary nationalist-bourge and counter-revolutionary tendencies. T had attached too much importance to th national traditions, to their history and the church; instead of insisting on the build up of socialism they saw the development Soviet Armenia as a patriotic adventure c tred on the preservation of the national pa mony and the settlement of refugees from V Sassun, and other Turkish regions in ancient Armenian countries of Transcauca

Only two authors survived the great pur Alazan and Gourgen Mahari. They were re bilitated in 1954 in a speech by Mikoyan Erevan. They returned from exile and stan again publishing their works, but, no do because of their age and the sufferings t must have endured, these works never reac their earlier quality. The former workn Alazan, whose writing career began under Soviet system, did, however, produce a n novel entitled *The Northern Star*, in which describes his experiences in Siberia and a working-class life in an Armenian town.

The dead writers have also been more or ss completely rehabilitated. Their works have een republished in Armenian and also trans- ted into Russian. Praise has been heaped pon them in literary publications; neverthe- ss, the circumstances of their disappearance ere very discreetly treated in 1956. The rmenian Writers Union appointed a commit- e to probe into the fate of Aksel Bakuntz nd other victims of the purge. The report nderlined the injustice, not only of their phy- cal annihilation, but also of the suppression f their works, which were so completely ban- hed that all mention of these authors was rictly forbidden in anthologies and school xtbooks. This state of affairs was changed, hanks to the thaw. Furthermore, the works of me authors have been reconsidered by the itics. Instead of being classed as a 'decadent' mbolist, Elysée Charentz has now been assed as a revolutionary symbolist. Even the e-revolutionary writers have benefited from is new approach. Thus Rafael Patkanian sses now as a realist writer, whereas before was classed as 'romantic' and 'idealist', jorative adjectives in the communist critic's cabulary.

One of the best examples of the change due the thaw in all that concerns Armenian erature is to be found in the Russian literary itic Valeri Kirpotin. In 1937 he declared: he role of Bakuntz, Alazan and others in erature was that of saboteurs, counter-revo- tionists, trotskyists . . .' But in 1956 the me Kirpotin wrote in the Moscow *Litera- rnaya Gazeta*: 'Axel Bakuntz is not well ough known by the Soviet public. This is a nial of justice because during his brief life produced some excellent works which con- tute some of the most beautiful pages of ntemporary Armenian literature.'

Thanks to the thaw some themes dear to the triotic Armenian were able to be treated in way that would never have been accepted ile Stalin lived. The atmosphere of Armen- n cultural life in 1955–56 was somewhat ilar to the one at the beginning of the viet regime, when the authorities were toler- t enough to authors like Avetik Issahakian, irvanzade, Hovhanes, Tumanian, for their siderable talents to flourish. Derenik Demirdjian, one of the first Armenian communist writers, and one of the most extreme in glorifying Stalin, wrote a few years ago, shortly before his death, a fervent work on the national and religious hero of Armenia, Vartan Mamikonian, who fought against heathen Persia at the beginning of the Christian era. The medieval epic, *David de Sassun*, suppressed for some time, is back again in the limelight. It is a very original work, the only one in addition to the Finnish *Kalevala*, which has been orally transmitted as a *chanson de geste* since the Middle Ages right up to today. The state publication house at Erevan has also published, since Stalin's death, about a dozen works by a famous nationalist writer of the end of the last century who had always been on the index. This writer was Raffi, whose numerous novels exalted the patriotism and the revolutionary ardour of Armenian youth rebelling against the powers which were holding the country under their domination.

Another consequence of the thaw was the resumption, or the expansion, of cultural exchanges with the Armenian diaspora, even the anti-communists amongst them. These exchanges had diminished considerably towards the end of the Stalin era, but expanded again with the republication in Soviet Armenia of works formerly on the index.

However, the thaw in Armenian literature was reflected not only in historical themes, but also in the daring treatment of some new themes borrowed from a Soviet reality up to then ignored. *The Return*, by G. Keshishian, tells of the moral sufferings of a soldier of the Red Army returning from a prisoner-of-war camp and considered almost as a traitor or a deserter. *Comrade Kerasin*, by S. Khanzadian, shows up the vulgarity and the arbitrary conduct of a kolkhoz director. *Mai*, by Z. Daryan, and *Ashken Satyan*, by M. Aslanian, draw for us the picture of a certain loose and wild Armenian *jeunesse*, devoid of ideals or morals. These works were severely criticised for their morbid and decadent tendencies and their indirect apologia for sexual licence. The export of Aslanian's novel was forbidden.

Two poems by Kevork Emin, one of the best contemporary Armenian writers, are among the most interesting and daring

productions of the liberalisation period following Stalin's death. One of these poems, called 'Silence is Golden', refers to the silence observed over Stalin's crimes, and to the fraud and the lies which weighed on the heart and the mind in the USSR at that time. The other poem is called 'Conversation with a Pharisee'. The Pharisee incarnates the Communist Party representative against whom the poet draws up an indictment which is somewhat similar, at least in its vigour, to the famous 'Poem for Adults' by Adam Wazyk. Kevork Emin wrote that at last the horn of truth had sounded '. . . now that our country is trying to wash away the filth of the past'.

These two poems were subject to some criticisms in 1957. However, at the Armenian writers' congress held that year Kevork Emin continued to show himself a rebel. He attacked the 'demagogic and nihilistic' critics who understood nothing about national literature and systematically distorted the party's decisions. If he accepted the criticism of 'Silence is Golden' he rejected the attacks on 'Conversation with a Pharisee'. But while continuing to speak openly Kevork Emin, who is a communist, still glorified the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution and also the launching of the Sputnik.

Another rebellious work published in 1957 in Soviet Armenia, called *The Fable of the Eternal Candles*, is by an author, Khugasian, who is not very well known. It is perhaps the most daring attack against dictatorship ever brought out in the USSR. The main character is a tyrannical sovereign who thinks he can rule over the whole universe and direct all the arts. He even considers himself a poet and writes verses while his hands are covered with blood. One day he learns that some satirical poems have been sung against him. The entire police force is put into action to find the author, who is at last discovered. He is a young man and the only person in all the kingdom who dares to light a candle at night when the king imposes absolute darkness. Instead of having the rebel executed, the tyrant decides to grant him his life on condition that he sings the praises of his reign for posterity. Three years later the young man comes before the king with a series of volumes. The tyrant proclaims the day a national ho day and his Grand Vizir distinguishes hims by getting drunk. But when the king begins examine the young poet's work he sees t the first page of the first volume portrays huge and hideous face watching a scene torture. The following pages are all painted black. The second volume contains all songs of hope of the people against tyranny. Furious, the king has the poet's han cut off and has him thrown into a di into which he also throws, derisively, so paper and a pencil. And then, miraculou the poet's hands grow again and his fing become luminous. Night after night his ha cross the kingdom distributing his songs hope, right up to the day when the peop tired of the tyranny, rise up against the bloo monarch and his alcoholic Vizir.

At the moment when this work appeared 1957, a reaction had already begun against thaw. Even in 1955 the poet Maro Marcar had been criticised because of the too natio list tone of her poems, and Kevork Emin h also been attacked as a rebel. At the plen session of the Armenian writers union held 1958, severe warnings were addressed on subject of deviations, particularly the natio list deviation, revealed in the young wri whose works too often express nostalgia the past. Tigran Bakour, for example, reprimanded by the official censors for hav evoked with too much delight the picture the ruins of Ani, ancient capital of Armen kings, the countryside of Mount Ararat, the past of Van, instead of interesting him in the modern monuments of Erevan and contemporary life. Rebukes were also addr sed to Armenian writers repatriated after last world war who often evoke with nosta their childhood country.

At the fourth Armenian writers' cong held in January 1959 the authorities' efforts restrict the results of the thaw received t sanction. The Secretary of the Association S. Topchian, came out strongly against th who showed an 'unconsidered enthusiasm the valueless works of the past, which l inevitably to a nationalist sentiment comple alien to Soviet patriotism'. He criticised particular the review of the associat

ovetakan Graganutyun, because of an 'anti-ientific and vicious' article on national haracter in literature. This reversion to the ist was also manifested in the Communist urty's attack on the tendency in some intel-ctual circles to purify the Armenian lan-iage of words of Russian origin. An Arme-an-Russian dictionary of recent date was iticised for excessive 'Armenianisation', and ussian has again attained primacy in the hools.

Since 1957, in the 7th to the 10th classes, ussian is taught for one hour more than the tional language.

zerbaijan

was in relation to the language question that e thaw was most sharply manifested in the oslem Soviet republic of Azerbaijan. In 56, two Azerbaijani deputies to the Supreme viet questioned the validity of the Russifica-n policy pursued by Stalin and furthered by riya and Bagirov. Shortly after, by a decree 21 August 1956, the constitution of the public was amended to make Turk-Azari the icial language, Russian thereby losing its imacy. Previously, Russian had been so im-rtant in the administrative services that ne officials had refused to handle documents awn up in the language of the people who med the vast majority of the population Azerbaijan; even inter-municipal corres-ndence had sometimes been conducted in ussian. To crown it all, the department ncerned with Turki affairs at one time had t a single Turki on its staff.

The leading position at last granted to the tional language of Azerbaijan, thirty-seven rs after the establishment of the Soviet ime which had claimed to liberate the ntry from Russian colonialism, was of brief ration. In June 1959 the central committee the Azerbaijan CP and the Azerbaijan uncil of Ministers adopted a joint resolution improving the teaching of the Turki and ssian languages; it consisted of ten para-phs, of which nine dealt with the teaching Russian; the tenth paragraph instructed the nister of Education to ensure that Turki s taught in the Russian schools of the ublic wherever the pupils or their parents desired that it should be. To balance this, the second paragraph instructed the same Minister to do everything necessary to effect 'a substantial improvement' in the teaching of Russian in all schools, in view of the importance of that language in consolidating friendship among the Soviet peoples and as a means of communication between them.

In the later months of 1959 important changes were made in the Azerbaijan party apparatus. Mustafaev, first secretary of the central committee, fell into disgrace, and one month later Djafarli, a central committee secretary, followed him. They were charged with ideological errors, in particular with regard to education in a spirit of internationalism, to the use of the national language, and to the choice of cadres. What they had in fact done was to show some preference for the indigenous people and so lay themselves open to the charge of nationalist deviation.

In Azerbaijan, too, the literary thaw was reflected in rehabilitations. As in the other Caucasian republics, the great purge hit a large number of Azeri intellectuals, including the writers Hussein Djavid, Ahmed Djavat, Yussuf Vezir and Ruhullah Akhundov; all were either shot or died in exile. Of these the poet and dramatist Hussein Djavid was the best known. Like most of the other victims of the purge, he had been accused of being an agent of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism, cultural and political movements which aimed at strengthening the solidarity of the peoples of Turkish or Turanian origin in Anatolia and Transcaspia. In 1956 his finest play, *Sheikh San'an,* was produced once more in the Baku theatre. The critics paid tribute to his talent, his sense of justice and the purity of his mind, deploring his fate as a victim of 'the cult of personality'. Two other plays of his, however —*Tamerlane* and *The Prophet*—are still not mentioned and appear to be still on the index.

In 1957 it was announced that the Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences had acquired the manuscripts and early editions of Hussein Djavid, Ahmed Djavat and Yussuf Vezir. Vezir had been diplomatic representative in Turkey when Azerbaijan was an independent republic after the First World War. He returned in 1925 to continue his writing and his research

into the local folklore, and published a good deal of work, approved by the Soviet censor, up to his arrest in 1937.

Luckier than his colleagues, the poet and dramatist Samed Vurgun escaped the purge. In 1937, as secretary of the Azerbaijan writers' union, he was severely reprimanded for lack of vigilance towards the agents of fascist imperialism, followers of Pan-Turkism, and bourgeois nationalists. He managed to put himself straight in good time, and this brilliant writer, Maiakovski's local counterpart, retained a certain popularity up to his death in 1956. He fought during the Second World War and sang the praises of the Soviet army, a service which earned him the title of People's Poet.

The festivities attending the fourth centenary of the birth of Fizuli, one of the greatest of Turkish poets, may also be regarded as a manifestation of the thaw. Fizuli, though born in Baghdad, wrote in Turk-Azeri and spent his working life and made his name in Azerbaijan. During the celebrations delegations of men of letters came to Baku from Turkey, Iraq and Persia.

Rehabilitation was also bestowed on an important medieval work, the epic of *Dede Korkut*. This relates the feats of a local legendary saint, the Imam Korkut, and is held in high honour by the Azerbaijani, the Turkmen and the Bashkirs. In the *Soviet Encyclopedia* it is compared to the *Chanson de Roland* and the *Chronicle of Igor*. It was put on the index in 1950, when the authorities discovered that the epic contained dangerous reactionary and Pan-Turki ideas and encouraged Moslem religious fanaticism. In 1957 this interpretation was revised, but the work continues to be somewhat suspect.

Since 1957, the wave of liberalisation has been ebbing in literature as in language. At the third congress of Azerbaijan writers in December 1958, warnings were issued against deviations of every kind, and the Communist Party spokesmen launched an attack on religious prejudices and nationalist or idealist aberrations.

Georgia

Georgia appears to have been less affected by the thaw than any other part of the Caucasus. The home country of Stalin and Beriya h always been something special in the USS It may be that, fearing that the national wave would grow too powerful once the floo gates of liberalisation were opened, the auth rities deliberately damped down the thaw that republic. However that may be, Georg offers very few examples of its operation.

The chief one was the posthumous rehabi tation of the writer Michel Djavakhishv executed in 1936 on charges of having ide lised the past, of morbid romanticism, and presenting a false picture of the revolutiona reality. His offence, in fact, was to have pu lished a novel, *Khizany Djako*. Djako, in wh some readers discerned a satire on Stalin, an uneducated, cruel and cynical bolshev under whom injustice and anarchy reign. Af Stalin's death, the state publishing house Tiflis began to republish this author's writin in fairly large editions; their success among t public appears to have been so great that t authorities cut down the size of subseque editions. Another writer whose works benefit from the thaw is the poet Tistian Tabidze, a a victim of the terror in the thirties beca of the romantic and patriotic character of verse.

Among the living, Konstantin Gamsakhur profited from the liberalisation of intellect life after Stalin's death to round on some the less attractive features of Soviet reality. his last novel, *Vasis Kvalidba*, he satirises th writers who set out to gratify the powers t be. Gamsakhurdia's non-conformism already brought him into pretty severe con with the authorities. Criticised as an idea and a mystic, he was deported in the thir to Solovki; he returned in 1939, having unc taken to mend his ways, but, even after course of socialist-realist treatment, he fa to satisfy his examiners. His works includ trilogy on David the Restorer, King of Ge gia, and a novel set in medieval times, *Right Hand of the Great Master*. In 1951 was severely reprimanded for his tendency idealise the past and to use archaic term which he could scarcely have avoided since themes were taken from the Middle Ages. main charge, however, was that he failed bring out the bonds uniting Georgia to Ru

to present a sympathetic and helpful ortrait of a Russian.

But even though so limited in scope, the aw in Georgia provoked a negative reaction. ie report given at the meeting of the Geor- an writers' union in January 1957 noted that ere were some writers who had made an correct use of freedom of thought and erary freedom. The official spokesmen rned these rebels that symbolism, futurism, d other decadent tendencies were not going be restored to favour.

orthern Caucasus

would have been difficult to find traces of e thaw among the mountain peoples of the ucasus, who have scarcely produced a litera- re of their own, had it not been for one ent which illustrates in a particularly striking shion the vicissitudes of post-Stalin cultural axation. This is the varying interpretations the role in history of the Imam Shamil, who d the resistance of the mountain peoples of Caucasus to their Russian conquerors in eighteenth century.

In the early years of the Soviet regime, amil was presented as a national hero and religious movement which he inspired, uridism, as a movement of national libera- n against Tsarist colonisation. In the thirties, amil became a dangerous religious fanatic d Muridism a reactionary anti-Russian vement inspired by British imperialism and Sultan of Turkey. At the beginning of the cond World War, when Moscow was trying galvanise the patriotism of the various ples of the Soviet Union, there was a rever- n to the earlier interpretation. In the *story of the USSR* edited by Professor akratova, used as a textbook in high ools, Shamil is described as 'an educated n, an outstanding leader, and a brave war- r. . . . Realising that the tribes of the Moun- neers could not prevail against the Tsarist onisers unless they united, he set about nging them together into a political unity . . . mil's actions were directed not only against rism but also against local feudalism, and a democratic character'. After the war, vever, there was a reversion to anti-Muri- m, and the 1948 edition of Pankratova's book contained, in place of the passage just quoted, the following account: 'The movement led by Shamil was not democratic nor was it a movement of national liberation; it was a reactionary and nationalist movement in the service of English capitalism and the Turkish Sultanate. It was contrary to the interests of the mountain peoples of the Caucasus'.

After Stalin's death, Shamil was once more rehabilitated. This coincided with the restoration of the Caucasian republics dissolved as a collective punishment for the collaboration of part of the population with the Germans during the campaign in Russia. Those Chechen-Ingushes and the Kabardo-Balkars who had survived mass deportation to Central Asia were repatriated, and the cultural rights of which they had been dispossessed were restored, including in particular the right to publish books and newspapers.

In 1956, in *Voprosy Istorii*, Professor A. M. Pikman showed that the resistance of the Caucasian mountain peoples to Tsarism was a genuine movement of national liberation. In January 1956 a conference of readers of that periodical held in Moscow endorsed the Professor's point of view. In October of the same year, the Dagestan Academy of Sciences convened a conference at Makhachkala, the capital, to discuss the question. Professor Pikman's interpretation was vigorously upheld, and a book disparaging Shamil, published by the Georgian Academy of Sciences in 1955, was severely criticised. The Makhachkala conference came to the conclusion that the resistance movement of the Caucasian Mountaineers led by Shamil was an authentic anti-colonialist movement of national liberation, but it had a religious and reactionary base, Muridism, which exacerbated Moslem fanaticism and stirred up hatred against neighbouring Christian peoples.

The conference was followed, a month later, by a conference on the same question at Moscow called by the history section of the USSR Academy of Sciences. More than 500 people from all parts of the Union attended—it was one of the largest semi-public debates of recent years; by and large, the conference upheld Professor Pikman's interpretation.

Early in 1957, the bureau of the Dagestan

Communist Party drew the practical conclusions from the Makhachkala and Moscow conferences and revoked its 1950 resolution condemning Shamil as an agent of imperialism. The Agitprop department was asked to restore to the public libraries the books and other writings about Shamil and his movement, and the Dagestan Minister of Culture was instructed to arrange for the return to the local museums of the documents and other mater illustrating the Shamil story.

No sooner had this been achieved than t thaw began to harden again, in the Caucas as in the rest of the USSR. At the end of 19 the anti-Shamil faction again took the offensi but so far it has not succeeded in provoki a new relapse.

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EAST GERMANY TODAY

Introduction

THE German Democratic Republic, to give it its official name, with its 17.3 million inhabitants, is the fifth largest communist bloc country. It is also, for obvious reasons, the most exposed of these countries to foreign influences. Korea and Indochina are divided, too, but in neither case has the southern, non-communist half an impact comparable to that of West Germany. As a result the rulers of East Germany have found themselves on the defensive in all fields but one, political propaganda. East Germany is the only country in Europe, probably in the whole world, whose population has actually decreased during the last ten years: from 18.3 million (inclusive of East Berlin) in 1950 to 17.8 million in 1955 and to 17.3 million in 1959. In other words, the number of refugees to the West has been greater than the considerable natural increase. 182,000 East Germans fled to the West in 1952, 331,000 in 1953, 184,000 in 1954, 261,000 in 1957, 143,000 in 1959.[1]

These figures are essential for an understanding of the policy of the East German rulers vis-à-vis West Germany, and of the line of the Soviet bloc on the Berlin crisis. East Germany has made considerable economic progress and the standard of living has gone up since the popular rising of June 1953. But standards of living in the Bundesrepublik have risen faster; East Germany has not become the show piece of the Soviet bloc it was intended to be. The targets of the first East German five-year plan have not been fulfilled; it strengthened the East German economy, though the rate of growth was slower than in the West. According to the present seven-year plan (to run until 1965) the per capita consumption of most essential consumer goods and foodstuffs is to exceed that of West Germany by the end of 1961. It was highly doubtful from the very outset whether East Germany could achieve this aim by its own resources, and it now seems certain that even massive Soviet bloc help will not be sufficient to attain this target, proclaimed with much fanfare only two years ago.

Economically, the East German regime is trailing West Germany; politically, too, it feels less secure than any other communist government. In consequence, East German propaganda has been for the last few years, and is now, the shrillest and most aggressive of all Eastern bloc countries. Soviet newspapers or magazines provide their readers with sedate and sophisticated fare in comparison with the often almost hysterical tone of the East Germans; not only the 'Adenauer clique' but West German Social-Democracy (including its left wing) are under permanent and most violent attack from East Berlin. Experiments in peaceful competition and popular frontism are clearly considered inopportune by Mr Ulbricht and his colleagues. Political, and perhaps mainly economic, considerations may induce them to support the Soviet Union in its conflict with China, but in its approach to West Germany, the SED (Socialist Unity Party) clearly prefers a 'Chinese' attitude. Whether such a policy will be much of a success in West Germany is more than doubtful, but it is clearly considered imperative for domestic reasons.

These political and economic facts, complicated still further by the forcible collectivisation of agriculture, provide the background for an appraisal of the *Kulturpolitik* of the East German party leadership. Larger sections of the population than in 1953 may be resigned to the regime but it clearly is not popular.[2] As a result Ulbricht and his colleagues have kept

[1] There has been a smaller movement from West Germany to the East. But the figures mentioned above refer only to refugees from the East who registered in West Berlin. Many did not register but went to West Germany on their own; as a result the total of what is officially known in East Germany as 'Republikflucht' may be even higher. Of those who escaped roughly 50 per cent were under 25 years of age.

[2] It ought to be recalled in this context that in pre-Hitlerite Germany, the communists were the largest political party in Berlin. In the last free elections, in November 1932, they polled 37 per cent of the total in the then German capital.

a very tight control on the intellectuals and the results have been disastrous. The deterioration of cultural standards has been more palpably felt in East Germany than in any other bloc country, for the simple reason that every observer will automatically compare what is produced now in literature, philosophy, and the arts with the general level in these subjects in Germany thirty or fifty years ago. Russia may not have a Pushkin or Tolstoy, but it has at least its Fedins, Leonovs, and Sholokhovs. If Rumania or Bulgaria have not produced writers or thinkers of world renown, it could be argued, after all, that these countries were never really in the forefront of European and world intellectual life. But with Germany it was different, and the decline is therefore all the more shocking. In the first post-war period this abrupt decline was not perhaps so acutely felt; there was a fairly large number of emigrants who had returned and lent the regime some cultural prestige and respectability. By now this layer is gradually disappearing: Brecht and Becher, Friedrich Wolf and Weiskopf are dead, Arnold Zweig and Anna Seghers have not produced a single work in many years that does justice to their reputation. Ernst Bloch retired and in disgrace, Kuczynski has co under sharp attacks, Alfred Meusel, H Mayer, and Leo Stern are still at work, w out however having written much that dese mention. All these men spent their forma years in the Weimar Republic and one lo in vain for those who are to replace them. leading official writers of the younger gen tion, men such as Kuba and Strittmatter, H been doing little more than paraphrasing prose or verse the resolutions of the cen committee; the young philosophers have best, written some not very relevant chap in the *history* of philosophy rather than atte ing their hand in what is there called ' creative application of the Marxist-Len method '. As for the historians and econom the less said the better. At international gresses the East Germans have earned the enviable reputation of the most boorish of Soviet bloc representatives. There are s exceptions, but these are few and far betw and the overall picture is one of al unrelieved gloom.

BETWEEN ODER AND ELBE

Carola St

HERE are some quotations, taken at random from the East German provincial Press:

> When there is a fire to be put out any sensible person raises the alarm, and this is just what we do, on behalf of the workers, when there is a food stortage somewhere. Recently, the Dresden GHG [wholesale trading association] for fruit and vegetables was a target for public criticism. There is a shortage of fruit and vegetables in Dresden, but the local party committee did not take our repeated criticism seriously. No change in the GHG without truly socialist action for a smoothly functioning fruit and vegetable trade!
>
> The wise farmer provides for the future. He knows that the pigs which have to a sty in the first half of the new year be in that sty in the second half of th year. This ancient piece of wisdom has, ever, been sadly neglected in the Perl administrative district. We are short o year's target by nearly 20,000 pigs. It i simply that they have all been slaugh for there is a deficit of over 4,000 quint the state market quota as well. They ar not there. No farmer can swallow tha his honour and the honour of his co-o tive, if not, indeed, the reputation of farmer in Perlsberg district, are at stake
>
> I am interested to read reports i paper of live poultry, supposed to be able now at various stalls in Leipzig.

Saturday I thought I'd get my roast in Dr Kurt Fischer Street. But, alas, at 1.00 p.m. I was still trailing round looking for chicken.

We the undersigned formed ourselves into a socialist producers co-operative. Our goal is to achieve an abundant supply of poultry and eggs. We are striking a blow against the West German militarists by increasing the market production of poultry and eggs, and hope, by more extensive application of intensive methods, to make great progress within the year in the production of eggs and poultry. We call on all Agricultural Production Co-operatives and all poultry farmers in the Dresden district to follow our example and compete with us for the highest production of poultry and eggs.

Party headquarters and the government mit that the plan for agriculture in the first lf of 1960 was not fulfilled. Senior officials round the green table in the SED Political reau, drafting resolutions for 'speeding up e production of pigs' and devising measures r 'breeding Friesian and other cattle'. The wly appointed Supply Commissar, Willi ph, until recently DDR Defence Minister, s summoned the provincial supply commis- rs to East Berlin for discussions on the steps be taken.

Although the economic plan for 1960, con- ry to custom, has not yet been published, d obviously will not be published before the d of the year, the SED newspapers do issue arterly progress reports on the fulfilment or n-fulfilment, as the case may be, of the set get. From these, as well as from refugee ounts and Press reports, it is possible to ce together a fairly accurate picture of the s and downs of the economic scene in East rmany.

A general increase in production in recent rs is not to be denied, but the plan quota certain key items has not been fulfilled. is applies to agriculture, of course, and ecially to the building and chemical indus- s, machine-building, and also to the pro- mme for power output.

Certain items in the plan for agricultural chinery had not achieved even 10 per cent filment by the middle of the year. Spare parts for agricultural machinery are in exceedingly short supply. When cultivation began in the spring, 7,000 tractors could not be repaired for lack of replacement parts. The prospect is no brighter in the building industry, which was already behind schedule in 1959. The SED leaders have to admit that for the present large-scale new building lies beyond their power. Until 1963, other tasks of the building industry, housing included presumably, are to be shelved in favour of extensions and conversions. The supply to farmers of fertilisers, weedkillers, and insecticides, and of mineral salts for animal feeding, likewise fell far behind the plan figures even in 1959. The fulfilment of the 1960 quota is giving the Chairman of the Planning Commission, Bruno Leuschner, cause for 'the utmost concern'. In addition, with production beginning to be affected by the low birthrate of the wartime generation, and with the flight from the DDR, particularly of young people, making itself increasingly felt, the East German economy is suffering from a chronic labour shortage.

The failures in these branches of industry will naturally have their effect on all other sections of the economy. The present seven-year plan, drawn up in conjunction with the other Soviet bloc countries, has been reduced to a worthless scrap of paper through sudden and substantial changes and unrealistic quota figures. Repercussions on other bloc states through non-fulfilment of the export programme—after the USSR the DDR is the strongest industrial power in the bloc—will also make themselves felt.

This situation was only to be expected. With a completely unprepared industry and the firm intention, cost what it might, of breaking the resistance of the peasant-farmers, Ulbricht plunged headlong into his collectivisation adventure in February this year. On the face of it, he had achieved his goal by mid-April. At the end of 1959, 50 per cent of the agricultural land in the zone was still privately farmed; today there exist 19,000 collectives with 931,000 members working 4½ million hectares (over 11 million acres), i.e. 83·5 per cent of the agricultural land. There are no independent farmers left.

Some weeks before this year's spring sowing, under highly unfavourable conditions, as one can imagine, everything depended on the new collective farmers getting down to work the collective farms whole-heartedly and without delay. But for various reasons this was not possible. Coerced peasants, who for generations have been their own masters and made their own decisions, stubborn, pigheaded individualists, some of them, conservative and set in their ways, cannot be transformed overnight. Making robots out of them is a long and painful process, against which they will constantly rebel. Besides, at the time of the spring sowing, work in the village factories was only just at the organisation stage, and this took up most of the working day. Even after having forced them to sign up for the collectives, the party could not just stick a hoe in the farmers' hands and pack brigades of them off to the fields.

The stock brought in had to be inventoried, the chairman and executive committee appointed, the individual brigades formed, the land parcelled out anew; statutes, production and financial plans and all the rest had to be worked out. One wonders how, in this welter of organisation, the peasants ever managed to do any work at all.

WHAT made all this necessary? What induced the SED leader to rush brigades of agitators out into the countryside, where, for three whole months, they descended on the villages like clouds of locusts, rounding up the last desperately resisting peasant-farmers with slogans such as 'War or peace? Those for peace will join the collective'.

There is no doubt that the SED leader, a number of his officials, and Khrushchev, too, believe that in the long run the collectivisation of agriculture will produce higher yields. Experts may contradict, but here ideology is decisive. Furthermore, in the last eight years—the first collectives were formed in 1952—the SED has failed to attract the most efficient and most experienced peasants into the collective farms. This was one of the reasons why the existing collectives had to be heavily subsidised by the state in order to be able to compete in some measure with the private farmers. Wit compulsory recruitment of the best farmers the party leaders obviously expect a significan improvement in the work of the collectives moreover, once collectivisation has been com pleted, state subsidies as part of a recruitin campaign can be discontinued.

An important factor in the collectivisatio of East German agriculture is undoubtedl Ulbricht's personal political ambition. Th GDR, by reason of its relatively high industria capacity and its geographical position, is on of the most important states in the Soviet blo It seems to be the East Berlin party leader ambition to gain a special place among Mo cow's clients for this westernmost outpost the Soviet bloc under his rule, and to turn th land between Elbe and Oder into a model f other People's Democracies. Collectivisation the USSR took place in 1929–30 under cond tions and circumstances totally different; eve the education of the masses in 'socialist co sciousness' and 'socialist morality' in th People's Democracies confronts the par leaders with tasks which cannot be altogeth compared with the ideological indoctrinatio of the more firmly established Soviet societ In this respect the People's Democracies ca learn more from each other, up to a poi than from the Soviet Union. Here Ulbricht se a chance for himself, a chance to consolida further his prestige with Moscow.

Things are not quite working out that w at the moment. The agricultural venture ov shot itself. To avoid aggravating existing di culties, the campaign against the rest of t middle-classes was temporarily halted. Beggi missions, by Ulbricht to Khrushchev in t Crimea, by the Minister for Foreign Trad Rau, to his opposite number in Moscow, a every conceivable manoeuvre have been nec sary to mitigate the economic crisis. Mosc and the West must help. In recent mont Eastern Zone foreign trade officials have c cluded supplementary long-term agreeme with English, Swedish, French, and Belgi steel concerns. Khrushchev and his econo experts may grumble at the East Berlin pa leader's urgent requests for help, but they c not turn them down.

IN their condemnation of revisionism, Ulbricht and the German Stalinists felt lose ties to the Chinese communists. But eking at the moment has only heavy ideologi- al guns to offer—not rubles, not machinery, nd not food. And Peking is far away— erlin and a German peace treaty are matters f second, if not third-rate importance to the ed Mandarins. The Berlin crisis is the work f Ulbricht and Khrushchev, the plans for fur- ier successes or for a withdrawal without loss f face, must be drawn in the strategical sand f the Kremlin and Pankow. Thus, willingly or therwise, the SED Political Bureau dangles rom Khrushchev's coat-tails and, after the romising 'Forward march!' of November 959, must now grit its teeth and swallow hrushchev's 'Company halt!' The over- ealous members in its own ranks, who had oped that after his return from Paris to East erlin the Soviet party leader would sound the harge to march on free Berlin, have had to be estrained.

At the same time it is necessary to convince hrushchev that in the controversy with eking the SED central committee stands rmly on the side of the Soviet party leader. mmediately after the Paris fiasco, the SED entral organ *Neues Deutschland* published a ading article which, while conceding that im- erialism had certainly not become 'a good, umane, peaceful system', that its tendency to ar and violence persisted, nevertheless stated: The refusal of imperialist politicians to cognise the inevitable in no wise alters the ghtness of peaceful coexistence or, therefore, e rightness of the principles of socialist reign policy as pursued by the Soviet Union d the GDR'.

Ulbricht used the same tone at the meeting Soviet bloc Communist Party leaders in ucharest and the same tone colours official DR discussion of imperialism. The party mmittee was astonishingly unequivocal in its ndemnation of the remarks made by the rector of the Chinese pavilion at this year's ricultural show in Leipzig, to the effect that e People's Commune was the supreme ganisational form of collectivisation, and was iversally valid. *Neues Deutschland* wrote: We must object to the attempts that are being made to create the impression that the method of land reform adopted in China, whereby People's Communes are developed out of collectives, is suitable for other countries. One should not get the impression that we in the GDR will change over to People's Communes'.

The Chinese propaganda for People's Communes came at a most inconvenient moment for the SED central committee, just when everything depended on pacifying the antagonised peasants, and winning them over for the work of the collectives; but the ideological controversy between Moscow and Peking over the nature of imperialism is, from East Berlin's point of view, more a conflict between two communist parties with no direct internal political significance for the zone, unlike differences with revisionist movements. To stand by Moscow in this conflict does not mean that Ulbricht has simultaneously to contend with comrades within his own ranks who have ideological affinities with the Chinese. The 'greatest danger' in the SED continues to be revisionism, allegiance to a policy of the 'third way', Social-Democracy.

IN fourteen districts of the GDR the SED held conferences of party district delegates this summer. The speeches of top officials contained repeated complaints about the inadequate ideological consciousness of officials and ordinary party members. Particularly in Leipzig and Dresden, but in other district capitals as well, speakers complained of 'capitulationism', of opposition within the party to the 'too rigorous policy', of 'uncertainty over basic principles of policy among many comrades', and above all of strong Social-Democratic tendencies within the party.

If one compares the moods and political ideas within the SED and among the East German people with the situation three or four years ago, a remarkable change becomes apparent. In the eyes of an East German the struggle against the SED regime is becoming less and less an all-German affair and more and more an internal struggle within the GDR. Long-cherished hopes of German reunification nurtured by declarations from the West which were often rash in the extreme, have given way to weary resignation, to understandably human

feelings of disappointment and embitterment towards the West and the Federal Republic, to the idea of having been ' left in the lurch ' both on 17 June and during the Hungarian revolution, and to attempts to come to terms with the obviously more powerful regime. This might, of course, be changed any day by fresh hopes of reunification. But the first success which the regime has achieved with its ideological-political re-education attempts is a slow, perhaps even unconscious abandonment, by certain sections of the East German people, of the earlier almost unqualified admiration of and faith in the West, even although it cannot be said that this is accompanied by a clearly positive attitude to Ulbricht. These tendencies are encouraged by a kind of ' sputnik ideology '. At the end of the Second World War many people in East Germany, still influenced by Nazi propaganda and also by their personal unpleasant experiences with Russian troops, were inclined to under-estimate the Russians. But from one extreme to the other—today, many people in the Russian zone may be beginning to toy with this new idea: even if we are not communists, perhaps we are on the side of the stronger power; perhaps we have behind us what others may still have before them.

The Eastern zone's anti-Western propaganda seems to be bearing its first fruits with the people—fruits helped to maturity by the West's own primitive efforts over the years at anti-communist propaganda and its glib slogans, by their isolation from Western sources of information, and by the slow—too slow—but nonetheless steady rise in the standard of living in the GDR.

For this reason the *Blitzkrieg* propaganda against the Federal Republic may not be without a measure of success. But it would be a mistake to treat this SED propaganda offensive solely as diversion tactics. It is part and parcel of Soviet policy, which is directed at making Bonn the black sheep of Europe.

The defamation of the Federal Republic in the rest of the world, linked with a skilful foreign trade policy, serves the dual purpose of obtaining ' social ' and, if possible, diplomatic recognition for the GDR. In this field, too, first successes can be reported. There is a continuous flow of visits by English Labour politicians, Finnish Peasant Unionists, American millionaires, and Tunisian and Cuban economic experts to the land between the Elbe and Oder. The Hallstein doctrine still holds good, and, so far, no state outside the Soviet bloc, except Yugoslavia, has granted the desired diplomatic recognition to the GDR, but East Berlin's ' Two State Theory ' is gaining more and more ground *de facto* if not *de jure*. In the past five months parliamentarians from twelve different European, African, Asian and American countries have visited East Berlin, and from that one can conclude that the existence of two German states has become a reality in political thinking abroad.

The GDR is at present undergoing a serious economic crisis, but not a serious political crisis, and it should be realised that this obviously thriving child of the Kremlin, though slow to develop, is not the stillborn babe that we wishful thinkers in the Federal Republic have long imagined it to be.

INTELLECTUALS UNDER ULBRICHT

*Melvin Croan**

BEFORE the Harich affair and the SED's slanderous campaign against revisionism, East German intellectuals were widely regarded as essentially subservient to the Ulbricht regime. Intellectual quiescence during the workers' uprising of June 1953, seemed to illustrate all too poignantly a conclusion which had already been argued in terms which variously stressed the effectiveness of political controls, the success of the regime in corrupting intellectuals through an excess of material rewards, and the commitment of East German writers, artists and scholars to the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism. But the 1956 intellectual ferment upset all such calculations. Almost overnight the intelligentsia appeared to be the Achilles' heel of the entire system. And even today, although public expression of intellectual dissidence has again been suppressed, the expectation persists that in East Germany, as elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, the future may yet belong to the critical spirit.

In a sense, interpretation of the political fate of the East German intelligentsia has been somewhat obscured by the still unresolved controversy about the role of the intellectual under communist totalitarianism in general. Students of the mechanics (or, as some would insist, the dynamics) of totalitarian rule *per se* have long denied the intellectual any fate other than that of self-compromising subordination. Others, however, have recently struck a different note. Those who look forward to an eventual transformation of the Soviet and satellite dictatorships envisage a special role for the intellectual committed to Marxism. In essence, proponents of this view ascribe to the Marxist intellectual the functions of guardian of the democratic and humanistic elements in the doctrine, critic of the political practices of Stalinist totalitarianism, and guide to the reformation of Soviet-style dictatorship. The first assessment thus postulates the obliteration of the critical spirit by political power, while the other point of view expects the committed intellect to restrain and eventually transform power itself.

Unfortunately, neither of the divergent interpretations adequately reflects the multiple predicament of the East German intelligentsia. In the first place, despite widespread intellectual antipathy towards party policies no less than towards Ulbricht personally, it is surely rather deceptive shorthand to introduce such set categories as 'the intelligentsia' versus 'the regime' (or vice versa). It may well be that the SED has appeared to represent a monolithic entity with fixed objectives. Thus, although lively disagreements raged within the highest party councils on the proper methods of countering the unrest of students and intellectuals during 1956, such disputes were carried on entirely *in camera*, with the result that the intellectual rebels never did have access to real political power and were readily subdued. More important, however, is the fact that the dissident intellectuals of 1956 never accounted for more than a fraction of the entire 'intelligentsia'. Indeed to impute a cohesion of composition or a singleness of purpose to the East German intelligentsia—in 1956 or at any other time before or since—is grossly misleading.

Unlike the intelligentsia in Poland, German intellectuals have never formed a distinct and homogeneous social class. Officially, the SED regime often talks as if there were but a single intellectual stratum, comprising both 'progressive' recruits from the pre-1945 generation and all the post-war graduates. Transparently, the terms of the party's discourse have been borrowed from the vocabulary of Soviet sociology. Accordingly, the regime has also had occasion, if only for purposes of classification, to draw a distinction between the technical intelligentsia (*technische Intelligenz*) and the intellectuals of the humanistic disciplines (*geisteswissenschaftliche Intelligenz*). The division of the intelligentsia suggested by the regime's formal classification is both a socially realistic and politically vital one. In fact there exist neither bonds of sentiment nor a sense of

* *The author wishes to acknowledge his appreciation of the support and assistance of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University.*

mutual affiliation between the two categories of the *Intelligenz*.

THE technical intelligentsia comprises a variety of technical and professional callings; engineers, economic planners, industrial managers, doctors and the like, while the humanistic intelligentsia includes artists, musicians, poets, writers, scholars and university teachers. University students, always a special case, have shown a special sensitivity to the eddies and swells of opinion among the humanistic intelligentsia.

To a very large extent the ranks of the technical intelligentsia are still staffed by non-working-class elements. In the main, these representatives of what is officially designated as the 'old intelligentsia' have little interest in and probably less sympathy for Marxism-Leninism as political doctrine. Ultimately, of course, the regime would like to replace all such people with new 'socialist cadres'. Its efforts in this direction are underscored by a *numerus clausus* providing that at least sixty per cent of annual university admissions shall be drawn from applicants of working class or peasant background, and by the establishment of special Workers-and-Peasants Faculties to provide immediate managerial and professional training for the talented and reliable from shop bench and collective farm. But the notorious persistence of class attitudes has impeded the speedy realisation of the regime's goal.[1] So far, at least, the social transformation of the technical intelligentsia has not even kept pace with the increasing demands for such talent generated by the 'socialist transformation' of the East German economy and society.

Nonetheless, the continued importance of the 'old intelligentsia' has proved embarrassing more in ideological than in political terms. The disdain of most members of the technical intelligentsia for Marxism-Leninism is but one manifestation of their more general political apathy. The high degree of specialisation together with the traditional German expert's attitude of political neutrality have contributed to the isolation of the technical intelligentsia from their humanistic counterparts. The very same factors have facilitated dutiful service on the part of most technicians and professionals. Although the SED basically distrusts these people, as the ideology dictates that it should, the regime recognises full well the need for their services and decided to purchase the required talents at a generous rate of exchange.

As early as 1949 the DDR government decreed that members of the technical intelligentsia, and, incidentally, also intellectuals of the cultural realm, were to be remunerated on the basis of individual contract. Subsequent directives during the period 1950–52 established a salary scale designed to guarantee a high standard of living, and provided a variety of desirable fringe benefits such as tax exemptions, old age insurance, and extended vacations at the more fashionable resorts and spas of the Republic. In addition, an elaborate hierarchy of prizes and decorations was established in 1952 in order to reward outstanding members of the intelligentsia with such imposing appointments as 'Honoured People's Technician', 'National Prize Winner', and 'Distinguished People's Scientist'. All these awards carry substantial cash premia. The most coveted bestowal, that of 'Distinguished People's Scientist', may, for example, carry a tax-free grant of 10,000 Marks.

THE extent of the material benefits offered to the technical intelligentsia, regardless of social origin, seems to lend substance to the charge levelled by West German critics that the loyalty of the managers and professionals has been bought by the regime. One must, however, bear in mind the essentially apolitical

[1] See Hans Köhler, *Zur geistigen und seelischen Situation der Menschen in der Sowjetzone* (Bonn, 1954), who quotes as typical the response of one young worker: 'I am not going to sell myself. If I don't do what they want in school, they'll throw me out and I won't have learned anything anyhow. I would rather remain a worker', p. 29.

[2] It is typical that the complaints of the technical intelligentsia against the regime are for the most part directed to such technical questions as the efficiency of centralised planning, distribution, and the like. For a list of such criticisms, see the anonymous survey 'Die Opposition gegen den Stalinismus in Mitteldeutschland', Beilage, *Das Parlament*, 11 June 1953, p. 296.

background and attitude of almost all the people involved. Their allegiance has proved quite fragile whenever the regime, contrary to its repeated promises, has exerted political and ideological pressures. Members of the technical intelligentsia figured significantly, for example, among the large numbers who fled the DDR in the course of the 'construction of socialism' drive during 1952–53. To a real extent these departures should be read as a sign of political protest. Not that the technical intelligentsia sought to remonstrate against Marxism as such; much less against the 'construction of socialism'. It was rather the case that the regime's declaration of class warfare in July 1952 inspired local SED militants to treat the technical intelligentsia as 'second class citizens', as the party euphemistically confessed at a subsequent date.[3] Specifically, bourgeois technicians and professionals were beset by incessant political agitation and bureaucratically deprived of a number of privileges which the regime had prescribed for them.

The unintended rout of technical and professional cadres during 1952–53 and the SED's reaction to it proved indicative of what has since become a recurring sequence. Long before the introduction of the New Course, special concessions were made to win back the technical intelligentsia. Thus, in March 1953, the regime decreed still further privileges involving increased rations, an inflated salary scale, and a number of new social perquisites. Moreover, party functionaries were directed in quite explicit terms to cease political persecution and ideological pressure.[4]

Almost the very same sequence was repeated more recently when the frenzy against 'revisionism' and the militancy of the current drive for 'an accelerated tempo in the construction of socialism' generated vexatious pressures against bourgeois technicians. In this instance members of the medical profession were particularly affected, with the result that during 1958 the DDR experienced a 'flight from the republic' of large numbers of doctors. This stressing situation, however, prompted a specific Politburo decree countermanding the pressures.[5]

Clearly no occupational category, no matter how useful to the regime, can be guaranteed permanent political immunity under totalitarianism. The point is rather that the technical intelligentsia in the DDR has fared as well as the behavioural characteristics of this particular regime can allow. Both the special treatment and the underlying factors which have made it possible have, in turn, further contributed to the isolation of the technical and professional people from the humanistic intelligentsia.

SEPARATED from the technical intelligentsia—and, it should be added, from most other social and occupational groups in East Germany—intellectuals of the humanistic disciplines have never displayed the unity that the regime imputes to them. Disciplinary specialisation, so traditional to German intellectual life, continues to be significant. On this divisive factor there has been superimposed a divergence of temper between the pre-war left intelligentsia and the younger ranks so pronounced as to seriously merit the designation of a 'conflict of generations'.[6]

Whatever cultural resplendence the DDR can claim it owes to intellectual notables of another era. Consider the reputations and biographies of writers like Anna Seghers, Arnold Zweig, Heinrich Mann, and Ludwig Renn, literary critics like Hans Mayer and Alfred Kantorowicz, the playwright Bertolt Brecht, and the philosopher Ernst Bloch. Without exception, members of this older generation of Weimar intellectuals had been in exile in the West. Having made the conscious and voluntary decision to return to the homeland, each chose East Germany. Ostentatiously received by the communist authorities, intellectuals of the older school have been publicly celebrated and munificently remunerated. Altogether the

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[3] 'Mehr Achtung den Angehörigen der Intelligenz!' *Neues Deutschland*, 23 May 1953.

[4] See 'Die Bedeutung der Intelligenz beim Aufbau des Sozialismus', *Neues Deutschland*, 24 May 1953.

[5] Cf. 'Fragen, die unsere Ärzte stellen', *Neues Deutschland*, 13 September 1958, and 'Kommuniqué des Politbüros zur Ärztefrage', ibid., 18 September 1958.

[6] See the very perceptive observations of Gerhard Zwerenz, 'Junge Intelligenz unter Ulbricht,' *Die Neue Gesellschaft*, July-August 1958, pp. 311–314.

arts and letters have been magnanimously supported by the regime, although it is scarcely necessary to add that since 1951 and the fifth plenum of the SED Central Committee, standards of socialist realism have been rigidly enforced.

Of the psychology of the older generation as a whole it should be said that a common animus against bourgeois society and the capitalist West have sustained its support of the East German regime. The fascinations of nihilism and anarchism that once enthralled the alienated café society of inter-war Berlin and intellectual members of the German Communist Party have faded into the social history of Weimar. But why this demise? And, even more to the point, how could a regime so unmistakably stamped with the Ulbricht personality have ever attracted such brilliant and sensitive psyches?

The attitude of the older intellectuals towards the German communist functionary of the Ulbricht stamp has from the outset indeed been an amalgam of contradictory responses. Consider the outraged comment of Heinrich Mann that he had 'found it impossible to sit at the same table with a man like Ulbricht who might suddenly assert that the table was no table at all but rather a duck pond and then employ every means to compel acceptance of his definition'.[7] All the same, such private contempt has been combined with a ready if not always enthusiastic acceptance. The apparent paradox is psychologically quite understandable. Contemplation of the despised self-satisfaction of the bourgeois West and, more especially, the memory of the horrors of the Nazi period, set within a framework which regards the national history as the story of 'German misery', have all played a part. Given the resentments and antipathies of the older intellectuals, there has simply been no alternative to which the Ulbricht regime has not seemed 'the lesser evil'.[8]

[7] Quoted by Alfred Kantorowicz, 'Kantorowicz berichtet,' *Die Welt*, 12 September 1957.

[8] Zwerenz, loc. cit., p. 312. Kantorowicz remarks, '...I believed for too long that these crude, stupid and violent [party] men were still ... honest allies in the struggle against Nazism ...', 'Evidence,' *The Review* (Imre Nagy Institute, Brussels), 2 October 1959, p. 77.

The contrast between the intellectual exhila ration of the Weimar Republic and the aridit of the 'construction of socialism' in the DD needs no comment. Not surprisingly, th oppressive conditions of party regimentatio have resulted in a pronounced sterility of th older generation of writers and artists. Ann Seghers, for example, renowned for h *Seventh Cross*, has since the war published b two novels, separated by a decade, and neith has been exactly a brilliant literary success. similar lack of distinction has characterise the few published efforts of Arnold Zweig an the late Bert Brecht. Stefan Heym, wh marked his return from America with a solem profession to the effect that the creative muse of the 'new Germany' would allow him litt diversion, has been able to write little if an thing. The situation was described by Wolfgan Harich in 1953 as nothing less than 'a cris of intellectual creativity of psychotic charact among those who support our republic witho the slightest political hesitation'.[9]

The absence of creativity, the 'failure produce', has been interpreted by the regim as a sign of political protest. This may well the case. The SED at least views the passivi of the older generation as a real challenge party authority. The point was made qui explicitly at the 33rd plenum of the Centr Committee (October 1957) when, during general discussion of intellectual attitud Hans Rodenberg, a party functionary wi special responsibilities in the cinematic an literary realms, denounced 'silence' as t 'most dangerous of all behaviour'.[10]

Yet, if the older generation of writers an artists is practising an inner migration throu silence, its external attitude towards the regi has been quite correct. Thus *Der Sonntag*, journal controlled by the youthful intellectu dissidents during 1956, felt it necessary to co plain about the insensitivity of their elders the new currents of fermentation and prote In essence, the complaint was exactly that the regime, albeit directed towards a differe end:

[9] Wolfgang Harich, 'Es geht um den Realism *Berliner Zeitung*, 14 July 1953.

[10] Quoted from an internal party document, *dem Wortprotokoll der 33. Tagung des Zentralko itees der SED vom 16.–19. Oktober 1957*, p. 124.

Where is the voice of our German writers in the newspapers, journals, at public meetings—in short, in public? [11]

The externally correct attitude of the older intellectuals was manifested all too clearly in the declarations against the Hungarian uprising which the regime sought and obtained from them even before the crackdown within the GDR. A blank verse poem reproduced by Gerhard Zwerenz conveys something of the sense of bitterness and betrayal which such behaviour produced among the younger East German intellectual rebels:

When they were young
They drew the sword impetuously,
Too impetuously
So they now suppose.
Having grown old,
They are prudent and wise—
And run the young ones through
With the thrust of
Their wisdom.[12]

WHAT, then, is one to make of the manifestations of revisionism uncovered by the SED in all spheres of East German intellectual life? It is entirely characteristic of communist functionaries of the Ulbricht cut that to them critical ideas of whatever direction and magnitude should appear as powerful weapons of the enemy. In the eyes of the Ulbricht leadership of the SED, there is little difference between criticism of the standards of socialist realism in literature and a programme of outright opposition such as that drawn up by Wolfgang Harich. All such currents, in this view, 'turn into open counter-revolution'.[13] In the longer scheme of things the assessment may contain elements of self-fulfilling prophecy; for the shorter run it only obscures the divergent strands of a multi-hued revisionism.

Merely to list all the entries in the SED's current catalogue of revisionist heresies would entail a protracted effort. But it would be pointless, for the category itself is little more than a pejorative one without fixed meaning or content. It covers thought as philosophically potent as that of Ernst Bloch, and also misdemeanours as devoid of formal intellectual content as the support offered by party functionaries to the Schirdewan-Wollweber 'faction'.[14] Some of the more prominent manifestations of revisionism in several different fields of intellectual endeavour do, however, deserve comment. The account of the regime's reaction to all such phenomena will illustrate the larger point: Much of what came to be labelled revisionism represented not so much a total challenge to the SED dictatorship as a response to an official invitation to strike out on new lines of 'creativity' during the period of doctrinal flexibility in 1956. That such efforts brought to the surface ideas which infuriated and possibly genuinely frightened the Ulbricht leadership of the party tells more about its own psychology than about that of the critical thinkers.

THE events of 1956 in East Germany did bequeath at least one radical programme of opposition to the SED dictatorship, that drafted by Wolfgang Harich. Harich himself, widely regarded as a typical and brilliant representative of the younger intellectual generation in the DDR, is in many ways much more of an individualist than is usually supposed. The extraordinarily successful career which he made for himself in the realm of Marxist philosophy has tended to obscure Harich's bourgeois background, truly atypical of his breed, as well as his own earlier fascination with Buddhism and Catholicism. But biography aside, it is true that the ideas associated with his programme, and more generally with this kind of intellectual protest, were far from uniquely German. On the contrary, the inspiration was provided by the Polish protagonists of 'humanitarian socialism' as well as by friends and teachers of the Hungarian Petöfi circle.

Nonetheless, Harich's 'testament', as it has been called in the West, does have independent significance. It is not so much that the thoughts

[11] *Der Sonntag*, 28 October 1956.
[12] 'Die alten Dichter,' in Gerhard Zwerenz, *Galgenlieder vom Heute*, Berlin, n.d.
[13] W. Ulbricht, 'Some Aspects of the Ideological Work of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany,' *World Marxist Review*, October 1958, p. 19.
[14] It should be emphasised that the anti-Ulbricht faction within the highest echelons of the SED at no time sought to rally the intellectual dissidents.

it expressed may have been widely shared. Certainly they were. Rather more important is the conclusion towards which the several contradictions of the programme itself seem to point. The very attempt to apply Hungarian and Polish notions of 'the special national road' to the East German situation only underlined the political infeasibility of 'national communism' in the DDR.

In essence, the Harich programme demanded a doctrinal and organisational transformation of the SED in order to attenuate the party dictatorship over East Germany. The image of a liberalised DDR which Harich suggested was that of a democratic collectivist rival to the present German Federal Republic which would display such economic characteristics as an abundance of consumer goods, profit-sharing, and industrial management by workers' councils. Furthermore, collective farms were to be dissolved, full intellectual and religious freedom restored, and a parliamentary coalition government established—albeit with the proviso that 'a reformed SED should remain in control'. Neither the order of significance of these several goals, nor even the issue of their compatibility is touched upon. But that deficiency, forgivable enough in an 'action programme', is far from the major point. What is more significant about Harich's proposals is the fact that the attainment of the entire programme of reform is viewed as providing only a *transitory* stage to lead logically and speedily to German national reunification. That a political relaxation according to the precepts of the 'special German road to socialism' would require the liquidation of the DDR is reasonable enough, but for that reason alone it is improbable that such a programme could ever have been accorded Soviet support, much less the support of those who actually wielded power within the SED.

How, then, is one to interpret the opposition of Wolfgang Harich and his associates? In the West, Harich has earned a share of the admiration which has developed for the intellectual rebels under communist rule who, in one fashion or another, have undergone martyrdom. The further claim of one of Harich's rebellious colleagues that Harich should be celebrated because he in fact attained that elusive national quality, a synthesis of thought and action,[15] can only be regarded with scepticism.

Too little is known about Harich's political thought to make a definite judgment on its quality. Certainly it would be a mistake to attach any particular intellectual significance to his programme of opposition, the 'testament', as such. Not only does it abound in potential programmatic contradictions of the sort already indicated, but its search for theoretical foundations is entirely abortive. Consider the following mixed bag of those called into service to 'enhance Marxism-Leninism':

> [Marxist-Leninist theory] must be enhanced and enlarged through the perceptions of Trotski and above all those of Bukharin; it must be enhanced and enlarged through the thought of Rosa Luxemburg and, partially, Karl Kautsky. We must take over into Marxism-Leninism worthwhile elements from the theories of Fritz Sternberg and other Social Democratic theorists. We must adopt aspects of the Yugoslav experience and those new elements which mark theoretical discussion in Poland and China. . . .[16]

To develop Marxism-Leninism simultaneously along these many lines would indeed be a challenging, if not wholly baffling exercise. It makes greater sense to suppose that Harich only intended to draw from each of the sources mentioned a justification for his own opposition to some specific aspect of SED rule in East Germany. As far as more constructive and perhaps more profound analysis is concerned, it is known that Harich, in the German manner, did prepare a set of sixteen theses, on 'the further development of Marxism-Leninism'. These he submitted to the editorial board of the *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, apparently in late summer, 1956. The philosophy journal refused to publish them because they explicitly contended that Marxism was relevant only to nineteenth-century conditions. A further important source for the intellectual biography of Wolfgang Harich,

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[15] G. Zwerenz, 'Aus dem Tagebuch eines Gefl[ü]henen,' *Der Monat*, December 1959, p. 48.

[16] 'Die politische Plattform Harichs,' *SBZ-Archiv* Sondernummer (1957), p. 8.

more substantial manuscript on 'humanistic Marxism' which was being written at the time of his arrest, reportedly fell into the hands of the secret police.

Leaving aside the substance of the youthful philosopher's thought, his lack of aptitude in synthesising thought with action can be demonstrated all too readily. Convinced of the merits of his own position, Harich first sought to present his programme to the SED leaders. In particular, he wanted to interest the recently rehabilitated Paul Merker and Fritz Dahlem. That failing, Harich closeted himself for a conference lasting four hours with Soviet Ambassador Pushkin. When Ulbricht, having been informed of these goings-on, summoned Harich to provide a list of all who shared his point of view, Harich grew angry and took his schemes elsewhere, this time to the West. Rudolph Augstein, editor of *Der Spiegel,* has given a staggering picture of the incoherence of Harich's optimism and the arrogance of his self-righteousness. Harich had become so convinced of the historical inevitability of his proposals as to believe that Ulbricht himself might adopt them to save his own position (*sic*!).[17] In the case of Wolfgang Harich, the conclusion seems inescapable that, however much he may have precipitated the expression of East German intellectual discontent, he himself was far too much the typical romantic and erratic intellectual to translate 'thought into action'. The real hiatus between political power and the critical spirit in a sense foredoomed Harich, as it had so many other critical intellectuals throughout German history, to an erratic romanticism.

IF Harich's self-acknowledged revisionism perished stillborn, what is one to make of the many other manifestations of 'revisionism' uncovered by the SED after the 30th Central Committee plenum of January 1957? Given the party's proclivity to regard unorthodox thought in the light of the Hungarian uprising, the creative strivings in East Germany which had been tolerated and, indeed, encouraged during the previous six months had to be denounced and denounced as ideological heresy. In fact, by the standards of orthodoxy which had been dropped in 1956 only to be restored in 1957, a good deal of such speculation did amount to precisely that.

Consider the realm of Marxist philosophy. Those who had taken seriously the SED's resolution calling for a struggle against dogmatism and for the 'further development' of Marxism demonstrated lively interest in the younger Marx and devoted painstaking effort to such other tasks as reconciling Marxism with the findings of modern physics. The work of many young philosophers, including Richard Lorenz, Günther Zehm (both pupils of Ernst Bloch), Martin Straus and Friedrich Herneck (two young Marxist philosophers of science) was not undistinguished. To be sure, they were countered at every turn by the remaining guardians of philosophical orthodoxy. On the other hand, the party leadership, with transparently little understanding of the substantive issues in dispute, stood aside, applauding the vigorous 'conflict of opinion'.

The consequences of the sudden change in the SED's attitude precipitated by the Hungarian events may be illustrated by reference to the case of the dean of DDR philosophers, Ernst Bloch. Bloch's unorthodox Marxism had long been tolerated, if only grudgingly. After the 30th plenum he was forcibly retired from his chair at the Karl Marx University, hounded as a revisionist, and summoned to renounce his deviant philosophical tenets. Unfortunately for him, the events of 1956 cast Bloch's notion of teleological indeterminancy, the uncertainty of history, in a dangerous light. Pupils of his school turned out to be in the forefront of those critics of the regime who insisted upon investigating the social origins of Stalinism. Furthermore, Bloch had lent the weight of his philosophical authority to demands for the abolition of the compulsory university course in Marxist-Leninist social science, a course which he had described as 'narrow-gauge Marxism.' As a result of all this, according to the regime, "his philosophy had become politics".[18]

Politics indeed! The SED's post-1956 review of the 'conflict of opinion' uncovered politics,

[17] *Der Spiegel,* 20 March 1957, p. 10.

[18] 'Der Kampf gegen die bürgerliche Ideologie und den Revisionismus,' *Einheit,* February 1957, p. 137.

and dissident politics at that, in every intellectual domain. Thus the example of the Harich case was employed to beat down Professor Hans Mayer, the Leipzig literary critic, who had followed up a criticism of literature as the science of engineering the human soul with an unfavourable survey of Soviet and East German literature. That kind of assessment, official spokesmen said in warning, represented 'capitulation to the forces of imperialist restoration and bourgeois decadence' and was to be combatted by 'ideological and organisational measures'.[19]

How much more appalling for the Ulbricht regime to discover that revisionism had also infected economic theory and tainted almost all its leading economists. In particular, the entire faculty of the German Academy of Economic Science, previously regarded as a bastion of party loyalty, had pursued the 'conflict of opinion' with spirited discussions of the problems of the withering away of the state. The Director of the Central Statistical Administration, Professor Fritz Behrens, and his assistant, Arne Benary, had even drawn up specific blueprints.[20] Their theses, which prescribed a far-ranging economic decentralisation and some new thoughts on 'the spontaneity of the masses', bore for the party a disagreeable resemblance to certain Yugoslav theories.

A similarly 'disruptive' proposal emanated from Professor Kurt Vieweg, Director of the Institute for Agricultural Economics, who envisaged state-supported but otherwise independent 'family farms' in place of the existing collectives. Vieweg further recommended that the MTS be transformed into repair shops to service the agricultural machinery which he suggested be transferred outright to the family farms and the few remaining collectives.

THE theories of Behrens, Benary, and Vieweg are singularly instructive. To all intents and purposes all three men were loyal supporters of the regime and certainly had nothing in common with the Harich opposition. Given the more relaxed atmosphere of 1956, they had registered the expert's response to specific economic pressures and popular discontents. For Behrens and Benary the problems of labour productivity and the over-planned and entirely inefficient distribution and supply systems were central. For Vieweg it was the perpetual crisis of agricultural production and the dissatisfaction of the peasantry. All these formulations were prepared at a time when it seemed that they might at least be welcomed as contributions to the 'conflict of scientific opinion'.

The several manifestations of 'revisionism', in philosophy, literary criticism, and economics may serve to point up the relationship between revisionism and the location of the party line. The doctrinal orthodoxy of Stalinism at least established well-defined categories. Until late 1957 and Khrushchev's own clarification of the menace of revisionism, the SED, no less than other satellite parties, had to proceed cautiously. The lack of clarity in the doctrine, as well as the elements of change and fluidity in Soviet interpretation and practice, confounded both SED functionaries and East German intellectuals loyal to the regime.

The case of Professor Jürgen Kuczynski, who occupies the chair of Economic History in the Humboldt University, illustrates the situation. In the spirit of the 1956 campaign against dogmatism, Professor Kuczynski had composed a very moderate appeal for limited criticism by which, he was careful to point out, he did not mean 'the useless criticism of bourgeois liberalism.'[21] The following revealing exchange between Ulbricht and Kuczynski occurred some months later at a conference of the editors of *Einheit* and party intellectuals and functionaries:

> Ulbricht: . . . the theoretical journal is to play a leading role both in the formulation of new questions and in the struggle against bourgeois ideology. For that reason *Einheit* carries articles which provoke discussion. But often nobody

[19] K. Schwalbe, 'Wichtige Aufgaben unserer Literaturwissenschaft, *Neues Deutschland*, 9 February 1957.

[20] See Fritz Behrens, 'Zum Problem der Ausnutzung ökonomischer Gesetze in der Übergangsperiode,' and Arne Benary, 'Zu Grundproblemen der politischen Ökonomie des Sozialismus in der Übergangsperiode,' *Wirtschaftswissenschaft*, 3. Sonderheft, 1957.

[21] Jürgen Kuczynski, 'Meinungsstreit, Dogmatismus, und "liberale Kritik"', *Einheit*, May 1957, pp. 603–611.

replies to such articles. This was the crux of the matter in the case of the theses of Comrade Kohlmey. Just what will happen to the article of Comrade Kuczynski, I cannot foretell.

Kuczynski: I know already!

Ulbricht: Well I really don't know yet. Perhaps you have already spoken with other comrades who want to take a stand on it. But perhaps a half dozen comrades who have quite different points of view will express themselves. That will be quite interesting.[22]

Kuczynski had obviously gone too far in his pronouncements against dogmatism. Did this mean that he too was to be adjudged a revisionist? Even Ulbricht was uncertain! It required a protracted and highly scholastic examination of virtually every potentially deviationist phrase of Kuczynski's piece before the party concluded that he had indeed been guilty of revisionism.[23]

The striking incidence of revisionism uncovered in East Germany, especially in 1957–58, must therefore at least partially be understood in terms of the shortsightedness of loyal party intellectuals in not anticipating the retroactive shift of the SED line. When Kuczynski undertook self-criticism at the Third SED Conference on Higher Education, in March 1958, his remarks revealed a sense of frustration of the sort only a loyal communist could experience over the shift of the party line in the course of his own scholarly work.[24] The point was made even more explicitly at the same conference by Professor Behrens, who announced that he had 'thrown overboard' his proposals for economic decentralisation:

I confess that objectively the conception which I developed was directed against the party and that therefore it was revisionist. There is no need for me to deny that the Twentieth Party Congress prompted me to work out my theory. . . . . I also acknowledge that it was quite wrong to have directed the main attack against dogmatism. Rather it must [now] be directed against revisionism.[25]

In a real sense, the emphasis on party-mindedness which once again dominates every intellectual pursuit in the DDR has simplified the problems of both intellectuals and functionaries. The indeterminacy of the party line which led unsuspecting intellectuals into the camp of revisionism along with the rebellious ones also impeded attempts of loyal functionaries to block the route. Consider the plea of Paul Wandel, under attack for having shown a 'hesitant and wavering' attitude towards intellectual currents in his realm:

Many things must be changed. In the very first place the ideological struggle must be waged differently from 1956. It must be waged more according to principle. Unclarified questions therefore need to be clarified, and quickly.[26]

The triumph of Ulbricht in the intra-party struggle has brought the desired clarification of doctrine. In the longer scheme of things there remains, of course, the potential menace that today's ideological 'revisionism' might become tomorrow's orthodoxy on certification from Moscow itself. More immediately, there is still the problem of intellectuals who, having once been exposed to the more liberal atmosphere, can no longer accept Ulbricht's clarifications as doctrine binding them to the SED.

THE most prominent exponents of intellectual criticism during 1956, Harich and his associates, have been removed bodily from public life. They were joined in gaol by a number of other young intellectuals who, in the course of the SED's review of 1956 events, were found to have spoken provocatively to students, or, as was the case with Ernst Bloch's pupils, Richard Lorenz, Günther Zehm and

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22 'Theoretische und praktische Probleme der Übergangsperiode und die Aufgaben der "Einheit,"' *Einheit*, June 1957, p. 669.

23 In Professor Kuczynski's case the conclusion was facilitated by the publication of his study of German Social Democracy on the eve of the First World War (*Der Ausbruch des ersten Weltkrieges und die deutsche Sozialdemokratie*, Berlin, 1957) in which it was argued that the leaders of the pre-war SPD 'were not primarily responsible for the attitude of the masses during August 1914' (p. 145).

24 'Forschung mit Kampf verbinden,' *Neues Deutschland*, 12 March 1958.

25 'Meine Konzeption war revisionitstisch.' *Neues Deutschland*, 4 March 1958.

26 *Aus dem Wortprotokoll der 33. Tagung des Zentralkomitees der SED*, p. 116.

Erich Loest, to have written seditiously. Revisionists of the older generation found it somewhat easier to make their peace with the regime. Behrens, Benary, and Kuczynski have all submitted to the required self-criticism, even if without the total self-immolation so pleasing to Ulbricht. Professor Bloch, too hoary and in his own view too venerable to write off an entire lifetime of philosophic work, has nonetheless expressed at least passing regard for the drive against revisionism.[27] Professor Vieweg acted more impetuously, fleeing to West Germany in April 1957, only to return to the DDR in November. Such irresolute behaviour led to his arrest on charges of having betrayed economic secrets to the Bonn Government. *Caveant alii.*

Once again a heavy pall of party-mindedness hangs over every intellectual pursuit in East Germany. Party doctrine has become fixed and party controls manifest renewed efficacy. The lessons of the Harich case have been hammered home in connection with a thorough exposition of the many potential forms and appearances of revisionism. Changes in organisation and transfers of personnel have been effected to ensure that the campaign would receive attentive hearing and obedient response. And no company of scholars or intellectuals is deprived of the presence of some representative of the omnipresent secret police.

The gulf between the generations opened by the quiescence of the older generation during 1956 has certainly not been closed. If anything, the behaviour of the older group has tended to confirm the charges of the militant young critics of the regime, that their elders have been corrupted by an excess of material benefits. One is reminded of Heinz Kahlau's remark to the 1956 Congress of Young Writers and Artists:

> One can as little expect militant controversy from [intellectuals] who are concerned with their household comforts as one can from functionaries who constantly travel about in their official cars.[28]

The disillusionment of the younger generation with its mentors has been given poetic expression in precisely these terms by Gerhard Zwerenz:

> The times are morose
> Writers are silent
> From fear
> And critics lecture
> At command
> And there is a literature
> Which no one believes
> But fees are paid.[29]

Yet, for all the element of truth in these recriminations, they do not do entire justice to the greater predicament of the intellectuals, elderly as well as youthful. Consider the fate of Alfred Kantorowicz, who fled to the West in August 1957. A literary critic and Professor of Modern Literature at the East Berlin Humboldt University, Kantorowicz had been the recipient of all the material benefits the regime could afford, including a handsome salary, a villa, servants and a private limousine. During 1956, Kantorowicz had remained splendidly aloof from the intellectual rebels, his only protest a privately devised strategem which enabled him to avoid having to add his signature to those of other writers on the declaration in favour of the Kadar regime.[30]

The reasons why Kantorowicz fled when he did, therefore make for particularly interesting speculation. Kantorowicz's case is all the more revealing, precisely because he refuses to answer the question in that form, but prefers to address himself to the reasons for his prolonged sojourn in the DDR. In essence, he shows how a concatenation of basically divergent factors—material rewards, repression, and inner migration together—had made him a part of the system.

Kantorowicz is fond of citing the sentiment of Carl Ossietzky, the much abused German pacifist who refused to flee from Hitler's power, to the effect that intellectuals who aspire to purify an infected national spirit must share its fate. Whether this applies to Kantorowicz himself is not really important for surely it does illuminate the predicament of

[27] Ernst Bloch, 'Ich stehe auf dem Boden der DDR,' *Neues Deutschland*, 20 April 1958.
[28] 'Revoluzzer?' *Forum*, 1956, 12.
[29] Zwerenz, *Galgenlieder vom Heute*, p. 28.
[30] See Kantorowicz's own account in 'Evidence' loc. cit., p. 82.

East German intellectuals, especially the more youthful critics of the Ulbricht regime. How misleading is the contention that dissident intellectuals, no less than others persecuted by the regime, have the easy option of flight to the West, an option supposedly made more attractive by the fact that in quitting the DDR for West Germany, they need not leave their country, its language or culture. To be sure, many an intellectual, menaced by the threat of arrest, has taken this path. For the others, however, the decision is not at all an easy and obvious one. Psychological factors reinforce personal considerations. For the young Marxist intellectual, flight from the DDR in fact means exile in a strange land. The very commitments and concerns which have driven him into opposition to Ulbricht are nowhere understood, much less shared, in the Federal Republic.

Not surprisingly, then, the logic of the totalitarian situation in East Germany involves the twofold phenomenon of the intellectual in subservience and the intellect in opposition. While it remains true that the intellectual by himself can do little to resist, oppose, or mitigate total power, changes in the structure or in the manner of exercise of such power may well induce a change of intellectual behaviour from external acquiescence to criticism and open opposition. Such certainly is the lesson of the events of 1956. However, the reverse relationship seems no less compelling. It is but one manifestation of the general truth that the psychology of the intellectual in any society is determined in real measure by his effectiveness, that under totalitarianism the individual behaviour and specific attitudes of the intellectual are conditioned by the effective exercise of political power. The repressive power of totalitarian dictatorship may not only preclude the expression of intellectual opposition; it may even change the attitude and psychology of intellectuals subjected to it.

The crucial interrelation between intellectual attitudes and the efficacy of political power is one that the Ulbricht leadership of the SED seems to appreciate especially keenly. The intolerance and even obscurantism which have characterised the reimposition of party controls over intellectual pursuits since 1956 seem ill-designed to assuage intellectual disaffection. But in the short run, such measures do at least preclude articulate opposition. In the longer term, they may well operate once again to repress entirely the critical spirit.

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Oxford University Press, Amen House, Warwick Square, London, E.C.4

THE POVERTY OF PHILOSOPHY

Peter Christian Ludz

THE 20th Congress of the CPSU released strong oppositional forces in all the People's Democracies; they were also revealed in the oppositional conceptions of a number of scholars and scientists in the DDR. Wolfgang Harich, the former editor-in-chief of the *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie,* who was arrested on 29 November 1956 for the 'formation of a conspiratorial group' and condemned to ten years imprisonment in March 1957, is still the symbol of this opposition. Apart from the important philosopher Ernst Bloch, reference should be made in the field of philosophy to Havemann, Schröter, and Herneck; in history to Kuczynski, Streisand, and, to a certain extent, Leo Stern; in literary criticism to Hans Meyer; in economics to Fritz Behrens, Benary, Kohlmey, and in some respects, Oelssner; in agricultural economics to Kurt Vieweg.

The ideas of the opposition in the DDR differ in essential points from those of the Polish and Hungarian opposition. Whereas the oppositional intellectuals in Poland and Hungary sought and found contact with the working class, the German opposition was confined —deliberately or *faute de mieux*—to the universities, especially those of Berlin and Leipzig, to the research institutes of the Academy of Sciences, to a number of journals (*Sonntag, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*), publishers (Aufbau Verlag). The German opposition gave up all claim to secure mass support for its ideas; it tried instead to form centres of influence.

In what follows we shall confine ourselves to outlining the revisionist conceptions of Jürgen Kuczynski and Joachim Streisand (historians); of Kurt Vieweg (agrarian scientist); Fritz Behrens and Arne Benary (economists), and also of the philosophical revisionists.

AT the 28th session of the SED central committee (27–29 July 1956) Kurt Hagen, the committee's secretary for science and research, had praised the 'numerous independent Marxist-Leninist studies' of Kohlmey, Meusel, Behrens, and also Kuczynski. The praise soon changed, however, into sharp attacks which lasted from the beginning of 1957 to the autumn of 1958.

In three short articles the prominent social historian Jürgen Kuczynski has developed ideas which deviate from the official position of historical and dialectical materialism.[1] He distinguishes between two concepts of *Parteilichkeit*—party-mindedness or party spirit, and modifies the specifically Marxist-Leninist one. He quotes Jakob Burckhardt and Ranke, especially the latter's method of source criticism, and his follower, the young historian Joachim Streisand, undertook a positive evaluation of the works of Bloch, Lukacs, and Collingwood.[2] He was criticised for lack of *Parteilichkeit,* especially on account of his positive appreciation of Ernst Bloch. Unlike Kuczynski, Streisand was dismissed from the editorial staff of the *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft,* because of this article, at the end of 1957.

As early as November 1956 Kuczynski had sent some decided views on the necessity of a 'conflict of opinion' to the editor of *Einheit.* The article was published [3] but not until May 1957, thus giving the orthodox critics a chance of making an immediate and violent reply, after the 30th session of the SED central committee in January 1957. Kuczynski referred directly to the discussion at the 20th CPSU congress and maintained that a conflict of learned opinion was simply a necessary exchange of experience, which could be rejected only by dogmatists who abhorred all independence of thought.

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[1] 'Parteilichkeit und Objektivität in Geschichte und Geschichtsschreibung', in *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft,* 1956, 5, p. 873 ff.; 'Der Mensch, der Geschichte macht', *ibid,* 1957, 1, p. 1 ff. 'Meinungsstreit, Dogmatismus und "Liberale Kritik",' in *Einheit,* 1957, 5, p. 602 ff.

[2] 'Kategorien und Perspektiven der Geschichte. Anlässlich einiger Neuerscheinungen der Geschichtsphilosophie', in *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft,* 1956, 5, p. 889 ff.

[3] 'Meinungsstreit, Dogmatismus, und "Liberale Kritik",' *Einheit,* 1957, 5, p. 602 ff.

On the basis of Ulbricht's report to the 30th session, Ernst Hoffman delivered a violent attack on Kuczynski in the very same issue of *Einheit*. He criticised Kuczynski for denying the leading role of the Party, and argued that there had never been any dogmatism in the SED, one reason being that dogmatism as such is a special characteristic of bourgeois ideology. The political interests of the working class required the deliberately one-sided ideology of dialectical materialism; therefore no conflict of opinion was possible with any scholars, including bourgeois scholars. The demand for a conflict of opinion showed that Kuczynski did not proceed from the party, i.e. the proletarian, class point of view.

As Joachim Höppner [4] has suggested, Kuczynski has no Marxist conception of the class war in society. Kuczynski derives the class war not from the processes of production but from the realm of consciousness, and his 'bourgeois objectivism' bears no relation to the Marxist-Leninist conception of history.

In 1958 Kuczynski embarked on a lengthy journey to China, thus escaping for the time being from all further attacks. Kurt Vieweg, who was for a time secretary for agriculture on the SED central committee (1950–53), a member of the central committee from 1950 to 1954, and later Director of the Institute of Agricultural Economics of the Academy of Agriculture (1953–57), has been responsible for the dissemination and discussion of a 'New Agrarian Policy for the Development of Agriculture within the socialist structure in the DDR' which he outlined in an unpublished draft of 1956 and in a contribution to *Einheit*.[5]

HIS ideas are based to some extent on those of Professor Baade of Kiel.[6] The discussion of Vieweg's ideas has taken place above all in the Institute of Agricultural Economics. The total collectivisation which has been carried out in the DDR since the spring of 1960 has meant that Vieweg's plans are now of purely historical interest, but they repay study. He proceeded from the fact that the planning and control of agriculture which were necessary in the immediate post-war years reduced output and were rejected by the farmers. The basis of the alliance between the workers and peasants could be maintained only if the peasants themselves were convinced of the historical validity of the road to socialism. In principle, therefore, the independent family farm must continue to exist alongside the state-controlled and collective sector.

For technological and financial reasons Vieweg regards a farm of 30–40 hectares (75–100 acres) as the ideal unit for a family concern. In accordance with the cooperative tradition of German farming they should be able to amalgamate in cooperative societies. The development of a cooperative democracy should also be promoted in other ways. The financially unprofitable collectives should be dissolved, the surviving ones should be able to obtain machines from the machine tractor stations (MTS), and work on the basis of economic book-keeping, with accurate accounts and correct costing, etc. The MTS should be transformed into agricultural-machinery cooperatives with the state contributing 51 per cent of the capital and without state subventions, and should use wage incentives. Alongside the family farms receiving state production credits, there should be farms employing wage labour which, unlike family farms, would be taxed at progressively rising rates in proportion to the number of workers employed. The former dual price system should be replaced by a uniform flexible price system, in which only the maximum and minimum prices are fixed. This price fixing should be undertaken by an agricultural prices council, consisting of farmers, representatives of the peasants union and the trade unions, agricultural and economic specialists.

From the very outset Vieweg's ideas were described as 'anti-socialist' and a 'relapse into capitalism'. From the standpoint of the SED they did indeed call in question its whole agricultural policy and the very existence and planned development of society in the DDR. Vieweg was criticised for considering the agrarian problem purely from the point of view of the economic working unit, and not in

[4] 'Zur Kritik der Geschichtsauffassung von Jürgen Kuczynski in den Fragen des Klassenkampfes und der Parteilichkeit', *Z f G*, 1958, 3, p. 562 ff.

[5] 'Ein Beitrag zur Ausarbeitung der Ökonomik der LPG,' *Einheit* 1956, 9, p. 853 ff.

[6] Cf. Baade, *Brot für ganz Europa* (1952).

political terms. The total collectivisation of agriculture which the SED evidently had in mind from the very beginning is obviously the basis of Walter Appelt's criticism:

> It is the task of the working class and above all of its own party to give advice and support to the small and medium-size farmers who as property owners tend towards capitalism and as workers towards socialism. They must be brought to see the rightness of the socialist way. Patient and persistent enlightenment is needed. The superiority of the collectives to scattered individual farming must be demonstrated to them.[7]

The main attack on Vieweg's conceptions was naturally concentrated on his plan for the dissolution of the MTS and the financially unprofitable collectives. The MTS are regarded as the footholds of the working class ('political ideology centres') on the land and as the material basis of large-scale socialist production. They represent state property as opposed to cooperative and private property on the land. They are the strongpoints of the SED in its attack on the private ownership of land. Their dissolution would certainly reduce, if it did not entirely eliminate, the Party's influence on the land. It was also argued that only the large family farms would have profited from the proposed machinery cooperatives.

Vieweg's critics called in preference for closer cooperation between the collectives and the MTS, in accordance with the so-called Schönebeck method. Following on the discussion of the dissolution of the MTS in the USSR, the Council of Ministers of the DDR decided to hand over the equipment of the MTS to the more prosperous and politically consolidated collectives on the basis of a loan agreement. Others are to continue to work on the basis of annual contracts. Although the MTS have very largely lost their former functions, they are not to be dissolved but turned into RTS (repair and technical stations). Tractor drivers, tractor brigade foremen, etc., will become members of the collective and their membership is intended to give it added political strength.

At the beginning of 1957 Vieweg himself was dismissed on account of his ideas and fled to the Federal Republic. At the end of 1957 he returned voluntarily to the DDR and in the middle of 1958 was sentenced to nearly five years imprisonment.

AT the conferences on economic theory held in March 1955 and January 1956 a number of economists criticised the state of economic research in the DDR. Fritz Behrens declared, at the second conference, that economists in the DDR were ruled by their feelings not by arguments; that the struggle against so-called 'bourgeois objectivism' was crippling independent research and narrowing the opportunity for scientific advances.

In two programmatical articles Behrens and Benary [9] have pleaded for a relaxation of state planning during the 'transition from capitalism to socialism'. A planned socialist economy is not necessarily the same as an economy centrally directed by the state. The important thing is rightly to discern and direct the activities of the individual who *knows* that he is working for himself and for his state. Above all, Behrens attacks the 'voluntaristic idea that the socialist state can determine the pace of economic development at its own discretion'. Behrens was here criticising the over-centralised economy of the DDR.

The main features of the criticism directed against Benary and Behrens may be quickly summarised. The points attacked include the thesis of the withering away of the state, and hence the Marxist theory of the state, the theory of spontaneity, the false interpretation of the role of the Party, and the so-called 'rule of the law of value'. Their ideas have been compared with the 'Yugoslav way', and passages from Kardelj's speech of 7 December 1956

[7] 'Die antisozialistische Konzeption Viewegs', *Einheit*, 1957, 7, p. 802 ff.

[8] Cf. Protokoll der theoretischen Konferenz des Instituts für Wirtschaftswissenschaften bei der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin vom 11 bis 14 März zu dem Thema: Die Übergangsperiode vom Kapitalismus zum Sozialismus in der DDR.

[9] Fritz Behrens, 'Zum Problem der Ausnutzung Ökonomischer Gesetze in der Übergangsperiode', *Wirtschaftswissenschaft*, V, special number 3, p. 105 ff; Arne Benary 'Zu Grundproblemen der politischen Ökonomie des Sozialismus in der Übergangsperiode', *ibid.*, p. 62 ff.

have been compared with passages from the works of Behrens.

The official critics argue that it is the so-called 'law of the planned proportional development of the national economy' which is the objective regulator of socialist production, not the law of value. This law is determined by the state. All the same, they admit that the 'planned establishment of the individual categories of value' must be combined with the 'conscious exploitation of the law of value'.[10] The intended nature of this relationship is not explained by the critics, any more than the problem of exact and at the same time dynamic instruments for measuring the output of work. These instruments cannot be replaced or created by the so-called Marxist-Leninist 'theory of reproduction' and its balancing methods. The lack of such instruments is one of the greatest sources of error in the economic theory of the socialist planned economies.

Yielding to the pressure of the Party, Behrens finally withdrew the main points in his conception to plead for a broader application of market-law in the socialist economy.

WALTER Ulbricht's speech at the 30th plenary session of the central committee of the SED on 30 January 1957 was a landmark in the development of 'philosophy' in the universities and institutes of the German Democratic Republic. The new tasks assigned to philosophy may be summarised as follows: 'an intensified struggle against "bourgeois" philosophy and philosophical revisionism in all its forms both inside and outside the DDR (the forms of revisionism to be attacked include the philosophy of history, existential philosophy, logical positivism, neo-Thomism); the popularisation of Marxist-Leninist philosophy in order to familiarise the whole people with dialetical and historical materialism, that is, the philosophy of the working class'.

Walter Ulbricht elaborated these objectives in a speech at Halle on 21 April 1958. He said: 'If the development of socialism is to be continued, with the aid of all the resources of the working class, the peasants, and other manual workers, it will be necessary for the people to participate consciously in the socialist transformation of society and for them to be made familiar with the laws of the development of nature, human society, and human thought'. The special tasks of philosophy were to include the training of 'qualified Party cadres who are able to defend and apply dialectical materialism, the philosophy of the working class, in the ideological struggles of our time, and who are able creatively to apply dialectical materialism to the problems of the fight for the victory of socialism and peace, to the problems of the struggle for the reunion of our Fatherland on a peaceful and democratic basis'.[11]

Ulbricht ushered in a new epoch in his speech at the 30th plenary session, but it was the central committee of the SED at its 34th conference that first described the study and dissemination of Marxist philosophy as the most important task in the ideological class war:

> The mastery of dialectical materialism, its application to practical tasks, the education of the Party cadres and the masses in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, is an urgent and immediate duty. The application of dialectical materialism makes it possible to avoid, or in good time to counter, one-sidedness and ossification of thought, dogmatic errors, and, above all, revisionist deviations. It will therefore be necessary to organise lectures, discussions, and seminars on dialectical materialism and Marxist-Leninist ideology, in all Party organisations, in order that Party members may understand the general laws of the development of nature, of society, and of human thought, and be enabled to apply dialectical materialism to practical problems. Such instruction will also enable Party members to wage the struggle against the ideology of the bourgeoisie with a firmer grasp of the principles at stake and with greater prospect of success.

This demand for the 'deliberate application

[10] Cf. Helmut Richter in *Wirtschaftswissenschaft*, 3, p. 51.

[11] Günther Heyden, *Über die Einheit von Philosophie und Politik in der Lehr- und Forschungsarbeit* (Berlin 1958), p. 159.

of philosophy to practical social problems' [12] has had a decisive influence on the subsequent development of philosophy. Philosophy has come to be conceived quite definitely as 'a form of political warfare' or as an instrument for increasing productivity.

The new conception of philosophy was elaborated at a series of conferences which were designed to promote the practical application of these basic ideas: the conference of the Department of Philosophy of the Institute of Social Sciences of the central committee of the SED on the theoretical and practical problems of a socialist morality (16–17 April 1957); the conference of the Institute of Social Sciences of the central committee of the SED on dialectical materialism as the theoretical basis of Party policy, of the working class, and its successful application by the SED (5–6 May 1958 in Berlin); the conference on political science and jurisprudence in Babelsberg (2–3 April 1958); the conference held on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the publication of Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (24–26 April 1959); the conference on 'Man and Technics' organised by the Department of Philosophy of the Institute of Social Sciences of the central committee of the SED (28 November 1958), and the conference on 'the nature of contradictions and their resolution in the period of the struggle for the victory of socialism' (24 October 1958).

IN the philosophical discussions of these years condemnation of the ideas of revisionism, wherever they appeared in literary and historical studies, or in the economic and agrarian sciences, was the dominant note. In the present context it is not possible to give a detailed account of the various revisionist currents and counter-currents. In philosophy the critics concentrated with special emphasis on the work of Ernst Bloch [13] and Georg Lukacs.[14] The attacks on Bloch have recently been revive by M. Buhr [15] and A. Kurella.[16] Buhr writes a follows:

> The origin of Bloch's philosophy of hope li in religion: in the Revelation of John, and the Book of Exodus; it is religious an teleological in character and inclines to th metaphysical and supernatural, or rather th mystical and the visionary; its ultimate pu pose is an attempt to preserve religion; an this goes hand in hand with an endeavour reconcile Marxism and religion (see his ear works), to demonstrate that religious pro lems are relevant to Marxism (see h middle-period works), to apply Marxist te minology to religious matters and prese them as proceeding from Marxism (see h latest publications).

To the amazement of many Western obser ers, the third volume of *The Principle of Ho* appeared at the end of 1959. In some passag it gives the impression of having been touch up. The work cannot be treated here, but i publication shows that the SED no longer r gards Bloch as dangerous. Unlike Luka whose analyses of literature and the history philosophy have had and still have enormo influence in the DDR (although it is at prese impossible to buy a single book of his in Ea Berlin), Bloch's influence has never been ve widespread. That his thinking was neverthele regarded as potentially dangerous by the SE was shown by its organisation of a speci conference on Bloch. (It should be mention that philosophy students who have fled fr the Soviet zone, when asked 'What do y know of Ernst Bloch?' have only been able say: 'I think he's a philosopher from Leipzig

[12] *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 1958, 1, p. 19.

[13] Cf. the contributions to the discussion at a conference on problems of Bloch's philosophy organised by the SED in the Institute of Philosophy of the Karl Marx University of Leipzig (4–5 April 1957). The main target of criticism was Bloch's magnum opus *Das Prinzip Hoffnung*, but his lecture on the 125th anniversary of the death of Hegel delivered at the Humboldt University of Berlin under the title *He und die Gewalt des Systems* was also attacked. Har any of the contributions are to be taken seriou They accuse Bloch of irrationalism, mysticism, ide ism, dogmatism, philosophical revisionism, etc., a reach the conclusion that Bloch's philosophy is inco patible with the teachings of Marx, Engels, and Le

[14] In particular, his main work on the history philosophy entitled *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft* (T Destruction of Reason, Berlin, 1956) has been shar censured.

[15] M. Buhr, 'Der religiöse Ursprung des Charakt der Hoffnungsphilosophie Ernst Blochs', *DZfP*, 1958, 4.

[16] *Sonntag*, 7 October 1956.

o real philosophical discussion of Georg ukacs's work has yet appeared in the DDR, it a full-scale philosophical critique is being epared at present in Greifswald as an augural dissertation, under the direction of ofessor Erhard Albrecht. All the attacks that ive appeared on Lukacs have been trans- ted from the Hungarian, of works by Balogh, igeti, and Revai. They usually take as their arting point Lukacs's speech on 'The Con- ct between Progress and Reaction in Modern ulture,' which he made in Budapest in Sept- aber 1956, and criticise him for his so-called bjective' idealism.

The controversy about the true subject of ilosophy, conducted in 1956 on the one side Robert Havemann, Friedrich Herneck, artin Strauss, Walter Besenbruch and others, d on the other by Viktor Stern, Georg Klaus, olfgang Schubardt, is perhaps one of the few ntributions in recent years which may be lled at any rate partly 'philosophical'. Have- nn's articles, 'Science is promoted by con- cts of opinion' (*Neues Deutschland* 7/8 July 56), and 'Philosophy and Dogmatism' *eues Deutschland*, 20 September 1956), take their starting point the primacy of the indi- dual sciences vis-à-vis philosophy. According Havemann, the dialectic and materiality of owledge which dialectical materialism re- ires, is present in every positive branch of ence. To that extent philosophy is never the source of new knowledge. It is indeed funda- mentally superfluous except for logic and the history of philosophy.

Herneck doubts even more fundamentally than Havemann whether dialectical material- ism can be an instrument of scientific research. Dialectical materialism did not play an opera- tive part in establishing the theory of relativity or the quantum theory. For many decades, dia- lectical materialism 'with its philosophical generalisations had lagged considerably behind the development of the modern sciences'.[16]

These heresies were attacked by Viktor Stern and Georg Klaus and Alfred Kosing in *Neues Deutschland* (25 August and 23 October 1956); the articles were intended to reveal the bourgeois roots of such ideas and their alien class character. The same kind of argu- ment appears in all the criticisms of Western ideas and systems: Philosophy is valid only as a theory of conscious action, based on 'right' thinking. This basic conception of Marxist ideology is bound up with a notion of the opponent which is related exclusively to his economic, social, and political position. The interpretation is never immanent, after the model of the infinitely far more inspired *German Ideology*. The bourgeois philosophers are re- garded only as apologists of 'capitalism' and 'imperialism'. A genuine philosophical discus- sion on this level has proved to be a complete impossibility.

GERMAN HISTORY AND THE SED

Fritz Kop

UP to about the year 1950 the East German Communist Party, the SED, made no attempt to regiment historical studies along Marxist-Leninist lines.[1] The cadres of historians who were available to the SED at the time were too small and too untrained. Above all, however, the SED did not yet want to use violence in the cultural and intellectual spheres against reformist socialists or against the academic representatives of its bourgeois partners in the government 'coalition'.

The first systematic attempt to make the universities in general and historical studies in particular toe the party line was signalised by the resolution on the universities adopted by the central committee of the SED on 19 January 1951, which called for an 'implacable struggle against bourgeois objectivism, cosmopolitanism, and social-democracy'.[2] After the second party conference in June 1952, this first attack was intensified by the development of a pseudo-nationalist theory of history with which the SED works on both sides of the zonal boundaries in the interests of Marxism-Leninism. It is a doctrine which has outlasted 'Stalinism', a controlled and camouflaged tool of the SED, but in no sense a ferment resulting from the decomposition of the Soviet doctrine.

When the popular rising of 17 June 1953 led to a temporary relaxation and liberalisation in the cultural and academic spheres, lasting about a year and a half, the first campaign was considerably modified. The second campaign emerged when the central committee returned to the attack on 5 July 1955, accepting a resolution on 'historical studies in the DDR' which stated that 'The study of history can fulfil its national task only if it is based on the uniquely scientific theory . . . historic materialism'.[3]

This second campaign died down in t spring of 1956 when the twentieth congress the CPSU and its withdrawal from rigid Stali ism had slight repercussions even in the Sov zone of Germany. It is true that the SED to a less sweeping and comprehensive view of t new liberalising tendencies than the Comm nist Party of the Soviet Union itself, but anti-orthodox discussion did arise and also strong aversion from the totalitarian regime tation of science and learning. Both mov ments also affected historians who had prov themselves faithful exponents of the SE Jürgen Kuczynski, Joachim Streisand a Fritz Klein.

Since the early summer of 1957, howev the central committee of the SED has come regard repression as the only way out. T editorial staff of the *Zeitschrift für Geschich wissenschaft* was 'purged' by the dismissal Streisand and Klein; the allegedly 'revisionis historians were prevented from continuing propagate their views. Streisand recanted, Ku zynski and Klein were sharply attacked, thou they did not lose all their posts.

Following Ernst Bloch, they endeavoured introduce into the Marxist conception both t individual and personal element and the spo taneous and the liberal, but they did not thi of giving up Marxism-Leninism itself. Nev theless, they were criticised by the orthod editor of the *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswisse schaft* for 'obliterating the difference betwe the idealist and materialist view of history The criticism appeared in an editorial und the title 'The Present Tasks of Historic Studies in the DDR'.

The issue of the *Zeitschrift für Geschich wissenschaft* of March 1958 completed a st in the suppression of the 'revisionist' histo ans. It included the 'self-critical statement'

[1] This is confirmed by the two most important studies dealing with the background of the subject of the present sketch, which also quote source material and studies of individual aspects of the subject: Max G. Lange, *Wissenschaft im totalitären Staat* (Stuttgart, 1955); Albrecht Timm, *Das Fach Geschichte in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone seit 1945*, 2nd edition (Bonn, 1958).

[2] *Dokumente der SED*, Vol. III (East Berlin, 1952), p. 353.

[3] *Dokumente der SED*, Vol. V (East Berlin, 195 p. 346; cf. *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissensch (ZfG)* (East Berlin), III, 4, p. 513.

[4] *ZfG*, 1957, 3, p. 454.

oachim Streisand and the editorial directive of he *ZfG* (i.e., in fact of the central committee f the SED): 'For the Consolidation of Socialist erman Historical Studies'. This directive ontained warnings against the 'revisionist iews' of J. Kuczynski and also of the histor- n and educationalist Professor Walter Strauss East Berlin), and it complained of the still- revailing 'underrating of dialectical and his- orical materialism'. It demanded the stern nd swift renewal of the campaign for the olshevisation of historical studies in the oviet zone, which has not had the expected esults during the last ten years. This famous irective of March 1958 followed the 35th lenary session of the central committee of the ED (3–6 February 1958), at which, after a ruggle that had lasted nearly two years, lbricht had removed from the central com- ittee and from State office the protagonists of reater elasticity (Karl Schirdewan, Ernst ollweber, and Fred Oelssner) who were pposed to 'Stalinist' brutalities and over-pre- pitate action.

The harsh demand contained in the directive March 1958 for the complete bolshevisation historical studies in the Soviet zone, and condemnation of all modifications and nances, is strictly in accordance with the gidly orthodox offensive on all levels towards he development of the socialist order of ciety in the DDR'.[5]

THE instructions for the third campaign for a bolshevist orientation in historical studies rive from the central committee of the SED. ey are being put into effect by the commun- 'Association of German Historians' unded on 18 March 1958, but they originate the directive issued by the editorial board the *ZfG* in March 1958. Since this directive s intended to be taken as the criterion for story teaching, research, and publications, a ief summary of it will be given here. Some owledge of its contents is the more reward- g as it also refers to those weaknesses and t resistance in the historical writing of the Soviet zone which even the central committee of the SED and the *ZfG* are unable to conceal. The directive contains an angry condemnation of the fact that only a few historians have abandoned the objectivist and non-propagandist scientific method and that 'bourgeois ideology is still the predominant influence in most of the history departments of our colleges and universities.' On this point there is the following very sharp comment: 'In the socialist transformation of our universities and colleges it goes without saying that the leadership and the initiative must rest with the basic organisation of the Socialist Unity Party'. But the predominance of those historians whose ideas are 'bourgeois' and whose research is scholarly and objective is obviously so great that the *ZfG* finds it necessary to issue the following guide to the tactics to be adopted: 'It would be wrong to drop those lecturers and professors who have not yet made dialectical materialism the basis of their work and have not yet made the socialist philosophy their own.' They will ultimately be 'convinced of the truth and scientific accuracy of Marxism-Leninism'.

It was vital, however, to recognise, more clearly and earlier than hitherto, 'the activities of the class enemy and the emergence of ideas and theories which may have a Marxist tinge but are nevertheless fundamentally revisionist' and which had 'caused temporary confusion'. It was equally necessary 'to enforce dialetical materialism as the foundation of all academic studies, teaching, and research, with a view to the transformation of the universities'. The directive goes on to assert that this action will be more successful 'the more we defend our scientific, ideological, and political principles without compromise and therefore with conviction'. What emerges here quite clearly is the subjective, arbitrary, repressive, and coercive foundations of the SED, the reversal of the basic formula promulgated by Marx and Engels, that Being forms Consciousness.

A long paragraph is devoted to a warning against the 'revisionist' conceptions of Jürgen Kuczynski and others. The climax of the angry attack on 'revisionism' comes in the following sentence: 'Such manifestations should be brought to an end once and for all,

[5] Communiqué of the 35th plenary session of the ntral committee, *Neues Deutschland*, 7 February 58.

in the interest of raising the theoretical level of our historical studies'.

The following paragraph takes the historians to task because 'discussion of the basic problems of historical materialism is still limited to a far too small circle of historians'. This is a bashful admission of the fact that, apart from a few young candidates for posts as university lecturers and a few orthodox historians with no reputation whatsoever as historical scholars or philosophers, no one has so far come forward against Streisand and Kuczynski. Even those historians who have a certain standing, at any rate as Marxists, such as Professor Karl Obermann and Professor Leo Stern, have maintained an eloquent silence.

After the tortuous references to the historians who are lacking in loyalty to the Party, the *ZfG* makes the typical remark that no one now (i.e. the beginning of 1958) dares to make a clear distinction of value and quality between scholarship and tendentious propaganda: 'None of our historians openly supports any longer the alleged antithesis between scholarship and propaganda, as was the case only a few years ago'. The final complaint, however, is that 'not everyone is yet sufficiently aware of the great topical importance of our academic work and the great responsibility which we bear towards our people as socialist historians'.

THE directive of the *ZfG* impresses on all historians (with a quotation from the resolution of the third Universities conference) that they must 'make a decision for socialism and overcome all manifestations of neutralism and non-political behaviour'. To prevail over the reserve which many students show towards dialectical materialism, the *ZfG* announces the 'publication of contributions on historical theory' and also the 'analysis of lectures and publications from the point of view of their theoretical content'. The editor adds: 'We invite our readers to support our efforts by submitting suitable contributions'. (The fact that there has been scarcely any response to this invitation throws an interesting light on the attitude of historians in the Soviet zone.)

Historians in particular are required to display a polemical and partisan attitude. 'In addition to the extremely important unremitting war on all revisionist manifestations in our own ranks, we must on no account neglect our task of unmasking the reactionary historical writing that is going on in West Germany, and of dealing with the historical writings of the right-wing social democrats.' The *ZfG* comments reproachfully that 'a work such as Bracher's on the dissolution of the Weimar Republic, with its deliberate falsifications, should not have to wait three years before receiving the treatment it deserved in our journal'. This is followed by a dirge on 'the underrating of contemporary history which is sometimes very pronounced in our ranks'.

The editorial directive culminated in an urgent commendation of the 'German Historians Association', since in this body 'the Marxist and progressive historians of the DDR are united in an organisation of their own, for the promotion of Marxist-Leninist history'. The propaganda of the *ZfG* on behalf of the new association, which is also intended to embrace non-party 'progressives', covers a wide range. It is linked with the missionary pan-German idea of the regime which is also intended to have an impact on people in the Federal Republic: 'The Marxist study of history in the DDR will help us to bring about a new socialist order, free from every form of exploitation, and thus to create a prospect of peace and social progress for the whole of Germany'. To support these endeavours is 'the chief task of the German Historians Association'.

WHAT effect has the third campaign for the bolshevising of historical studies had? A glance at the *ZfG*, the only licensed forum of the historians, will give us a few clues. It is typical that from 1957 to 1960, the proportion of articles and miscellanea in the *ZfG* relating to the period before 1789 is very small indeed and that the period from 1789 to 1917 is also treated much less often than the period following 1917. The SED is obviously trying to concentrate attention on historical themes of the greatest possible topicality, regarding history primarily as an instrument of polemics and propaganda. Above all, it is looking for absolutely contemporary work dealing with the

mediate issues of the day, which can be used communist propaganda and also in the emocratic-anti-fascist' and anti-militaristic mpaign against NATO and the Federal epublic. Evidence of its efforts may be found the quarterly review *Contributions to Contemporary History* which has been appearing ice 1958.

What is the significance of the great preminance, evident from the columns of the *fG*, of articles dealing with the most recent story and with day-to-day politics, and of neral articles in praise of the Soviet Union d the SED? A very great number of the unger 'cadre' historians who are so intent toeing the party line are quite unqualified deal seriously with genuinely historical aterials. Even the 19th century, and still ore the epochs before 1789 and 1641, are arly too difficult and unrewarding for the thodox publicists. At the same time, the agre scholarship and thematic one-sidedness the *ZfG* shows that the older historians and o the more solid of the younger scholars are staining from publication not only on subts of immediate contemporary interest but o on earlier periods. Moreover, the bstainers' probably include some whose neral outlook is Marxist. They too dislike ing confined to the dogmatic recipes of Lenism and of SED propaganda in the investigan and exposition of historical themes.

There is not much of interest to the historian the standardised, thematically sterile, and icially canalised writings published in the viet zone. The trivialities and scholastic tleties of the 'Theses . . . for the Textbook German History' are scarcely worth menning. The way Kuczynski's book on the D in 1914[6] was treated shows how unscholy and tendentiously narrow is the official w of history.

Paraphrasing them to suit the Marxist-Lenst line, Kuczynski reproduces the facts hich drove the SPD, like its considerably aker and likewise devoutly pro-government er parties in Great Britain, France, Austro-ngary, etc., to consent to the war credits and the party truce. He makes a distinction between the economic causes of opportunism, which to some extent poisoned the labour movement under the conditions of imperialism, and the effects of the 'special injection' for war purposes which was called "defence of the fatherland" . . . which was able for a time practically to kill the class consciousness of the labour movement, already weakened by opportunism.'

To explain the attitude of the SPD leaders he refers to their tradition of hostility to the Russian autocracy, inherited from Marx and Engels, and contrasts their 'corrupting leadership' with the 'consistently Marxist leadership' of Lenin. And he continues, with regard to the SPD:

> Whilst it is impossible to attribute the attitude of the masses in August 1914 primarily to the perfidy of the Party executive, they were clearly responsible for the fact that the German imperialists succeeded in waging the war so long and that the revolution not only came so late, but also failed.

On what grounds has Kuczynski been upbraided? Josef Schleifstein, a lecturer in Leipzig, has commented as follows on Kuczynski's analysis of the reasons for the party truce:

> It turns the Marxist conception of the relationship between leader and masses into its direct opposite; it reduces the historical responsibility of the right-wing leaders for the confusion of the social democratic masses in a way which could be used only too easily to belittle the responsibility of the present SPD leaders for the infecting of the West German workers with the poison of bourgeois ideology.[7]

The criticism which has been formulated by three young members of the 'cadre', Günther Benser, Xaver Streb and Gerhard Winkler, opens with the charge that Kuczynski has committed the dangerous error of hoping for everything from the spontaneity of the masses and 'failing to recognise the role of the Party. Only a worshipper of spontaneity could expect effective action from the masses whose

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Jürgen Kuczynski, *Der Ausbruch des ersten ltkrieges und die deutsche Solzialdemokratie—ronik und Analyse* (East Berlin, 1957).

[7] *ZfG*, 1958, 1, p. 204.

organisation had been misused against themselves and who were betrayed by their leaders '.[8]

Professor Albert Schreiner, who acts as party spokesman on historical matters, attacked Kuczynski on grounds of principle.

> Kuczynski is ultimately precluded from a true understanding of the attitude of the working class owing to the philosophical idea which he has expressed on previous occasions and which involves a denial of the historically creative role of the masses. It is obvious that Kuczynski believes that this 'failure of the masses' [in 1914] illustrates the validity of his un-Marxist ideas.[9]

PROFESSOR Meusel, whose attack on Kuczynski's work followed some months later, allied himself on the whole with the previous critics.[10] Here for the first time was a historian of some weight expressing his views on Kuczynski. Whether they were his own personal views remains an open question. He too took the line that it was not the mood of the masses and the profound loathing of the officials and adherents of the SPD for Tsarist-Muscovite despotism that led to the party truce, but the corruption of the perfidious party leaders who desired that 'the largest possible scraps should fall from the monopolists' table for the labour aristocracy'.

All the same, Meusel's procedure in matters of detail is considerably more objective. He admits that the fear of Tsarism was very effective among the German industrial workers; that the party truce was made possible by 'the nationalistic incitement of the German people that had been going on for several decades'; and that 'the intense anti-war feeling that still predominated among the class-conscious workers at the end of July 1914 and which was expressed in tremendous demonstrations which have been underrated by Kuczynski, was not resolute enough to act as an unbreakable dam against the chauvinistic spring tide that broke in on the outbreak of war.'

The final part of Meusel's criticism throws a certain light on the true state of mind of the inner circle of historians in the Soviet zone. Meusel declares that 'it is necessary to demo
strate that Kuczynski's recent studies are bas
on false principles, since they are *au fond* r
visionist and therefore bound to do harm if th
are not refuted'. But Meusel goes on to sa
with an expression of remarkably friend
regard for Kuczynski the scholar and politic
fighter for social progress, that he is entire
free of the despicable kind of caution whi
shrinks from tackling dangerous questions a
always swears by the words of the old maste
Meusel is really lamenting, in this quiet hint, t
extent to which history is being overrun
orthodox dogmatism.

The central committee of the SED is pus
ing this 'anti-revisionist' line very vigorous
everywhere. The campaign for the 'victory
socialism' which was proclaimed at the fif
Party conference on 16 July 1957 is having
effect not least on the writing of history, as a
the theses propounded by the Politbureau
the SED on the tenth anniversary of the foun
ing of the German Democratic Republic
They are applied to contemporary history b
also used in the treatment of earlier perio
Thus Professor Engelberg, the chairman of t
communist Association of German Historian
declared at the foundation of this associatio

> One of the important duties of Marxist h
> torians is the study of pre-proletarian pat
> otic and revolutionary traditions. Th
> exposition by scholars will not only exte
> the horizon of the working class but w
> also contribute to the strengthening of t
> alliance between all levels of the worki
> population in the spirit of socialism a
> democratic patriotism, and to the creation
> the moral and political unity of our people

Even those subjects which, for thematic
documentary reasons, are treated somewh
less polemically and politically, are forced in
strictly Marxist categories. For example, t
conference at which the medieval section of t
German Historians Association was found
(January 1960), took as its second main the
the problems of the early middle-class revo
tion in Germany in the first half of the si
teenth century. Professor Max Steinmetz

[8] Ibid., p. 175.
[9] *Neues Deutschland*, 13 February 1958.
[10] *ZfG*, 1958, 5, p. 1049.
[11] *Neues Deutschland*, 25 August 1959, special su
plement.
[12] *ZfG*, 1958, 3, p. 492.

na formulated 34 theses which were taken as e basis of the conference.[13] He divided the volutionary events of the fifteenth century d the first third of the sixteenth into new riods, beginning in 1476 and ending in 1535, th the struggles separated into three stages. e also called attention to the existence, sides the Saxon-Thuringian area, of a second ntre of the early bourgeois revolution in Ger- any in the Alpine countries, which deserves ser consideration since, unlike Thomas ünzer's revolution of the common people, it is precisely here (Zwingli) that in certain cir- mstances chances of success did exist. After e disintegration of the centralised national ti-Roman movement two wings, a moderate d a radical, were formed within the revolu- nary party in the course of the Peasants' ar. Steinmetz regards the Peasants' War as e climax of the early bourgeois revolution, as e first attempt of the masses to create a ntralised national State from below.

The *ZfG* published (1960, 4, p. 974) the fol- wing comment on this conference: 'The ain task, that of combining all available ces and directing them to collective work on rticular problems, was taken in hand. In th subject groups the role of the masses, pecially the plebeian strata, was the main ntre of interest and thus the Marxist view of story was put forward and enforced.' But e journal also added this critical note :

> There are nevertheless certain lessons to be drawn from this conference. Above all, the study and application of historical materialism must be intensified, Marxist studies in the socialist states must be made better use of, and forms must be found in which collective work can proceed.

Historians are certainly being regimented and made politically-minded by the SED. All the evidence, above all since the opening of the third campaign for the bolshevisation of historical studies, confirms this. There is one department, however, which enjoys the special attention of the SED and the German Historians Association which is attached to it: local history, which has at all times been carried on mainly by amateurs. In the official manual on this field of study the introduction contains the following statement: 'The struggle for the development and victory of Marxist-Leninist history in the German Democratic Republic must also be waged in the sphere of local history.'[14] A little further on it is claimed that the writing of local history should be 'a means of training people in socialist patriotism, that is, in active cooperation in the development of socialism in the DDR and the defence of our workers and peasants State.' Like every other sphere of life in the Soviet zone, this field too is to be placed in the service of official policy and propaganda.

[13] *ZfG*, 1960, 2, p. 113–124.

[14] Hubert Mohr and Erik Hünns, *Einführung in die Heimat-Geschichte* (East Berlin, 1959), p. 1.

THE PRODUCTION OF LITERATURE

and the Literature of Production

Sabine Brana

THE term employed by the SED to describe the measures it has taken to reinforce its control of the arts is 'a cultural revolution of the workers and peasants'. The slogan under which this cultural revolution was carried through was announced by Walter Ulbricht, first secretary of the SED and dictator in the Soviet zone, at the fifth congress of that party in the summer of 1958: 'Workers, storm the heights of culture!' This military metaphor conceals, not the desire to raise the educational level of the Soviet zone workers, but the intention to create an army of auxiliaries who are to help the SED to supervise the writers. The writers were summoned to leave their writing tables and go into the factories and villages where they could study 'the reality of our tumultuous and transforming life' and so fit themselves to write of what was 'new in the present socialist revolution'. They were to shovel coal on the slagheaps, work alongside the toolmaker at the bench, trundle muck together with the collectivised peasant; they were to live and dwell among 'progressive working people' (i.e., communists), discuss with them the plans for their books, with them go through their manuscripts page by page.

To train the new style of critics for their job, the SED started a movement which called on the workers of the zone to write books themselves, and to show the professionals how the job should be done. 'Seize the pen, mate. Our socialist national culture needs you!' But in order to cure the workers of their diffidence about this new and unfamiliar kind of intellectual occupation, politically reliable writers were needed to teach the younger generation of workers how to set about it. How the difficulties of a marriage between art and life were to be tackled was demonstrated at a writers' conference called by the SED in April 1959. It was held in the recreation hall of the Bitterfeld electrochemical plant, and witnessed the first appearance of the communist cultural couple who have sin been the star attraction at all conferences a congresses in the zone—Regina Hastedt t writer, and Sepp Zach, the coal heaver, acti ist, bearer of the 'Banner of Labour' med and of two other medals for outstanding pe formance in socialist competition.

The two found each other in 1958, when t East Berlin writers union and the commun trade union federation were making joint pr parations for the 'seize the pen' movemer The two organisations invited a few write loyal to the party and a few selected worke to a meeting which, in the words of a parti pant, resembled nothing so much as an auctio Each writer had to select one of the worke that they might together storm the cultur heights. Miss Hastedt, whose assigned task was to write a book about the Karl Liebknec coal mine, chose the miner Zach. Until then s hadn't the slightest idea about work in a mi The coalface worker Zach, on the other han had never read a book or been to the theat So the writer set about giving him at least minimum of cultural education so that he cou advise her about the writing of her book. He his turn took her down the mine and let h shovel some coal, until her hands blistered, that she could acquire the necessary sense community with the working class. A year la the Hastedt-Zach book was finished.[1]

In the course of this cultural revolution liter ture in the Soviet zone sank to a depth fro which it could scarcely fall lower. Ulbricht, t SED boss, from the outset of the campaign o nounced all writers who might resist it revisionists, that is, as enemies of the state. T newspaper and book publishing houses we instructed to publish only those writings whi followed the new line in cultural policy, a since there are no independent patrons in t communist world, the writers had only t

[1] Regina Hastedt, 'Den lass ich nicht mehr lo *Neue Deutsche Literatur*, 1959, 6.

hoice between obedience, poverty, and persecu-
on. During the brief thaw in 1956 one of the
okesmen of the group of oppositional poets
ad written of the Stalinist control of art which
d then just ceased: 'With a few exceptions
tists were no more than hawkers of party
ecisions and government orders. They fabri-
ated works of art about government decrees,
stified mistakes and ignored reality.'[2] The
harge might well stand as equally applicable to
terature in the Soviet zone today.

ERICH LOEST, the Soviet zone writer whose books were published in the coun-
es of Eastern Europe in editions totalling
0,000 copies, disappeared without trace in
e autumn of 1957 from his home in Leipzig
the Soviet zone of Germany. In December
58 came the first public announcement of his
te. A brief report appeared in the press of
e trial of an anti-state group held in the dis-
ct court of Halle; the sentences imposed
nged from three to ten years. Loest was one
the prisoners, charged with counter-revolu-
nary activities.

He had never done anything except write, a
mmon enough practice among writers. He
d taken as his starting point and guide for
s work the maxims of the twentieth CPSU
ngress; he had taken destalinisation seri-
sly, and had written a story in which he said
hat he thought of the methods of the security
lice in the Soviet zone; he had written some
etches for the oppositional Leipzig cabaret
'he Pepper Mill'; he had not given up his
endship with those who had fallen into dis-
our with the SED, the Communist Party of
e Soviet zone; he had been unwilling to
gage in self-criticism before an SED investi-
tory commission. The SED took its revenge
the form of a prison sentence, the length of
ich was not announced, but may well be
1 years. One of his friends, the journalist
chen Wenzel, whom the Leipzig security
lice also picked up in the street, did not even
as far as a trial; he died during the police
amination.[3]

In the same year the publisher Walter Janka was given a five-year sentence, on the charge of counter-revolutionary activity. Janka ran the Aufbau publishing house in East Berlin, the most eminent in the Soviet zone, which brought out the works of Bert Brecht, Johannes R. Becher, Arnold Zweig, Anna Seghers, Thomas Mann, Lion Feuchtwanger, and the classics of German and other literatures. During the 1956 thaw Janka tried to liberate the Aufbau concern from the chains of Stalinist cultural policy.

In September 1957 Alfred Kantorowicz, the prominent communist writer, left his home in East Berlin and fled to the Western sector of the divided city. Explaining the reasons for this step, Kantorowicz wrote: 'It became more and more agonising for me to breathe in that stifling atmosphere of lies, crudity, stupidity, violence.'[4] At about the same time the two young poets Gerhard Zwerenz and Peter Jokostra fled from the Soviet zone, where arrest threatened them, to the Federal Republic.

The SED tried, through the police, to root out the last shoots that had broken through during the thaw. In any case, the thaw in the Soviet zone of Germany was a pretty timid affair compared with the revolt of the writers in Poland and Hungary, and was manifested primarily in a movement of young poets. But the SED saw in this escape from their control over art a danger to their entire position, and after the Hungarian rising of October 1956 the party regarded any display of tolerance in the cultural sphere as political suicide. The writers and artists of the Soviet zone were called to order, the products of the thaw were suppressed and their authors persecuted, slandered, and arrested.

The back-to-Stalin movement reached its climax at a cultural conference held by the SED in October 1957. Here the old Stalinist precepts for the right kind of artistic creation were restored to their position as binding rules for all cultural activities in the Soviet zone.

Prominent communist writers, right up to Johannes R. Becher, at that time Minister for

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'Revoluzzer?', *Forum* (East Berlin), 1956, 12.

Gerhard Zwerenz, 'Immer noch stalinistische rorjustiz', *SBZ-Archiv* (Cologne), 1959, 2.

[4] *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), 5, 12, and 19 September 1957.

Cultural Affairs, went through the act of self-criticism, and in public speeches acknowledged with deep regret that in their desire for artistic freedom they had sinned against the party and done a service to the enemy. A leading cultural official, one of the party whippers-in, made an aggressive speech denouncing the oppositional young poets in the zone as servants of the enemy and added this threat: 'There is a good deal of *Sturm und Drang* among our young writers. But in what direction is the storm blowing? Where is the pressure making for? The party will tell them what is right and what is wrong. Let no one doubt that . . . We can't go on any longer with the game in which every intervention by the party is regarded as an obstacle. It is high time to speak out clearly.' [5]

THE outlook for publishing houses and literary periodicals is dominated by names which were entirely unknown two or three years ago. They are the product of the 'seize the pen' movement, and the flood of writing which they have produced can perhaps be best described as 'incentive literature'. The novels, stories, plays are as like each other as peas. No matter whether the action is set in a factory, a village, a mine, or a dwelling, it is always a tale of how the progressive communists imbue their well-meaning but vacillating companions with the right kind of socialist consciousness, how production targets are fulfilled, hostile elements exposed, punished, locked up. Since these writings always faithfully reflect the current political or economic directives of the SED, it is not surprising that over the last year a great many writers have chosen the socialisation of agriculture as their theme. While the refugee camps in the Federal Republic were filling with farmers from the Soviet zone, driven to flight by forcible collectivisation, you could find in these tales by East German authors touching scenes of how a peasant woman who had agreed to join the collective farm brushes and polishes up her cows before they are led away from her stall into the collective stall; she tells them: 'You're not leaving here dirty. They'd make fun of and I'd be ashamed to my dying day.' [6]

The war literature of the Soviet zone fa into a special category of its own. It has go through a number of changes over the yea Stories about the war have been written si 1945, but in the Stalinist period it was qu impossible to write honestly about the w The stories that were written and publish were designed primarily to show that inhabitants of the SED state consisted of coerced and the misled, and also of course anti-fascist resistance fighters, whereas majority of the West German population w composed of Nazi war criminals steadily p suing their preparations for a new war, a with the development of the cold war Western allies were also drawn into the pictu

But in the last few years a good deal of a war literature has been published, some o very talented. It is entirely the product of 'lost generation', a parallel to the writings the West after the two wars (Hemingw Remarque, Mailer, Jones, etc.)—young m who grew up amidst the horrors of the w and whose despair and indignation came fr the heart. Among the most interesting, artis ally, is 'Die Höhle von Babie Doly' (*N Deutsche Literatur*, 1957, 12), a story by H Pfeiffer, a successful actor and former pupil Ernst Bloch. The story was based on a p report—since denied—about some Gerr soldiers hidden underground in Poland dur the war who, after six years of secret impris ment, come out into the world again. Pfei used the incident to illustrate by the drea fate of these men the whole tragedy of the w In *Dem Erdboden Gleich* (1957), Egon Günt describes how a fanatical Nazi incites a cr to lynch an American airman who has mad forced landing during an air raid; it is breathtaking study of human brutalisati Karl Mundstock's novel *Die Stunde des Diet Conradi* (1958) is concerned with the struggl the mind of an SS officer who, having falle love with a Polish Jewess, realises the crim character of the Nazi ideology and colla under the weight of the conflict in his hear

[5] Hans Rodenberg, 'Wo steht ihr, Kulturschaffende?', *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), 25 October 1957.

[6] Kurt Steiniger, 'Die Herrin', *Neue Deut Literatur*, 1959, 11.

The SED critics at once went into action against the writers who had so wrongly interpreted the party's peace propaganda. A leading East zone newspaper wrote: 'All our work and all our battles are now being regarded from the angle of peace or war. But for a socialist writer there lies behind these alternatives, these two words which move the whole world, the other alternative: Imperialism or socialism. He cannot *say* the word peace without *thinking* the word socialism.' Books which showed only of 'blood, muck, and death in the fire of battle' were harmful, for they inhibited the militant party spirit of the masses'.

THE communist critics accused the young writers of bourgeois pacifism and of having ignored the Marxist-Leninist appraisal of war. Günther is charged with a 'mystical' attitude to war, because he removes the question from the sphere of the class struggle to the sphere of psychology, and with a superfluous 'objectivism' because he attempts to penetrate into the heart of his characters, when all that is necessary is a practical political attitude.[7] Mundstock came in for the same kind of criticism, for trying to see into the heart of an SS officer; he had also committed the further offence of imitating Hemingway. 'Mundstock's story disagreeably recalls the melodrama of the wounded American general and the young Italian contessa in *Across the River and into the Trees,* which Hemingway wrote to edify poor-spirited creatures.'

Mundstock's novel also served as good terrain for the fight against 'tough language', a style of writing which the anti-war writers in the Soviet zone have taken over from the American novelists. The SED, which shrinks from toughness as unsuitable for those who are to bring communist salvation to the world, points out sharply against the tone of Mundstock's story: 'This crude-but-tender style is not inhuman.' And the critic adds: 'Mundstock is clearly striving after a certain literary manner. He is trying (consciously or half-consciously) to create a "style" of his own, and has forgotten that form cannot be divorced from content. Style cannot be surrendered without a surrender of ideology.'[8] The conclusion to be drawn was that writers who adopt the tough American style are propagating the ideology of American imperialism and acting as servants of the enemy. And that put an end to the authentic war novel in the Soviet zone.

Meanwhile a new kind of war literature has already appeared. It, too, has its model, found not in the literature of the West, but in the military training manuals of the Nazis. 'Writing soldiers of the People's Army' have now joined the 'writing workers' of the seize-the-pen movement. This moral-political-military literature of edification is designed not only for the troops of the Soviet zone army, but also, and in the first place, to awaken love for the army among the people. It is to show the man in the street in East Berlin and Leipzig what a difference there is between a socialist and a capitalist army, and why a call-up order in the Soviet zone confers an honour on the man concerned, whereas in the Federal Republic it is a crime. The Soviet zone Ministry of Defence has its own publishing house for putting out this literature. In 1959, when the zone was celebrating its tenth anniversary as a state, the Ministry of Defence publishers organised a literary competition for socialist stories about soldiers. The entries were collected into one volume, published on the anniversary day itself, and bore the title *Take up Arms* (*Nimm das Gewehr*).

The Ministry publishers issued the following statement: 'We received hundreds of entries when the competition was announced. Hundreds of writers came forward to help fill this gap and to create a People's Army literature. Writers and composers, officers and other ranks, workers and peasants, teachers, housewives, and others came forward. They were all writing for our army . . . The poems and songs and stories made known the work of our comrades and their readiness to serve peace and the construction of socialism.'[9]

How closely this writing resembles its Nazi predecessor can be seen from a story in *Take up Arms* which has been reprinted in the literary periodicals of the zone. Its author is a second lieutenant of artillery, and his story is

[7] *Neue Deutsche Literatur,* 1958, 4.

[8] Ibid., 1958, 12.

[9] Ibid., 1959, 9 and 10.

a moral tract on the egoism of an officer who, during manoeuvres, keeps his knowledge of the terrain to himself, as a result of which some artillery officers with their men remain stuck in the mud, while the egoist arrives at the goal in time. But since, in a communist army, there cannot really be any egoists and careerists, the officer regrets his uncomradely behaviour and publicly confesses his error, and everybody in the officers' mess behaves in an exemplary and heroic fashion. Precisely in these terms, twenty-five years ago, the schoolbooks described life in Hitler's barracks. There once more is the model Nazi leader-officer, but now he is called a party organiser.[10]

WHAT is surprising is that it is not the prominent writers who give the country its intellectual cast, as they do elsewhere, including the Soviet Union, but party hacks utterly lacking in talent. What then are the well-known writers doing? This is a question put by the SED. In April 1960 the SED cultural dictator Alfred Kurella declared sadly that 'many of our older artists, who even five years ago were at the very centre of our public life, now stand rather at the periphery, because they were unable to link their work directly with the cultural aspirations of the masses and the social transformations now taking place'.[11]

A year ago the SED tried to shake these writers out of the lethargy into which they had fallen since the restalinisation cultural conference of 1957. *Sonntag*, the journal of the Communist League of Culture, put out a circular in which artists, including writers, were asked to give a report on the work they were doing and their plans for future work. Strikingly few of the well-known names were to be found among the answers, and the few who did respond wrote with notable brevity and reserve. Ludwig Renn, offspring of the old imperial officer corps, General Staff officer of the International Brigade in Spain, and author of famous war books, managed to get four lines out of his pen. 'I am writing a novel about the 1918–19 revolution. What I will do after that only the gods know, and if there a no gods, then no one knows.' The novel Arnold Zweig promised a novel 'about the w in the Western Desert 1942–43', and ende 'My plans? Next year I will have a creati pause'.

Arnold Zweig, with whose honourable gr head the SED is always eager to decorate cultural congresses, brought out his last book 1957. It is called *The Time is Ripe*, and for the sixth in a cycle entitled *The Great Wh Man's War*, better known as the *Grischa Cyc* which has the First World War as its them The SED critics received this last volume wi mixed feelings. Between the lines you cou hear the reproachful question which the c ture functionaries of the SED have more th once put openly: Why does Zweig only wr about the First World War? Where is artist's appraisal of events after 1918, not mention after 1945?

Well, it isn't by chance that Zweig s quietly at home in his shell, leaving it only write articles for the newspapers. Twenty ye ago, in his novel *The Axe of Wandsbek*, set Nazi Germany, he showed that for him G man history did not end in 1918. But it w precisely this anti-fascist novel, which l great literary merit and breathes a milita humanism throughout, which the powers th be at Pankow find not to their liking a which they have successfully kept out of sig if not actually suppressed—the film based the novel was in fact prohibited. It was imp sible not to see in the novel a parallel betwe the brown dictatorship of that day and the dictatorship of today.

Zweig has never admitted openly this sp between his own humanist outlook and Communist Party line, but with the years has been driven into a dilemma which ma him in fact sterile—a quandary that entang all artists in the communist world. Incapab notwithstanding all his efforts at self-decepti of lying, Zweig has renounced in advance a attempt at a poetic treatment of the years si 1945, and in its place offered the SED, c cerned to establish its legitimacy, furt volumes of the *Grischa Cycle*. The last in series, *The Time is Ripe*, is chronologically first; it covers the period from summer 1913

[10] Heinz Senkbeil, 'Die Nacht am Fluss', *Neue Deutsche Literatur*, 1959, 11.

[11] Quoted by H. Kersten, 'Die Revolution von Bitterfeld', *Der Monat*, No. 141.

ring 1915, and is intended to set the scene nd expound the theme of the subsequent olumes. Compared with the full and moving riting of the other volumes, particularly *The ase of Sergeant Grischa*, this last work is npty. The treatment is thin, and is seriously ejudiced by anachronistic attempts to filter e events of those days through SED lenses. t it is still a subtle description, accurate in tail, of life in the last years of the Hohenzol-rns. Zweig obviously wrote it with loving re, and not all the political parentheses can nceal that this love is given not so much to e theme as to the period in which the story set. Sitting in his Pankow study surrounded the realities of the Soviet zone, Zweig has njured up a picture which does not scourge e epoch that gave birth to the First World ar, but is a bitter-sweet envoi to an age in ich a man was conscious of his individua-y, in which young love, golden wine, and the auties of other lands could be enjoyed at sure. So strong is the impact of these des-ptions of the loves and deeds of Zweig's aracters, their joys and sufferings are alled with such evident enjoyment, that the litical excursions woven into the tale lose all ce.

T was with far more enthusiasm that the SED critics greeted Anna Seghers' last ok, *The Decision* (*Die Entscheidung*), which peared in autumn 1959. Since her return m exile in Mexico at the end of the war, na Seghers had been continually at logger-ds with the cultural functionaries of the D. As a writer of high standing (she was arded the Kleist prize for her first story in 28, and won international fame in 1941 with anti-fascist novel *The Seventh Cross*), she not find it too easy to accommodate her ents to the demands of SED cultural policy, l the twentieth CPSU congress reinforced resistance. But with the Hungarian rising October 1956 she had to make her choice, rticularly since her husband is a Hungarian l she has many long-standing friendships in t country. Unlike Zweig, who sought refuge idylls, Anna Seghers, confronted with the ice between breaking faith with her Hun-ian comrades and renouncing the Com-munist Party, chose the party, and in token of her complete and final submission sacrificed to the party her last artistic reservations and wrote a book which, both in form and content, can match the products of the seize-the-pen movement. Punctually on the tenth anniversary of the foundation of the Pankow state she deposited her decision—as the SED press said —'as a gift on the table of our Republic'. The book was given an emphatic party welcome and praised as a 'masterpiece of socialist realism', and Anna Seghers received a national prize.

In her novel the world is divided along the correct diagrammatic lines—a socialist peace camp and a gang of capitalist warmongers. The action takes place largely in the United States, Mexico and France, countries which Anna Seghers knows from her emigré years. The United States is presented as a country whose government is following straight in Hitler's footsteps. At Washington's command, agents go to West Germany where they supervise the re-establishment of the armaments industry and share the profits with war criminals; US intelligence agents collect from Mexican forests and from West European prisoners camps former Gestapo officers and perpetrators of crimes against humanity and instruct them in how to commit sabotage in the Soviet zone.

In contrast we have the SED state, the German Democratic Republic. Here there are no weapons at all, as there are in the warmongering West. In Anna Seghers' novel there is not a single soldier of the People's Army, not even a People's Policeman. Instead we have progressive, very progressive, and extraordinarily progressive workers, SED members, trade union secretaries—and the security police. An engineer, entangled by an unfortunate chain of incidents in a factory accident, takes his life even before his first examination by the security service. Comrade Seghers attributes this to his deficient political consciousness; he has no faith in the agencies of the SED state. In any case she hasn't a very high opinion of the technical intelligentsia, for they never stop thinking, and thought is the worst enemy of belief, including political belief. She shows what crimes the thinking technician is

capable of; the leading engineers in her novel allow themselves to be seduced over to the West by American agents.

Notwithstanding the simple black and white colours, it is surprising that the SED should have greeted this book so warmly. Seghers' picture of the SED state is hardly attractive. It is full of the noise of machinery and the heat of furnaces, devoid of any living joy and peopled by bad-tempered communist militants. Couples in love measure their feelings by each other's performance in socialist construction, and cease to love if the other falls down on the job. The uneasy impression is not softened by the speech of her characters: 'And I tell you, mate, you get more out of life here. It belongs to you, do you understand? What you're living is yours. What you do, what you have. The land belongs to you. Over there, it's true, many things are better and cheaper. Margarine, shoes, clothes—is that what you mean by "getting more out of life"? No . . . People have at last had the good idea of sharing out everything afresh and equally.'

The reason for the SED's approval of this grey picture of the Soviet zone is the author's unreserved surrender to the abominable. It is true that she does not conceal anything, but she also approves everything; in her novel the SED state, in all its repulsiveness, is the only country in which life is worth while. She had already made the leap into the absurd which the SED demands of its writers.

THE third prominent Soviet zone writer to publish a new book during this cultural revolution was Willi Bredel. Bredel, an old communist, is one of the few worker-poets in the DDR who once really were workers, and one of the few who would be capable of writing useful books if their party did not hamper them. At least once, in *The Fathers,* a novel about the early days of German social democracy, Bredel showed that he had a talent for writing. In the sequel, *The Sons,* there is already apparent an adjustment to the Stalinist picture of the world, while the third volume, *The Grandsons,* was a literary catastrophe.

In 1959 Bredel published *A New Chapter.* It is a story set in Rostock during the early years of the Soviet occupation. Since it has become customary in the Soviet zone to call eve book which has more than a certain numb of pages a novel, Bredel calls this a novel to but in fact, like Zweig's and Seghers' books, is a kind of political-historical picture seri with the scenes loosely tied together. It is form eminently suitable for a commun author whose purpose is not communicati but demonstration.

Bredel takes nearly 400 pages to show th the years of Soviet communist rule since 19 were the only way of rising to a better life. T do this he first of all dismisses all the horro connected with the entry of the Red Arm The rapes and murders become in his tale t imaginings of hysterical petty bourge women; looting the boisterous pranks of har less high-spirited soldiers. A German g whose bicycle is taken away by a gang ebullient Red Army soldiers at once fin fatherly consolation and help from the Sov commandant: 'No, don't cry. You'll get yo bicycle back, I give you my word. If not you then another.'

To fill the key positions in the new admin tration the Soviet authorities have broug with them a staff of well-drilled officia former German emigrants to Moscow, wh the occupation authorities can of course tr more than they can trust the communists w stayed in Germany and had lost touch with the switches in the party line while in Hitle concentration camps. Bredel knows what is talking about. Himself a Moscow emigré, was appointed political instructor in Meckl burg after the war. The political instructor his novel explains what his job consists 'After a decade of brain softening un fascism, we have to get the workers to und stand afresh what their historical mission But if even communist workers, in the abse of guidance and control from Moscow, beco uncertain in their appreciation of politi questions, what can be expected of so democratic workers? To show that the desi workers' and peasants' state can only be communist state, Bredel presents us with group of foolish and ignorant social democra led by a gang of intriguing hypocrites, w from the very first cherish the idea of betra to the capitalist class enemy on the other s

f the zone frontier. The foundation of the ocialist Unity Party (SED), which the com-unists had planned, then appears as the ecessary outcome. In similar fashion Bredel stifies the trick of smuggling reliable com-unists into the Social Democratic Party—' in rder to strengthen the will to unity among the ocial democrats '. The SED is founded, and e SPD is liquidated. As to elections, Bredel's olitical instructor makes it clear what his arty thinks about democratic elections: ' We'll old elections . . . but only when the workers ave reached some degree of political consoli-ation, and when people understand what we ean by true democracy.'

It is difficult to decide whether Bredel is out ly to justify his party, or is indulging in this eological casuistry out of pure cynicism. He esents us with a real curiosity in the scene in hich two Soviet officers are discussing the building of Rostock. ' They've actually begun dismantle the Heinkel plant. When you ink that no worker or employee has yet had ll wages or salary, because no cash has yet en released, I must say that the willingness rebuild is astonishing.'

The SED did not accept Bredel's candour as thusiastically as Seghers' confession of faith. er picture of the Soviet zone is in any case at every zone inhabitant knows; but Bredel veals too much of what goes on behind the olitical curtains, and before the manuscript as passed for publication he had endless diffi-lties with the censor. These went as far as e SED central committee, who compelled redel to make changes in the disputed pas-ges, and since so much that is revealing was t in the book, it is easy to imagine how teresting must have been the details that ere left behind in the censor's sieve.

A less prominent Soviet zone author did not t by so easily. Herbert A. W. Kasten wrote historical novel—*Karsten Sarnow* (1958)—t in the fourteenth century and concerned th a bourgeois-democratic movement against e rule of the patricians in the port of Stral-nd. The hero whose name gives the book its le is a cloth merchant, whose story Kasten und in some old papers. At first the novel as well received by the SED critics, and the atter might have ended there, but unfortunately the party poet Kuba (Kurt Bartel) had written a play with a similar theme set in the same period. Kuba, a fanatical communist, at one time a poet of talent and now one of the worst of the whippers-in, denouncers and mischief-makers, wrote his piece to show that all previous history was nothing but preparation for the rule of the SED. He chose as his hero the pirate Klaus Störtebeker, who ' took from the rich and gave to the poor ', made him take up the revolutionary fight against the patricians, giving him the character of a kind of prehistoric communist. With such a revolutionary epic as criterion, the bourgeois reformer Karsten Sarnow no longer seemed so acceptable. Since Kuba's play was designed precisely to suit SED requirements, it was not difficult for the influential party poet to get his competitor's book ground to bits in the mills of SED cultural policy. The reviewers' attitude to Kasten switched overnight, and the brave cloth merchant Sarnow suddenly became a predecessor of the West German social democrats and therewith a lackey of the class enemy; Kasten was asked to rewrite his book, taking Kuba's piece as his model. All Kasten's arguments to show that, in contrast to Kuba, he had followed the historical facts, were of no avail. He refused to make the required changes, and when his position became really dangerous, fled to West Berlin. Kuba's *Störtebeker* was produced on a large open-air stage on the island of Rügen, and free transport was provided for the audience.

But even now, after three years of the new cultural policy and a propaganda campaign in all its publications, the SED does not seem to have had much success. In April 1960 a second cultural conference was held at which the party drew up the balance-sheet, and came to the conclusion that there was still a distressing deficiency of revolutionary spirit. Associations and schools concerned with arts and letters came in for pretty severe criticism: ' The retraining or expulsion of those who reject our art policy or are sceptical about it, which we have been insisting on for years, day in and day out, has not been carried through.' One SED speaker ended his remarks with the words: ' Colleagues, we must take the bit in our teeth and storm the heights of culture.'

LETTER FROM BERLIN

Heinz Kerste

The East German Theatre after Brecht

IT was only shortly before his death in August 1956 that Bertolt Brecht had the satisfaction of seeing his plays produced in other theatres of East Germany than his own Theater am Schiffbauerdamm, the home of the Berliner Ensemble in East Berlin; they had been presented in a great many provincial centres. The critical note running through all his plays, their appeal to the audience to think for themselves, had always made him suspect to the Stalinist dogmatists, and it was not until the thaw that his work was allowed to reach a wide public within the domain of the SED. Nor was this Brecht renaissance stifled when the SED authorities changed their cultural policy after the revolt in Hungary. Their constant insistence on ' topical socialist plays ' which can serve as the mainstay of the theatrical repertoire, has even left Brecht as the East German playwright most frequently produced in the DDR, not least because there are so few others whose works have any artistic value. But notwithstanding the high esteem outwardly enjoyed by the plays of this writer since his death in that part of Germany which he chose as his last dwelling place, there is no doubt that his work has little in common with the idea of a ' socialist theatre ' entertained by the cultural policy makers of the Ulbricht regime. That emerges clearly from their attitude to some of the younger dramatists who take Brecht as their master.

Until the 1957–58 season, the East German theatrical repertoire reflected the general relaxation in the cultural climate, which was particularly marked even in the DDR after the twentieth CPSU congress. Plays of a communist colouring were given less frequently, and some plays were put on for entertainment only to meet the public demand; even a few modern Western plays were produced, while those by Soviet authors and dramatists from the other communist countries declined in number. But in 1957, as cultural life generally in East Ge many began to show the effects of the new ha line, the SED paper, *Neues Deutschland*, r ferred to the attempts of managements ' increase theatre takings by showing more a more plays of a shallow but " marketable character, by our own or foreign authors, i stead of by improving the artistic and ide logical level of their programmes ', and to the ' eagerness to produce " interesting " exper mental plays without concerning themselv about their ideological value or even their ide logical harmfulness '. Alexander Abusch, at th time deputy Minister for Culture and lat Minister on J. R. Becher's death, rebuked tho in the theatre who, after the twentieth CPS congress, denied ' the necessity for ideologic advice and direction from the Ministry f Culture '. ' In our theatrical work,' he said, ' in all our cultural activities, we can tolerate denial of the cultural-educational function of o socialist state, no revision of our state princip . . . Our workers and peasants government w as before use all spiritual means, and all t appropriate administrative means, to ensure t socialist character of our artistic developme It is in this sense that our state intervenes questions of art, and will continue to intervene

When, despite these warnings, a few theatr made no change of policy in the programm they announced for the forthcoming season, a instead of ' topical socialist plays ' by East Ge man and Soviet writers announced plays modern Western dramatists like Anouil Giraudoux, and O'Neill, and ' bourgeois cri cal-realist ' plays, the way in which ' our st intervenes ' was given a dramatic demonstr tion. On the instruction of government a party officials, the theatrical programmes had be changed, and of the total of 63 producers least 10 had been dismissed for politi reasons by the autumn of 1959.

The strongest resistance to the SED's policy f *Gleichschaltung* was put up by the theatre in ast Berlin. With an eye to its position as repre-ntative of the capital, and, no less cogently, o the proximity of the Western sectors of the ity, it had managed to maintain a compara-vely high artistic level; this it did not wish to ndanger by dubious experiments with the new opical socialist plays so beloved by the SED, hich maintained no such aesthetic standards. ED criticism was levelled chiefly at the eutsche Theater and the Volksbühne, which ere accused of neglecting 'topical socialist lays' and favouring bourgeois critical realism. n article on this subject in *Neue Deutsche iteratur*, the journal of the East German riters union, reached the following conclusion:

> In the 1952–53 season one-fifth of all the plays put on by the Deutsche Theater and the smaller theatres were examples of post-classic bourgeois drama [this category extends from Ostrovsky, Ibsen and Hauptmann at one end to Irwin Shaw, Giraudoux, and 'My Friend Harvey' at the other]; one-half were socialist plays. Since then the numbers in the first group have risen steadily, and reached two-thirds in the 1956–57 season [this proportion was maintained in the following season], while the other group declined to one-tenth in 1955–56 and the following years.

EARLY in 1959 the SED leaders found the opportunity to make the unsatisfactory tuation in the East Berlin theatre the subject f a press campaign designed to bring about ie required changes. The leading drama expert the Deutsche Theater, Dr. Heinar Kipphardt, ho had already been severely criticised on any occasions, and who had just gone over settle in the Federal Republic, had turned own a new play by Gustav von Wangenheim, ell known for his loyalty to the SED line. nder the title 'Student Comedy', it dealt with uestions in which the SED was interested be-use of their relevance to its propaganda for he socialist transformation of high schools', ut it did so at a pretty low artistic level. The ast Berlin Volksbühne had also turned down propagandist play of which the SED thought highly; this was the dramatisation of the satirical comedy 'The Captain of Cologne', by Slatan Dudow and Michael Tschesno-Hell, already shown as a film, which follows the career in the Federal Republic of a waiter who pretends to be a much-decorated officer sought as a war criminal.

The displeasure of the SED cultural authorities was deepened by the action of the Volksbühne in putting on 'The Bath-house', the last play written by Mayakovsky before he killed himself in 1930; this is a bitter satire on bosses, bureaucrats, and jumped-up art officials. Banned in Stalin's lifetime, it was produced in Moscow with great success after his death. At the Moscow drama festival arranged for the fortieth anniversary celebrations, it was staged in Meyerhold's original version of 1929 and was awarded a prize. Although the director of the Volksbühne, Fritz Wisten, called in one of the co-producers of the Moscow presentation to put it on in East Berlin, the play was withdrawn on SED orders after only five performances, and the East Berlin press was forbidden to report the enthusiastic reception it was given on the opening night. Clearly, the SED leaders have an even more orthodox and dogmatic cultural policy than their Soviet mentors.

Since 'The Bath-house' could not be used as the theme for public debate, the Deutsche Theater was chosen as the target for concerted press attacks; the East Berlin theatre was said to be 'backward', as shown by its failure to put on plays by East German writers which had had successful runs in the provinces, and the attack led on to charges that it showed revisionist tendencies. In March the cultural commission of the SED Political Bureau summoned the East Berlin theatre personnel to a meeting, at which the party put its line across and the director of the Deutsche Theater, Wolfgang Langhoff, performed the required self-criticism. Thereafter the two East Berlin theatres which had annoyed the SED had to put on the 'topical socialist plays' which they had earlier rejected, and the men responsible for the choice of plays were replaced by others more agreeable to the SED.

At a meeting of SED members of theatre personnel, held on 28–29 May 1959 in East

Berlin, the party once more expressly emphasised its claim to leadership in all matters connected with the theatre and demanded the transformation of the DDR stage into a 'socialist theatre'. The head of the cultural department of the SED central committee, Siegfried Wagner, took the opportunity to find fault with certain aspects of the new East German drama, which had already aroused considerable misgivings among a number of prominent officials. The dispute concerned the so-called 'didactic-dialectical play', derived from Brecht, and embodying dramatic ideas popular in the Soviet theatre in the twenties but later condemned by the Moscow authorities. Plays in this genre aimed at revealing contradictions in social development and made no attempt to gloss over the facts; they were meant to appeal to the intelligence of the audience and for the most part excluded emotional factors. The official cultural politicians' dislike of the 'didactic theatre' is based on the contention that plays of this kind, because of their abstract and intellectual quality, do not 'reach' the audience and are therefore 'ill-adapted' to the 'creation of socialist consciousness'. And there is the further fear, not expressed, that these plays are deficient in 'party spirit', and might lead the audience to undesirable conclusions. Of the 21 plays put on for the first time between the SED cultural conference in October 1957 and the beginning of 1959, twelve may be put in the 'didactic-dialectical' category. Their authors are all young.

The play most frequently produced was Helmut Baierl's *Die Feststellung*, which in style shows Brecht's influence most strongly. It deals with the flight of farmers from the DDR and the right way of setting about persuading them of the advantages of SED agrarian policy. A farmer and his wife have returned from the West, and at a meeting of members of the agricultural cooperative (collective) the reasons for their flight are examined. It turns out that the chairman of the collective had used threats to get the farmers to join. To show how he should have set about his job, the incident which led to the flight is re-enacted at the meeting (this is the high spot of the play), then the roles are reversed, and finally a cunning but by no means 'progressive' farmer is put up to recruit th pair as members, and he manages to convin them of the advantages of collective farming.

Another play in this category, Heiner Mü ler's *Der Lohndrücker*, deals with the yea 1948–49 and the beginning of the 'activis innovator' movement in East Germany. Th positive hero is the mason Balke, a charact drawn from the East Berlin workingman Ha Garbe, who made his name by lining a furna before the fire was completely out. On the sta his repeated over-fulfilment of the producti norm brings on him the reproaches of his fell workers. One of them, whose work turns o to be wholly useless, is sent to prison as a sab teur, and makes this comment: 'Well, the you are. You sweat yourself sick for thir years; you eat like a dog, and wear yours out to an old crock. And then you're called saboteur. There's your workers state for yo You're no better than the Nazis'. Anoth worker buttonholes the party secretar 'You've been living on politics, secretary. Th haven't got socialism in America, but t workers there go to work in their own ca Here, with socialism, you have to have a perm to get shoes. Can you explain that?'

Throughout the play the workers speak this fashion. They grumble about high pric complain that the factory management is e ploiting them, and once even try to strike. Th director of the factory sums up their attitu soberly: 'They haven't any confidence in t party'. Of course, the play ends with an op mistic vision of the triumph of the new as e bodied in the ideas of the activist Balke, but t realistic scenes that precede this provok *Neues Deutschland* to critical comment: 'Th displaying-the-new-life-just-as-it-is kind of pl forces the author into the position of a passi observer, and may prejudice his attitude in t choice of material for use as the subject dramatic conflict'.

While *Der Lohndrücker* was not staged wi out difficulty, the next play by Müller, *Die K rektur*, had to be rewritten several times party orders before it had its premiere. The pl deals with the construction of a large industr plant in East Germany. An old communist, w had not quite kept up with the party tacti

ine, comes to work at the plant and is put in harge of a brigade by the party secretary. He oon comes into conflict with his men, who want o persuade him to manipulate the production norms. Brigadier Bremer calls this treachery, nd sticks to his position even after he has been eaten up. When the foundation work in his art of the job collapses, he is held responsible, lthough the fault is only indirectly his. He ries to shift the blame on to an engineer, whom e denounces as a former assistant of Hitler. The engineer threatens to dismiss him, and the arty secretary persuades him to apologise which, after a severe internal struggle, he does, thus correcting his error for the sake of socialism. To complete the transition to a positive ttitude, one of the workers in the brigade who had helped to beat him up, announces his desire o join the party. The brigade undertakes to epair the foundation, and so harmony is restablished between Bremer and his men.

THE theme provides an opportunity to expose clearly a number of defects and grievances in ' the construction of socialism '—hortages of material, bureaucratic rigidity, disputes about spheres of authority, the flight from esponsibility, new housing without plumbing, nterruptions in supplies which reduce earnings nd lead to deception, extravagance, and so on. There are even references to relations between he sexes in these new industrial centres which re scarcely in harmony with socialist morals, nd to money-grubbers who wander from one ndustrial site to another, their eyes only on the ash, who grumble at difficulties, laugh at ocialist posters, curse the engineers, and get runk at night.

Such a presentation of reality on the stage ore little relation to the SED's idea of ' socialst drama '. Its spokesman, Siegfried Wagner, escribed it as ' presumptuous and inartistic '; it as ' incompatible with socialist drama ' to ' try o educate the workers by a demonstration of ncorrect behaviour '. The representatives of dialectical drama ' were accused of giving a ne-sided picture of the working class, one hich emphasised the contradictions without owever resolving them. Art, said Wagner, fulfilled its task only ' when it helps to resolve the contradictions that exist and that arise in building socialism '. The dialectical dramatists were further rebuked for their hostility to an artistic presentation of ' the socialist perspective '. ' A closer examination of the theory and practice of so-called dialectical drama ', Wagner concluded, ' reveals that it is shaped by an artistic method which is not in accordance with the method of socialist realism; it has no proletarian class content, but a bourgeois and petty-bourgeois one. Indeed, it even shows traces of Western decadence.'

The final rejection of the ' didactic-dialectical theatre ' came with Wagner's demand to the comrades of the Berliner Ensemble—Brecht's theatre in East Berlin—' to oppose more vigorously those who today would falsify Brecht and his work, or who falsely claim Brecht as their model and so hamper the development of socialist theatrical art '. ' Our socialist art,' he added, ' is not the outcome of any formal innovations; what is new in it is revealed primarily in its socialist content.'

These instructions having been taken to heart, plays are now accepted or rejected according to whether their content can or cannot help to instil a socialist consciousness in the audience, and, from this point of view, formal weaknesses are overlooked. Theoretically, most of the latest plays by East German authors are concerned with agriculture or industry, or present life in West Germany in the militarist Nazi colours prescribed by SED propaganda. Hedda Zinner, a prolific playwright, who had a resounding success some years ago with her play about the Reichstag fire, *Der Teufelskreis*, wrote a comedy for the DDR tenth anniversary, *What would happen if . . .*, which still reveals her craftsmanship but has a purely propagandist story. In a small village on the zonal frontier the rumour suddenly spreads that the area is about to be incorporated in the Federal Republic, as part of an exchange, and the play is concerned with the different reactions of the villagers to the prospect. She can find no better reason to explain the sudden attachment of these by no means ' progressive ' peasants to the DDR and the SED than to make them fear the return of the Count; he is the bogyman behind

the scenes. These new peasants all tremble for their land; only two, with fair-sized holdings, and the Count's former butler, rejoice at the rumoured change. Of course, at the end, they're the ones that have made fools of themselves.

A number of other plays serve primarily as recruiting agencies for the agricultural collectives. Frequently the 'positive hero' is a simple peasant woman, whose name gives the play its title, such as Gerhard Fabian's *Marie Hedder*, Helmut Sakowski's *Lene Mattke's Choice*, or Fred Reichwald's *Maria Diehl's Venture*.

'Topical socialist plays' by East German writers now account for about one-third of the DDR theatre programme. The general uncertainty created by the sharper line in SED cultural policy resulted in a large measure of uniformity in the plans for theatre repertoires. As against this, a conference held early this year laid it down that 'a socialist theatre repertoire must have breadth and diversity', and in consequence the programme for the 1960–61 season shows, within the limits of the politically possible, a greater variety than last year's. The classics account for a good part, but plays of the bourgeois realist school are better repre sented than they were before and there is, i addition to Soviet and Popular-Democrati authors, a sprinkling of contemporary Weste dramatists. All the plays in this group fall int the category of 'social criticism', such a Hardy's play about an Australian miners' strik *Black Diamonds*, Bright's *City of Angels*, whic has as its theme racial discrimination again Mexicans in Los Angeles, and the Danis dramatist Kielland's anti-imperialist piece, *On says no*. Even Adamov, who chose Paris, enjoy rising value. Last season his *Paolo Paoli* wa produced, and in the forthcoming season hi most recent play, *Spring 1871*, will be shown. is a tribute to the fighters of the Paris Com mune. Sartre and Anouilh are also include once more.

The choice of every play must still have i ideological justification, and this defines th limits of the theatre in East Germany toda That, despite these restrictions, the theatre, pa ticularly in East Berlin, can often stand up we to international comparison, is due solely to th quality of the artists still working there.

Painters in Uniform

AT the cultural conference organised by the SED in East Berlin at the end of April 1960 the head of the SED cultural commission, Alfred Kurella, asserted that it was the plastic arts that were 'most deeply infected by decadence.' It was there, too, that 'resistance to the transition to socialist-realist creative methods' was strongest. And it is indeed true that the disputes between the SED and these artists since the line hardened again in 1957 have been particularly long drawn out and wearisome and pretty ineffective.

During the thaw many artists in East Germany broke away from the mechanical socialist-realist style and turned once more to non-political themes. This was apparent in a number of exhibitions which were, on that account, severely criticised by the SED. Even abstract paintings turned up here and there, and the young artists in particular, as well as the art school students, began to examine serious the art of the twenties, hitherto forbidden, an to catch up with the moderns in the West.

A further impulse among the younger gener tion towards the moderns was given by an exh bition of the work of young Polish artists he in East Berlin in the summer of 1956; this ove whelmed the East German visitors by its bo search for new means of expression. Th pictures were a demonstrative rejection socialist realism, and the comments in the vis tors' book reflected the envy of East Germa art students and their dislike of the illitera cultural functionaries who cramped their ow artistic development.

Early in 1957 paintings by young Ea German artists were exhibited in the Dresd Albertinum; these too betrayed their efforts break away from the models until then he up to them, and unmistakable signs of th

nfluence of Picasso, Leger, Gilles, Kokoschka, Masereel, Moore, and Schwimmer. Characteristic of the change among many young artists is he work of Heinz Drache (born 1929) who, at he third East German Exhibition in 1953 howed propaganda-poster pictures with titles ike ' Party Secretary Rudi Günther ', and ' The eople say yes to peaceful construction ', and ow exhibited a ' Harlequin ' that recalls Hofer, nd abstract ' compositions.'

At the time the critics interpreted the new ote in the work of the young artists as an nderstandable reaction against the period of mitation and regimentation in art which was aid to be at an end, but the official rejection of his kind of experimentation, this thrust forward n a domain hitherto kept within close bounds, oon made it clear that an advance on these nes was considered undesirable. The relative olerance shown up to then came to an end with he disavowal of all liberalising tendencies and he reversion to a hard line in cultural policy. n a number of ways pressure was exerted on he art schools; in many cases both students nd teachers were dismissed.

Public discussion of questions concerning odern trends in the plastic arts was also stifled. uring the liberalisation period the journal of he East German Artists Union, *Bildende unst,* had devoted a good deal of space to hese questions and published a number of unrthodox contributions. The editor-in-chief, erbert Sandberg, was dismissed, and the SED eoretical review *Einheit* made a strong attack n the editorial board, who were rebuked for aving published the works and ideas of ' antiumanist and reactionary artists.'

Preparations for the fourth East German Art xhibition were used as an opportunity by the ED to give further emphasis to their demands n the artists and to come out forcefully against l liberal tendencies. The discussion of an hibition held in Halle early in 1958 of pictures nt in by the Halle and Magdeburg district of he Artists Union acquired particular signifince. *Neues Deutschland,* the SED daily, wrote this exhibition that ' of the 308 works shown, ose that deal with the problems of our time n be counted on the fingers of two hands '; the exhibition was nothing more than ' formal experimentation.'

At a meeting organised by the Halle district committee of the SED, this ' lack of ideological clarity ' was brought up, and the artists were severely rebuked and called to order. The discussion lasted two days, at the end of which the SED had, at least in appearance, put its policy across and won acceptance for its attitude that the Halle exhibition showed ' how great was the influence of decadent ideas on many members of the union, including party comrades . . . that in their work most artists did not start from the sentiments and thought and imaginative world of the working class . . . that art is not an end in itself, but subordinate to the class struggle and to politics, that there can be no peaceful ideological coexistence, no peaceful coexistence of decadent and socialist art.' ' Partisanship on behalf of the working class interests ' was shown ' in the shaping of socially significant themes and in an intelligible language of form.' Soviet art was the ' model in the application of the method of socialist realism.'

IN the weeks and months that followed, this statement was endorsed by the committee of the Union and the other district committees. A number of meetings of the Union were attended by industrial workers who, ' speaking for the people,' echoed the party's criticism and advanced demands. Other ' educational ' measures included the despatch of delegations of artists to factories and farms, where they were to find the themes recommended by the SED.

The fourth East German Art Exhibition, held in Dresden from October 1958 to January 1959, made explicit the dilemma of the artists, caught between their own inclinations and the new pressure for political commitment in theme and restriction in form. Of the 623 exhibits, only 133 carried a direct political message of the correct kind; a further 154 dwelt on themes that accorded with SED wishes, while the subject of 336 was neutral. The genre most highly praised by the propagandists of socialist realism, mirrors of the Soviet model, was only inadequately represented, or did not treat the correct kind of theme. In many of the works shown the artist's acknowledgment of official art doctrine

was restricted to the title he gave his picture, and practically all of them gave evidence of a flight into the unorthodox. Even the portraits were largely neutral. Political subjects were more widely represented in the graphic arts than in painting, but even there what was typical was an artistic handling of the themes of war and fascism rather than representations of 'the new life in the DDR.'

The party critics were not slow to voice their disappointment; SED chief Ulbricht was particularly dissatisfied. He deplored the 'liberal-bourgeois concept of the "worker" as someone always to be pitied, always suffering and helpless' and the 'decadent devaluation of the human form which generates an inclination to portray what is ugly.' Pictures in which 'arms and legs become sticks, and heads become schematic egg-shaped images' were 'unfortunately all too numerous.' And to this criticism he added the threat of economic pressure: 'Artists who see and present people in this fashion must not be surprised if no art-loving worker or peasant wants their pictures. And I would add that the agencies of our State would simply not be justified in encouraging the creation and distribution of works of this kind, or in spending the workers' money to buy such pictures.'

Speaking at the cultural conference in April 1960, Ulbricht said that he still missed, in most paintings and even in posters, 'the new socialist man, the enthusiastic worker,' and portrayals of 'the historic struggles of the working class.' From which it appears that nothing essential has changed in the work of East German artists since the fourth art exhibition, although the SED made great efforts to influence developments in the desired direction. A prominent theme at the fourth congress of the Artists Union, held early December 1959 in Leipzig, was the close bond between artist and worker, and a number of examples were adduced of entry by artists into the life of factory and farm, as a result of which, it was said, the artists had modified the resulting works in accordance with the wishes of the 'toilers.'

In his report to the conference on 'The Seven Year Plan and the Tasks of the Plastic Arts,' Willi Wolfgramm (subsequently elected deputy president of the Artists Union) took to task the representatives of a 'third way' in the plastic arts. Wolfgramm reprimanded the adherents of this 'third way,' which was said to run 'between the dubious achievements of bourgeois modernism and socialist realism,' for 'holding bourgeois views alien to our art' hampering the development of an art truly bound to the people, a partisan in the cause of the working class and the people, and preventing artists from turning to what is new and speaks of the future in our life.' The agitation for the 'third way' took the form of discussions of neo-realism, Picasso, the Mexicans and Brazilians, of the discovery of Buffet, of enthusiasm for the Venice *biennale,* and now they had reached Henry Moore. 'The realists of the 19th and 20th centuries are rejected as "dusty," "academic," and "conventional." They speak of "expressive realism," of "magic realism"; it is only about socialist realism that many of our colleagues here are not inclined to talk openly and seriously.'

THE teaching staffs of the art schools also came in for sharp criticism in Leipzig. Many teachers were 'ideologically uninterested' and therefore even if they had considerable talent as artists they could not be good teachers. In an eleven-point programme for the Union, therefore, a demand was made for the promotion of a 'new, socialist system of education.' The first point of the programme, significantly enough, is the demand for organised study of Marxism-Leninism and Marxist aesthetics for the members of the Union. References to 'ideological clarity' as the 'most important prerequisite for artistic creativity' were frequent throughout the congress meetings. There was also the suggestion that a movement should be started on the lines that 'artists and people are one.' The study and criticism of art should be directed along the lines followed in the USSR and 'the aesthetic judgment of the working class'; in their work the exhibition selection committees and bodies which commissioned and bought works of art, as well as museums and art publishers, should apply the criteria of socialist realism and the cultural

policies of the SED. If they complied with these demands, if they took the road desired by the party, artists would find that the question of their livelihood was settled satisfactorily.

Typical of the methods used to oblige artists to follow the official line is an agreement on cooperation between the Trade Union Federation and the Artists Union, in which the most important clause is the provision for working agreements between factory managements and artists. These oblige the artist under contract to execute his commissions 'according to the methods of socialist realism,' to join a collective workers brigade if possible, and to support cultural activities in the factory. He would receive a monthly salary from the factory and in return, at the end of the year, would submit a report on the work executed as artist, as factory hand, and in cultural activities. Agreements of this kind had been concluded by 99 factories at the time the cultural conference met. But on the whole, factory managements appear as reluctant as the artists themselves, who fear above all—and justifiably—an encroachment on their independence as artists. But those who do commit themselves have other privileges accorded them, such as reduced rates at trade union holiday centres and journeys abroad with trade union delegations. The regime's effort to use material pressure to persuade artists to adopt, at least outwardly, communist art doctrine, can also be seen in a recommendation by the SED political bureau to all public and state bodies 'to give preference to those artists who . . . take part in the new development.'

That such artists are still a minority was obvious from the speeches at the cultural conference, in which reference was continually made to 'misunderstandings,' 'lack of understanding,' 'resistance' among artists, particularly those of the older generation, about SED cultural policy. The 'conflicts' and 'crises' of the artists were to be overcome by collective and individual party persuasion. But there was no thought of permitting 'misunderstanding and resistance, supported by the great authority of the artists, to exercise their influence in government and social institutions which directly affect our cultural and artistic life, where they would act as obstacles to development.' Kurella named the executive committees of artists unions, where the new tendencies have been strengthened recently; art schools, where 'the retraining or exclusion of those who reject our cultural policy or regard it with scepticism, which we have been demanding for years, has not been carried out'; and, most important, the East Berlin Academy of Arts. The Academy, whose fifty members represent whatever is outstanding in the art world of East Germany, and who for the most part made their name in the twenties, was accused of showing extreme reluctance in regard to the practical questions of cultural development; several of its members regarded themselves as 'guardians of true art against the art that is now growing out of the artist's direct contact with the working people.' A resolution passed by the conference asked the government to investigate the work of the Academy.

Nevertheless, even after this criticism, the Academy organised an exhibition to celebrate its tenth anniversary, which still displayed all the features so displeasing to the SED. Political themes were far less well represented than non-political, and the quality of the work shown by artists like Fritz Cremer, the Academy President Otto Nagel, Hans-Theo Richter and Josef Hegenbarth was far superior to the work of any of the young artists recently on view. Of course, it should not be forgotten that the development of this younger generation is once more being hampered; the feeling for what is modern can find an outlet only in industrial design, the illustrative arts, and handicrafts. But the experience of the short liberalisation period still suggests the conclusion that the future in East Germany will scarcely belong to socialist realism.

CURRENT SOVIET STRATEGIC IDEAS

H. S. Dinerstein

MAY 1960 was a dramatic month in international life. The Soviet Union announced that a U-2 American reconnaissance plane had fallen into Soviet hands; the United States through its Secretary of State announced that the plane was American and explained the necessity for reconnaissance. President Eisenhower made it clear that his Secretary of State had spoken for him too, and then Mr Khrushchev came to Paris only to reject, with an unprecedented display of bad manners, the Summit meeting he had sought so assiduously and so long.

Ordinarily such a combination of events would signify a radical change in the foreign policy of one or more countries. But as the shock wears off, it is the continuity rather than the change in the policy of the major powers that stands out. The Berlin crisis is still not resolved, but postponed. The position of the major powers has not altered on this issue, which Khrushchev brought into singular prominence by his incessant attention to it.

It seems likely that Khrushchev once hoped that differences of view within the NATO alliance, and the cumulative effect of Soviet trumpeting of missile superiority, would cause the West to make some concessions on the Berlin issue at the Summit. But several months before the Summit meeting he began to suspect that this estimate was over-sanguine and the Soviet Press began to hedge its bets on the conference. The stand taken by the United States on the U-2 incident, and the support it received from its major allies, converted the Soviet suspicion into a conviction. Khrushchev apparently preferred postponement and no contest at all on the Berlin issue to a confrontation which would yield none of the desired results. Soviet policy on Berlin is, to use a harsh but accurate word, blackmail. If the victim is not intimidated, the blackmailer must execute his threat or be discredited. Should the Soviet Union now begin to apply any one of the many measures for which the Berlin blockade established precedents, the play would go to the West. The West might acquiesce without protest, but on the other hand it might be spurred to measures the Soviet Union would prefer to avoid. For example, the candidates in the American presidential election would probably agree that the changed situation made higher military appropriations a necessity. Whatever dangers the Soviet leaders may see in a policy of unilateral action on the Berlin issue, they have decided that it is wiser, either to make another attempt to get the West to agree to concessions on Berlin, or to postpone the execution of their threats until after the American election.

But the Soviet moratorium on threats to Berlin is not a policy of the removal of pressure. Moscow has threatened to hit bases from which planes depart on missions of reconnaissance of the Soviet Union, and at the same time has made yet another disarmament proposal. Now the Soviet Union wants to start disarmament with delivery vehicles (including American overseas bases) rather than with the weapons. But the continued vagueness on inspection measures leaves the observer with the unchanged impression that Soviet interest in disarmament is tactical rather than actual, although this will not prevent the Soviet Union from wringing whatever political profit it can from talking peace while making military threats. In short, the failure of the Summit meeting to take place has not changed basic Soviet policies. On 14 January of this year Khrushchev addressed himself to problems of Soviet policy and revealed much of the development of Soviet thinking. Since this speech to the Supreme Soviet remains the most complete statement of Soviet assumptions about the strategic situation and its political implications, it merits careful examination.

THE Soviet Union, he said, had become and would remain stronger in the weapons that counted for victory in modern war. As part of the programme for continued improvement, the overall size of the armed forces would be reduced over the next two years. This would cause a reduction of military

budgets in the capitalist countries, and the Soviet Union would perfect missiles, take steps to insure their survival if war broke out, and develop new weapons until agreement on general disarmament was reached.

Khrushchev boasted that the Soviet Union was now 'unassailable'. The term 'unassailable' was rhetorical, for Khrushchev admitted that in a nuclear war the Soviet Union would suffer great losses, but the meaning is clear. The attacking power or powers would be wiped from the face of the earth, and the Soviet Union would survive. Thus Khrushchev claimed that because of superior military strength the Soviet Union, even if she were in the disadvantageous position of the defender against a surprise attack, would suffer great but limited damage, while her enemies would suffer complete destruction. This preponderance of Soviet strength, which Khrushchev promised he would maintain, would continue to reduce international tension, because Soviet preponderance reduced the danger of war. Only madmen would attack the Soviet Union now, and although Khrushchev could discern such tendencies in West Germany, he hoped that the evidence of Soviet military strength would prove sobering and cause the West to behave sensibly on the unresolved problems that might cause serious difficulties, such as the status of West Berlin. If the West refused to come to an agreement on West Berlin, the Soviet Union and anyone else who desired to do so would make a separate peace with East Germany, which presumably would for the Communists settle the status of West Berlin. If any power then used force to oppose East Germany's assumption of her rights, massive Soviet retaliation was threatened.

The military strength upon which these threats are based was discussed in greater detail by Marshal Malinovsky on 19 January. The two speeches make the Soviet theory of the nature of nuclear war more explicit. Target systems and the philosophy of missile employment are described with greater authority and detail than ever before. The danger of a third world war is said to arise from the West German search for revenge. If West Germany or any other power attacked a member of the Soviet camp, it would be wiped from the face of the earth. Talk of limited nuclear war is nonsense because, if war should come, there will be massive employment of nuclear weapons.

In 1955, when Khrushchev replaced Malenkov, he charged Malenkov with complacency about the military position of the Soviet Union, with jeopardising the security of the Soviet Union by diverting resources to civilian needs. Now, when Khrushchev himself promises to increase the amenities available to the Soviet people by reducing the size of the Soviet forces, he is constrained to maintain that he is prudent where Malenkov was reckless; that the situation is different from that of 1955; that the Soviet Union is stronger and the danger of war less. These arguments undercut Khrushchev's attempt to prove that the reduction of ground forces is a selfless and unilateral Soviet contribution to the cause of disarmament and world peace, but they are dictated by domestic Soviet political necessities.

Political needs shape the form of Soviet policy statements and one must be careful to distinguish statements that reflect genuine Soviet views from those made for political effect, and again from those that reflect both aims.

One can discern this combination of influences in the treatment of the central question of the nature of warfare in the nuclear age. In 1955, after a prolonged doctrinal controversy, the recognition of the importance of nuclear weapons and surprise attack became official Soviet doctrine. But the losers in the conflict did not yield completely and continued to talk about mobilisation during the course of the war, to argue that nuclear war needed more ground forces than conventional war, and to repeat that wars were won by a combination of all arms. With the passage of time this residual resistance to the new doctrine has declined and now it is virtually proscribed.

Khrushchev has been in the vanguard of the campaign to elevate the ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead to the status of the supreme weapon. He is constrained by his own record to promulgate a theory of warfare in accordance with this position. He has associated the primacy of ballistic missiles with his leadership of the party and has changed the organisation

and equipment of the Soviet armed forces to suit his theory. Many of the more radical formulations to be found in the speeches of 14 and 19 January were adumbrated in earlier speeches but here they find their sharpest expression.

According to Marshal Malinovsky, who replaced Marshal Zhukov as Defence Minister, missiles, because of their great speed and the great distances they traverse, can now have 'a decisive influence in changing the situation in our favour. . . . Missiles are the most effective of all earlier and all presently existing means of war'. The reliability and the great destructiveness of nuclear-armed missiles change the character of the initial phase of the war. Formerly, Khrushchev recalled, wars started with an attack on troops deployed along a border, and in the first days of the war each side brought up reinforcements; now war starts in the deep rear 'so that there will be not a single capital, not a single industrial or administrative region which would not be subjected to an attack not only in the first days but even in the first minutes of the war. Thus the war will start differently, if it starts, and develop differently'.

This kind of statement has been common in Western writings on strategy in the last eight or nine years, but in the Soviet Union it represents the culminating point in a long development. Until recently some Soviet writers clung to the idea of extended wars. Now such a position seems to be excluded. The initial phase will last perhaps only for some minutes and the war will then develop in a manner different from that of past wars. Until now the importance of numbers, of the quantity of divisions, although minimised, has never been explicitly rejected. Now, Khrushchev says, 'the defensive capacity of a country is determined not by the number of soldiers we have under arms. . . . If we set aside the general political and economic factors about which I spoke earlier, then the defensive capacity of a country depends to a decisive degree on both the fire power and the delivery vehicles at the disposal of a given country'.

The insistence on the importance of the initial phase of the war is tied to missiles, and Khrushchev has announced that the production of bombers is being curtailed and will ultimately cease altogether.

THE conception of a nuclear war in which only missiles are the delivery vehicles requires reflection about target systems, measures to ensure warning of a possible enemy attack, and the ability to deliver a first nuclear strike. On some of these subjects Khrushchev and Malinovsky are explicit, on others they divulge only part of their views.

On target systems the speeches are more explicit and authoritative than earlier statements on the subject. Khrushchev discusses target systems in two contexts, first the minimal target system of a presumptive attacker, and secondly the targets which will probably be destroyed on both sides in the very first minutes of the war.

In discussing the requirements for a successful surprise attack, Khrushchev says the attacker must count on putting out of operation 'all stores of nuclear weapons and all missile installations'. For a power that wishes to strike first, this is apparently the obligatory target system. Khrushchev, in the description just quoted of the first few minutes of a nuclear war, described widespread destruction of strategic *regions* on both sides.

What does this mean? The targets which it is essential to eliminate if one is to be able to strike with impunity are counter-force targets. The other targets in the deep rear, which include administrative and political centres, almost necessarily fall into the category of population targets. Possibly Khrushchev mentioned population targets in his speech only to frighten his opponents, and in the event of war intends to aim chiefly at Western striking forces. But he wants to present as dismal a picture as possible of the devastation his weapons can create.

Although Soviet theory always assumes that the opponent would be the aggressor, it is necessary to examine whatever evidence is available on the Soviet preference for striking first. In earlier discussions of doctrine, Soviet writers stressed the advantages of surprise (if nuclear weapons were employed) to demonstrate, first that warlike elements in the West

night be tempted to strike first and gain victory, and second that the Soviet Union had to be able to pre-empt such a strike. Soviet ability to do this would deter Western aggressiveness and, if war came, would ensure Soviet victory. This doctrine was developed in the course of an internal controversy about military strategy and since that conflict of opinion was resolved any discussion of a Soviet first strike has been dropped, because its public advocacy would initiate the propaganda picture of the Soviet Union as a peaceable power which would retaliate against attack but never initiate a war. In these speeches of January 1960, therefore, discussion of a Soviet pre-emptive strike is eschewed, but everything said by Khrushchev and Malinovsky is consistent with a continued adherence to the policy of striking first if possible and if necessary.

Evidence of the persistence of this policy is to be found in Khrushchev's discussion of the problem of mutual deterrence. Khrushchev argues that, in the unlikely event of the West drawing even with the Soviet Union, it would still be deterred from striking first at the Soviet Union because it could not hope to knock out all the Soviet missile sites and therefore would have to reckon with Soviet retaliation on a scale that would make the initiation of war insane. In other words, striking first in a situation of missile parity would not offer enough advantages to make war a sensible policy. Khrushchev, however, says nothing about the advantages of a first strike for one side if it has the preponderance of missile strength which he now claims for the Soviet Union. How the Soviet Union survives is of course a matter of great concern to the Soviet leaders, and the kind of Soviet Union that would survive depends very much on whether that country strikes first or second. Here Malinovsky's employment of the phrase 'instantaneous retaliation' is of interest. If he were thinking of deterrence in its most limited sense, he would have been satisfied with 'inexorable retaliation'. To deter the opponent one must make him believe that the threat to retaliate would be executed, but to destroy the opponent and perish in the effort is not desirable and therefore not credible. Conversely, to destroy the opponent and to survive and recover is desirable and therefore credible. For this reason, in addition to the obvious one, the Russians want to be able to win the war and to convince their opponents of their ability to do so. Being able to win means reliable deterrence against all but madmen, and an expansion of the areas where Soviet influence and control prevail. To argue that the Soviet leaders want to be able to strike first in a nuclear war is not to argue that they want *only* to strike first. Khrushchev seems to think that the capability alone promises to win what the Russians want without the risk of war. Hence his dictum that preponderant Soviet power means the reduction of international tension.

THE theory of war promulgated by Khrushchev and assented to, apparently grudgingly, by the generals, is an extremely radical statement of the increased importance of strategic nuclear weapons in modern warfare. By the same token the importance of more conventional weapons of more limited range and effect is downgraded. It is proper to inquire whether Khrushchev is employing hyperbole to wring the maximum political effect out of the Soviet military position, while the operating Soviet military doctrine is not quite so radical. There is some evidence to that effect in the speeches themselves. Khrushchev talked of reducing and then stopping the production of bombers. Marshal of Aviation Vershinin, although he spoke very briefly, pointed out the practical significance of the continued production of aircraft. New aircraft, what types he did not say, were still to be phased into the forces. Khrushchev did not refer to what was once obligatory, the concept of combined arms; Malinovsky presented the formula but in a watered-down version. 'The missile troops in our armed forces are undoubtedly the chief type of the armed forces, but we understand that all tasks of war cannot be solved by one type of troops. Therefore, on the assumption that the successful conduct of military operations even in modern war is possible only on the basis of the coordinated employment of all means of waging the armed conflict, we are retaining, in the appropriate and reasonable proportion, all types of our armed forces, whose military

activity both in organisation and methods of operation will little resemble what took place in the last war.'

In the past, Khrushchev has made radical and too-sweeping statements about the decisive importance of the weapons which he claims the Soviet Union has in superior numbers. In each case he himself has later offered slight modifications of his thesis, his service chiefs have modified it a little more, and low-ranking officers writing in the military press have occasionally exhibited decently veiled but unmistakable resistance to it. As time passes the modifications become slighter and increasingly unimportant. Khrushchev's political predominance in his own country ensures that his theories are accepted as true. Subsequently, when theory is translated into practice, his theories become a true reflection of the real situation. For example, when the Soviet Union abandons large surface vessels and bombers, these weapon carriers will in fact no longer be able to challenge missiles in any review of the strategic picture. The theoretical primacy of missiles will have become actual. For these reasons we can accept Khrushchev's enunciation of the Soviet theory of nuclear war as an authoritative one with practical consequences for the future.

The Soviet leaders are faced with the dilemma of wanting at one and the same time to trumpet their claim to military pre-eminence and to present themselves as a force for peace in the world. Khrushchev wants to paralyse the West by a show of force, but he always risks galvanising the other side into increased activity. Hence his somewhat gingerly treatment of the subject of deterrence, which has been misinterpreted abroad as a statement of 'mutual deterrence'. Actually, the phrase 'mutual deterrence' is employed only figuratively in Soviet writing. The point deserves close examination because it is so characteristic of the dilemma inherent in the Soviet Union's political use of military power.

IN the future Khrushchev's speech of 14 January may be known as his massive retaliation speech. Like other political leaders, he has always sought to pursue his policies from a position of strength, but only recently has he acquired the power to do so. He has always linked the phrase, 'position of strength', in a derogatory sense with the schemes of Western powers. Nevertheless, as long ago as June 1954, in a speech where he departed from his written text, Khrushchev spoke approvingly of operating from a position of strength. He said that Churchill had made the point well from the point of view of his class: 'With the Bolsheviks one should talk from a position of strength because they are our class enemy'. Khrushchev was on the point of saying that he believed in following the same principle in talking to *his* class enemy, but after some awkward detours he concluded with a rhymed couplet from Krylov, the Russian Aesop, to the effect that one must be strong to live with the enemy. These statements did not appear in the official text as published. But five-and-a-half years later the printed official text of Khrushchev's speech of 14 January contains a recognition of the advantages of a position of strength. After accusing Adenauer, in his old style, of seeking to pursue a policy 'from a position of strength', Khrushchev remarked:

> When the Western countries had economic superiority, had the monopoly of so powerful a weapon as the atomic bomb, then there was still a kind of logic to that policy although even then it did not give grounds for the conduct of a policy 'from a position of strength'.
>
> But now when the Soviet Union possesses atomic and hydrogen weapons, when our country has demonstrated to the whole world her superiority in missile technology when the economy of the Soviet Union and all the countries in the socialist camp is flourishing . . . in these circumstances a [Western] policy 'from a position of strength' becomes completely senseless.

In other words, the West once had preponderant military and economic strength and sought to force its will upon the Soviet Union on the basis of its superiority. Now the Soviet Union has the preponderant strength and the West cannot pursue such a policy without suffering Hitler's fate, upon which Khrushchev proceeded to elaborate. Khrushchev did not say

n so many words that the Soviet Union would ursue a policy from 'a position of strength' ow that it had the wherewithal, but the form f his argument made the implication clear nough.

Malinovsky was more direct, for he dismissed Western concepts of limited war and in ssence threatened that any armed conflict etween the West and the socialist countries ust be a total nuclear war. Here the threat f massive retaliation is unambiguous. Malinovsky's refusal to envisage a limited East-West war, though not new, is so important a eature of Soviet policy that his words merit uotation verbatim:

> In determining the course of the further development of our armed forces in the context of a reduction of numbers we assume that a future war, if it is unleashed by the aggressors, will be waged with the mass employment of nuclear weapons. We emphasise this because in the West much is now said and written about 'limited nuclear war', about 'the tactical employment of nuclear weapons', about the 'strategy of doses' [graduated deterrence] and about 'the strategy of terror', etc., etc. All these 'theories' and if you will permit me to say 'strategies' are testimonies of the imperialists' fear of the inevitable retaliation which they could receive in the event of an attack on the countries of the socialist camp. At the same time such 'theories' are preached to quiet the broad masses of people in order to be able, under cover of this smoke screen, to do the dirty work of preparing a new world war.

Malinovsky did not explicitly extend the hreat of massive retaliation to the case of an ttack on one or more of the Soviet allies. The countries of the socialist camp' were nentioned *en bloc*. Imprecision has its advanages. The victim is threatened, but the blackmailer is not committed to execute his threat r to suffer loss of prestige if he fails to do so. Khrushchev also was ambiguous:

> I again emphasise that we already have so many nuclear weapons—atomic and hydrogen, and the appropriate missiles for the delivery of these weapons on the territory of a possible aggressor—that if some madman should cause an attack on our government or on other socialist governments, then we *could* literally wipe from the face of the earth the country or countries attacking us.

The ambiguity in the threat is important and contrasts with what is said about a direct attack on the Soviet Union alone. An attack on the Soviet Union, it is promised, means instantaneous retaliation upon the attacker. An attack upon a satellite, Khrushchev has said, *could* mean such retaliation, and Malinovsky by his contemptuous dismissal of 'theories' of limited war has suggested that an attack on a country other than the Soviet Union would probably bring massive retaliation. But he and Khrushchev say *could*, not would. The reason seems fairly obvious. This distinction hardly diminishes the effect, but it avoids giving Soviet clients and allies a blank cheque. Perhaps the Soviet concern over an attempt by Albania to cash such a cheque is low; the concern about communist China is probably higher.

Another feature of the speech of 14 January reinforces the impression of blackmail. Only a single international problem is really ventilated—West Berlin. If Khrushchev were really interested in a *détente*, he would list the major issues outstanding between the powers and offer his proposals for a settlement. In fact the raising of more than one problem is a desirable preliminary to any genuine negotiation because it gives scope for the negotiating powers to trade concessions. To insist upon one issue at a time is the technique of blackmail. 'I have terrible weapons; I can wipe you from the face of the earth; Berlin is the issue threatening world peace; Adenauer is a criminal; let us avoid war.' A single demand in such a context has a better chance of success than half a dozen demands across the conference table. The blackmailer must not appear insatiable. The essence of political-military blackmail is instalment payments.

Going Places in the USSR

TRANSPORTATION: DISCUSSIONS AND INTERVIEWS

Holland Hunter

THESE notes cover two visits, a 29-day tour in June 1957 and a 21-day trip in December 1959. In each case I summarise major professional interviews and append a few remarks on some less formal discussions.

While the first trip involved a tour through eight cities, my principal hope was to meet and talk with Soviet economists in the transportation field. Here I was fortunate, having a total of eight interviews. The first was with 'A', to whom I had sent the galleys of an impending book, *Soviet Transportation Policy*. He had not yet had time to read them, so our first conversation was general. Three colleagues were with him, and we discussed (a) the relative merits of planned and unplanned transportation systems, (b) the railroads' investment needs, (c) the Western approach to capital allocation problems, and (d) the use of mathematics in planning. 'A' believes the work of several carriers can only be effectively co-ordinated under a planned system. I was unable to persuade him that low-cost efficiency is promoted when the shipper can make several carriers compete in offering him service. He said, 'Of course, we have socialist competition, too'. When I reported my conclusion that another transportation crisis was not impending, and that the share of total investment going to the transportation sector would not have to increase, he countered with four reasons why a substantial absolute investment programme for the railroads would be essential: output growth meant traffic growth, new areas needed opening up, new rail lines could reduce circuity, and new rail lines could replace other high-cost carriers. It sounded almost as though he feared my position might give ammunition to a kind of Budget-Bureau body, before whom he would be a claimant for the transportation sector.

I asked about the extent to which a mathematical approach was used in studying the need for transportation, and he expressed great scepticism as to its usefulness. He said such an approach was used for the First Five-Year Plan and at many points proved to be off by as much as 50 per cent. He argued that broad directions were obvious without the use of mathematical methods, while detailed relationships eluded them, and finally that (here repeating Stalin of the early 1930s) the Plan was a living thing and changed *en route*.

The next interview was with a professor of railroad operations at a Transport Economics Institute. He was polite, but our discussion of current operating problems was not very rewarding, both because I was insufficiently prepared and because he was somewhat vague. During a trip down through the south, there were two more interviews, at the Railroad Engineering Institutes of Kharkov and Rostov. The meetings, arranged on the spur of the moment, involved a group of the faculty and were very cordial. I expressed doubt on the prospects for water transportation and was assured that joint shipments had a rosy future. They were interested in American transportation and frequently had technical questions I could not answer. My guess that perhaps 3,000 people were studying the theory and practice of railroad transportation in the United States proved to be a source of surprise and pride for them, since it turned out that there were 3,500 students studying at the Rostov Institute alone. They were interested also in the general American scene, including such things as the earnings of physicians, and the degree of income inequality between rich and poor. My copy of *Statistical Abstract of the US, 1956* came in very handy.

Back in Moscow, the second interview with 'A' was the high point of my trip. He and the head of his Institute's foreign publications section had carefully read through the whole of my study, and they gave me three-and-a-half hours of detailed comments. In general, it seemed, the study was 'objective'. However there were quite a few detailed objections. The

chapter comparing Soviet and American railroad practice gave a less complimentary picture of Soviet practice than they felt it should, mainly because their recent improvements made some of my remarks out of date. The chapter on co-ordinating the work of several carriers was, to their way of thinking, too disparaging. At some points I had injected phrases that seemed to them 'propaganda'. At other points, 'A' corrected simple mistakes or amplified my argument with additional considerations. The great bulk of the substantive work passed their review without objection, and it was most encouraging to find that so much common ground in an objective field is now possible.

Then I met 'B', a leading writer on transportation statistics. He is an exceedingly jovial man, and turned out to be interested in learning precisely the same fine points about American transportation statistical reporting that I was anxious to learn about his system. We could not dispose of more than one or two questions that morning, partly because he did not have the facts at his fingertips, and it appeared that an exchange of documents might prove very useful. (That summer I sent him seven pounds of US material, but received nothing in return.) This discussion, too, wandered into other fields, including a review of index number theory. One of his graduate students, a bright woman, knew of Irving Fisher's ideal index number formula—in fact, wrote it out for me—and I therefore had to deliver a short lecture on current index number thinking in the United States, emphasising the problem of changing market-basket contents. I ended with my offering to send them a copy of Hodgman's book on Soviet industrial production, which I subsequently did.

Another interview was with 'C', at the Economics Research Institute attached to Gosplan. He was interested in the use of linear programming in the United States, and knew, for example, of Leontief's consulting firm. I spoke in general terms of its use here and inquired about its use there. He was explicit in replying that they were interested, but had not yet applied this approach to their planning. He emphasised the difficulty that would arise because coefficients in a matrix would have to be drawn from last year's results, and thus if used for next year's plan would be two years out of date. I suggested that each could be modified on the basis of technical advice, and that the matrix would provide an orderly framework for planning. I had seen a model of a large computer in the Academy of Sciences pavilion at the Agricultural and Industrial Exhibition, and small electronic computers in the Machine-building pavilion, but he said these were not being used by Gosplan. Earlier, 'A' and 'B' had told me that such equipment was not being used to solve freight traffic problems either. These men were all surprised that I knew of Kantorovich, the Leningrad mathematician who has done impressive early work in this field. The impression I got was that actual economic applications of his theoretical work have yet to be made. 'C' knew of him, though, and said he had done some work on 'intra-plant economics', too.

ON three occasions, I was invited to people's apartments. The first came after meeting a professor of English and American literature, with whom I spent an enjoyable evening in my hotel suite and at the ballet, and a second evening at a restaurant where the professor introduced me to an engineer friend of his. The third night, the engineer took me to the apartment of a friend of his who was a railroad man. Their wives were away, and in company with the Intourist interpreter (a former student and trusted friend of the professor), I spent a pleasant bachelor evening drinking and eating. There was one large room, a small kitchen and a toilet on the fourth floor of a rather shabby building. The television set, with a screen about 7″ × 5″, had a large magnifying screen in front of it. The parents and their eight-year-old son were clearly crowded here, but not prohibitively uncomfortable. The railroad man turned out to be a writer of children's books on railroading, and fortunately I own one, which even appears in my bibliography, thus demonstrating what a small world it is. When this came out we had several more toasts all around. These men were cordial hosts, quite frank in their comments on life around them, and thoroughly normal in their choice of topics, i.e., women.

On another occasion I found in conversation with my three companions in a train compartment that one of them, a 29-year-old extrovert, was a freight locomotive engineer. When I asked about the possibility of seeing a well-known freight classification yard I had read about, he said he used to work there, knew the yardmaster, and would see if he could arrange a visit. Two days later, having worked through Intourist, he got me at my hotel and took me to the yard, where I was shown the whole thing, though I was not permitted to use my camera. He then took me in the yardmaster's car to his own apartment, so his wife could give me dinner and I could meet his 5½-year-old son. This apartment had a living room, kitchen, and (I think) two bedrooms and toilet. It was on the third floor of a three-storey building—the water pressure was too low to produce water out of the tap when we went to wash our hands before supper. His mother-in-law lived with them and another elderly lady was present. His wife was finishing an engineering institute; when she is through they would like to have a second child. He earned 1,200 rubles a month, she got a stipend of 800, and her mother got a pension of 300. The wife showed me an album of family snapshots, standardised right down to one of herself as a baby with no clothes on. The fairly lavish supper was most cheerful and pleasant. He then accompanied me in a taxi back to my hotel, and went on to his evening-shift job. All of this, be it noted, on his own initiative and evidently with no fear of difficulties arising from contact with an American.

The third occasion was a visit to the apartment of an elderly couple whose daughter had married an American during the war. Another visitor and I had gone out to the apartment one evening, being unable to telephone them, and had not been admitted, the hour being already 11 p.m. We left a note, and I was phoned the next morning at 7 a.m. and invited to come out, which I did, alone, that evening. The parents, and a sister about thirty years old, were most cordial, and gave me a detailed message setting forth the respects in which everything was well with them. Their apartment was in a building only one year old, on the third floor of a 10-storey building (elevator and old woman at each entrance). It contained besides the living room where I sat, an entranceway and at least two other rooms (which I assumed belonged to them). The retired parents were getting 500 rubles each as a monthly pension, and the daughter earned 1,000 rubles a month as an 'economist', a rate which, she said, was quite high for a woman. They said food and living quarters were cheap, but the cost of clothing was still very high. They spoke of phoning the United States, and urged me to write to them, evidently anticipating no difficulties. When I said something vague about the problem that used to arise in these matters, the old man said explicitly, 'That was in Stalin's time'.

THE interpreters supplied by Intourist differ widely in character and intelligence. I was very lucky; mine was a prim, convinced believer in the system, but at the same time intelligent and a fine person, with dignity and a sense of humour. She was capable and even aggressive in arranging things for me, though socially she was somewhat shy. Some of the local Intourist guides were stupid, and their obstreperousness seemed to arise from a lack of understanding rather than positive malevolence. Other tourists were sometimes the victims of interpreters who simply didn't know much English, or didn't translate accurately. And I was told of others who were quite unpleasant as people.

My Intourist guide arranged very easily for me to see the catalogue at the Lenin Library where I found that the basic Transport Ministry statistical annual had stopped reaching the Lenin Library in the mid-1930s, just about the same time it stopped reaching the Library of Congress! It may be in a special collection with a special catalogue, but when I asked how one would go about trying to get it on inter-library exchange for Harvard, I was told laconically that it was 'no longer published in the regular way'. Evidently it circulates only in the government. Nor did I have any luck inquiring about a file of the railroad journals for 1949–55, the period when it was not possible to get them abroad.

Another American economist and I went one afternoon to hear a dissertation defended

t the Academy of Sciences Economic Institute. The author, a man in his sixties with a pronounced stammer, had written a massive ome on the role of transportation in developng the Soviet north. His official opponents were quite gentle with him, but the exchange f views was most interesting. These occasions re open to the public and a fine way to meet eople in one's field. It is apparent also that cademic gamesmanship has certain universal haracteristics, noticeable especially in those who invite themselves into the discussion.

MY first trip to the USSR had emphasised general tourism—interviews were ot crucially important and were easily btained. In the fall of 1959 my experience as different. Several months ahead of time I ad written to the directors of the economic nstitute attached to Gosplan and of the main ransportation institute, getting cordial but ague replies. Three weeks before departure, wrote the head office of Intourist asking for specialised interpreter and suggesting preminary co-ordination with these institutes and thers. On arrival I turned over a list of names nd phone numbers to the interpreter assigned o me and he began to phone about appointents. He was not, however, trying very hard. spent our second working day driving around o six offices where, in spite of his reluctance, dropped off copies of two draft articles I had ritten, plus quite a variety of recent Ameran economic and technical material, to proide a basis for the interviews I sought. t the Academy of Sciences Economic Institute, the secretaries were unwilling even to ccept this material, but elsewhere it at least eached the guards at the door or the attenants in the downstairs cloakrooms.

It seemed a worthwhile experiment to offer he draft articles both in their English text and a translated Russian version. The latter was iticised as being too literal, though I'm sure s contents reached several readers who would ave gotten nothing at all from the English xt. Even 'A', who reads English well, did s homework on the Russian version. Ideally, would be well to spend more time and get a olished Russian translation prepared.

There were interviews on eight of my twenty-one days in the USSR (twice I had two in one day), eight days were without interviews, two were used initially to get under way, and the other three were Sundays. So much persistence was required to obtain interviews that other secondary projects, like a possible trip to a third city, could not be attempted. Towards the end my interpreter was told at three of the offices where I had left material that 'there would be no reception'. The reasons he passed on to me included such excuses as 'on leave', 'out of town', or 'working at home', and they would have been more plausible if they had not changed from day to day. In another instance, I handed my articles to a young mathematical economist and we arranged for me to come back three days later, but in the evening before the interview he phoned to say that there was no point in my coming round, since he was a mathematician and my discussion was 'too political'.

In all this, Intourist was not actively helpful. At one point, my interpreter got official word from his chief that it was not their responsibility to locate people for me; I had to know exactly where the men I wanted were located before he could seek an interview. He, in turn, was very nervous about bothering potential interviewees, and would have waited for weeks to get their assent.

One hesitates to generalise. Some of the reluctance reflected this particular interpreter's limitations. He was twenty-three years old, intense, and insecure. One of my naïve little projects was to visit a kindergarten with a book of American folksongs I had brought along, and sing a few for the children, having him translate them. He was utterly uninterested in this and nothing developed. However, I am sure that the woman who was my guide in June 1957 would have been intelligent and energetic in assisting such an obviously harmless project.

Even this intense young man, at once fascinated by Western things and full of scorn for them, unbent sufficiently at one point to tell a current anecdote about three graduate students completing their five-year course at an institute and coming to the director's office for their three-year work assignments. The first was assigned to Vladivostok and said loyally,

'Glory to the party and government!' The next came in and was assigned to Khabarovsk, at which he winced, but also shouted 'Thanks to the party and government!" When the third came in and was told that he was being assigned to the Chukotsk peninsula (bordering the Bering Straits) he exclaimed, 'Thanks to the Americans!' This of course surprised the director, who asked, 'Why?' The reply: 'They bought Alaska'.

The worst setback for my interviews came at the beginning of the last week, when the interpreter phoned at 10 o'clock one evening to relay a message from the presidium of the Academy of Sciences, to wit: 'We cannot tolerate the hostile treatment of Soviet scientists in the United States. Therefore, you cannot see Belkin or Nemchinov'. After finding that the United States Embassy had not been informed of any recent difficulties, I went out alone to the presidium to get some explanation. There Mr Konstantin Vasilevich Semenov, in the department for dealing with foreign visitors, said that last summer the Academy of Sciences had informed two American officials what the difficulties were. He complained also that the Soviet delegates to an oil conference had not been allowed to see even open institutes. He suggested I write to Academician Topchiev, and said that full details would then be supplied. He assured me that this was not directed against me personally, and then said he had to go on to another meeting.

It was explained at the US Embassy that the oil difficulty had arisen in the negotiations for our second cultural exchange agreement. The Soviet side was unwilling to make a balanced arrangement for the exchange of two technical delegations, so that a simultaneous attempt, by Soviet technicians attending an International Petroleum Congress, to visit American refineries, had to be put aside. It seemed discouraging that these complaints of six months ago were being renewed now, after a group of Soviet atomic physicists had just returned from a very cordial reception in the United States.

In spite of these vicissitudes, it was possible to get ten interviews, as summarised below. An informed reader will notice that the Soviet replies to my questions were frequently bland and vague, or patriotic and inherently implausible. On many points the interviews only supplied a form of negative evidence, indicating a prickly state of mind among those obsessed with overtaking the country from which I came. Nevertheless I believe such interview efforts are worthwhile. Readers of this account will see ways to learn from my mistakes in order to forestall difficulties and improve the effectiveness of future interviews. It is possible that the impact of these discussions on some of the Soviet participants is more helpful than the Western visitor can appreciate at the time. In any case, one is conscious of the need for patience and persistence, even while sitting through a frustrating interview, since it is hard to see any other way of reducing gradually the mutual mistrusts that underlie Soviet-Western tensions.

'B' was the first to respond to my arrival, phoning as soon as my papers reached his office to say he could see me the next day at 3 p.m. I began by thanking him heartily for sending me a copy of the new statistical handbook for 1958, which he did very promptly last September, in return for my having left a *Statistical Abstract of the United States* with him two years ago. We turned to detailed problems in transportation statistical reporting and he stressed the accuracy of Soviet freight traffic data. I mentioned the problem of truck drivers exaggerating their mileage by pouring gasoline to simulate on-the-road consumption and he said this was under control. 'These drivers are criminals. Now a new gas meter is being installed. The possible error is negligible anyway, in relation to overall freight traffic'. As for the tonnage of railroad shipments, he said exaggeration was prevented by the conflicting interests of shippers and receivers, and of various groups in the railroad service. The receiver of freight, he said, would not agree to exaggerated shipment data. He added, with a flourish, that if scales were off by as much as one part in 10,000 they would be sent for repairs. He then inquired about the importance in American railroad operations of the second, third, and fourth-class carriers and about work-train traffic. This took some time. Finally, we closed with his novel observation

hat, whether the big questions of war or peace ould be settled or not at the summit, we hould at least try to clear up some of these atistical details!

Next I was able to renew acquaintances with 'A', who greeted me cordially. I handed him y draft articles and Ernest Williams' mono-aph on Soviet freight transportation; he said e could discuss them after he had had time read them. I asked him to mention my vailability to other economists he thought ight be interested, and even suggested kingly that he phone Intourist and assure em that I was not 'dangerous'. He and the terpreter laughed merrily, but there was ever any subsequent indication that this ggestion was taken up.

'A' asked my opinion of his new book on e economics of transportation, which he had nt late last spring, and I praised it warmly. e asked whether there was any chance of its ing translated into English. I said it would fine if it were, but cautioned him that US ilroadmen were loaded up with their own oblems, and that the audience for his kind treatise was a small one. He said nothing out the possibility of translating my *Soviet ansportation Policy* into Russian (he had held t this bait in June 1957), and I imagine the dy is now judged out of date and mistaken various points (as was indicated in the *oprosy Ekonomiki* review of 1958, No. 9).

One morning 'D', who apparently is in arge of meeting Westerns for the Gosplan stitute, phoned the hotel to say that they re anxious to have me come out. We first tled on three days later, but then he called ck to suggest their sending a car for me at on the same day. This led to a mixup, since ourist informed him later that morning, ile I was out in an Intourist car, that it uld bring me to the interview. About 12.45 ' phoned again, asking where I was, and en we understood the mixup, he said in w, precise English, 'Jesus Christ!' By 2 n. I was once again sitting at the long felt-vered table in 'C's' office, this time facing e men.

'C' said he had not had time to read my ft articles carefully and suggested that I te the main points briefly. I drew attention to my notion of an optimum degree of tautness in planning, and he said categorically that my graph does not describe Soviet actuality. Any deviation from target is undesirable. In practice there may be some, but 'We usually achieve our targets'. Even before the war, he said, plans were based on feasible possibilities. I asked about the recent pattern of over-fulfilments and he said the industrial 'decentralisation' (he used the term) meant that local organs had more initiative. The centre only plans the main targets now. Local authorities have found new reserves. Over-fulfilment is not a result of bad planning—it is welcomed.

I invited questions about the United States, and they wanted to know my forecast for our growth rate. I replied for about five minutes.

Next I enquired about my description of the planning process, and especially about the reserve stocks administered by the Council of Ministers. He said that I implied a conflict between Gosplan and the Council of Ministers, but that this was incorrect since Gosplan is part of the Council of Ministers. He said each one-year plan is a closer definition of what is set out in the one-year breakdowns of the five- or seven-year plans. Each one-year plan is based on (a) the objective situation, (b) new resources and possibilities, (c) new tasks confronting the country. He would not say how many material balances are now drawn up, saying there were several different types of plans, and different numbers of balances for each.

Again I asked for counter questions, and this time was asked why US railroads are not electrifying, and how they would handle the additional traffic associated with the additional output I had been predicting. My replies took about ten minutes. One of the men broke in to ask whether Soviet freight traffic, compared to US freight traffic, doesn't indicate that Soviet industrial output is now about half as big as ours. This was a shrewd observation, and I said the same point had come up in Washington the week before at hearings before the Joint Economic Committee. I said the ratio was probably something less than 50 per cent, but quoted myself to the effect that output and traffic ratios were 'in the same ball park' (which proved difficult to translate).

'C' then suggested that I should avoid psychology and stick to objective economic factors. If factories produced their own parts, it was not because of the manager's psychology, but because in the early years after 1928, though specialisation and co-operation were fully understood, large-scale subcontracting was not possible. When only a few automobiles were being produced, subcontracting was not feasible.

On the way out, I asked 'D' to phone 'E' and explain who I am. He said he would on Monday. (After two weeks, however, there was still 'no reception' from Professor 'E'.)

ONE day I had an interesting talk with three young members of a small group studying mathematics and its use in economics. They showed me some of their books, translations of certain Western titles, a poster announcing six lectures on this general subject, and even the programme for a midwinter four-day conference at which fifty papers on the use of mathematics were to be given.

'F' said their new institute building near Novosibirsk is not finished yet, and that Professor Kantorovich visits it off and on. There are jokes now about his doing much of his work aboard a jet plane. I asked if these three had heard Professor Leontief on his visit in January 1959, and 'F' said: (a) Yes, but Leontief was unpatriotic in leaving his country, and (b) Leontief had been undiplomatic in asking for a copy of a rare pre-revolutionary book of synthetic proverbs as a condition for his providing copies of his own books. Miss 'G' showed me her copy of the new book by Kantorovich, of which only 3,000 copies were printed last September. It is already unobtainable in book stores, and they had no suggestion as to where I might be able to find a copy.

I handed over copies of my draft articles, and after glancing at the planning one for a while, 'F' had a few comments. He denied that a plant manager could successfully propose easy targets for his enterprise, arguing that the workers there, when plans were discussed in open meetings, would force the manager to raise the proposed targets in accordance with opportunities for progress. He spoke with pride of how local plants ha recently been undertaking to meet seven-yea plan targets ahead of time, but admitted with out my urging that such ahead-of-schedu growth by local firms would enlarge the demands for raw materials and other inpu from other regions, and therefore complica matters elsewhere. There will be 'difficu balancing problems'. 'F' also echoed 'C' saying that vertical integration had arisen, n for the reasons I gave, but for 'historic reasons'.

I offered the three a choice between the 195 US *Statistical Abstract* and the new Departme of Commerce National Income volume; the were charmingly disconcerted. They hesitate to make a choice, so I gave them the latter, probably contributing more to their speci interests. Not to be outdone, Miss 'G' the proceeded to give me her own copy of t Kantorovich volume. I protested politely, b they insisted, and said that she might possib be able to find another copy for herself som where. I stopped arguing and accepted wi great gratitude.

They invited me to come back any time, I returned the next morning to take notes some of the material they had shown me. T following morning I listened to 'H' give two-hour lecture (10-minute break halfwa through) to thirty-three graduate students in large and chilly lecture-hall. He was explai ing the rules for adding and multiplyi matrices. He lectured very well, without note using the blackboard, and pausing occasiona for questions, though students were shy abo identifying their uncertainties. He twitted the gently, saying, 'What's the matter? Are y frozen today?'

After the lecture we went to the room I h visited the two preceding mornings, and had somewhat formal conversation, flanked by m interpreter, the three assistants, and oth intermittent visitors.

The strongest comments on my planni article came from 'J', who said he wou speak 'not as a mathematician, but man-t man'. The article, he said, is 'naïve'. I m quantitative and qualitative things togeth though the argument is not convincing becau it is not sufficiently quantitative. Very lar

uestions are mixed together with very small nes. I insult the reader, using the term 'backard' as applied to the USSR. My use of the rm 'dictator' is 'hostile'. 'J' said the leader the party stays in power as long as he is rrect.

'J' went on to say that Marxism does not clude rent; that Marx's discussion of land nt was in fact the first scientific harbinger of near programming! Marx's full costs, he said, ere related to shadow prices. 'We see rent d interest, not as produced by land and pital, but as means of accumulating former bour.' I should not say that linear programing is Western, since the mathematics of it gan with Kantorovich.

He argued that the Soviet approach has any basic advantages over the Western proach: Progress is not hindered by ivate ownership and vested interests. He lieves that the era of private ownership of e means of production will some day be oked back on as one of 'barbarism', and at a scientifically-optimum regimen of conmer goods can be more effectively approxiated by the Soviet system than by the equitable and chaotic Western market ocess. 'J' expressed a fundamental convicon that overall demand can be objectively aluated, especially in longrun terms, that the eds of society can be seen clearly and ientifically, and that all this is handled badly a chaotic market where purchasing power apes the results.

'J', too, denied that tautness in plans reflected the imposition of will from above. Before al targets are established, suggestions and formation are collected from below by perienced people. For example, he said, the itiative for setting up a new computing ntre in Novosibirsk came from the scholars emselves. I asked why. He replied, 'Because ey knew the need for it'. He also suggested at the law of large numbers contributes to ecision in setting aggregate targets within rrow limits of error.

He said he hoped I would not take offence all this; that he had spent five years in the ny, and had marched on foot from Leningad to Berlin. His young assistant sat beside n, and the Intourist interpreter was also participating. Some of his speech may have been for their benefit, though he had an air of genuine conviction. After an hour of this, I was accumulating a number of points for a reply, but 'J' rushed off with 'H' to another meeting, so the interview ended. Quite an experience. . . .

At another institute I renewed acquaintance with the man who had reviewed my book, in a session with his institute's director and four other men. I began by asking about their research on the use of linear programming for traffic planning; the reply was that only one man in this institute was working on it, and that no results had yet been published. Then I was asked about my expectations regarding US freight and passenger traffic in 1975, and I replied for about five minutes.

My questions about their methods for estimating future traffic demands, analysing the impact of the switch from coal to oil, and evaluating general prospects for the average length of haul, all elicited rather vague answers. I asked about the current revaluation of railroad assets, and was told that the work has been going on for two years, is not yet finished, and might lead to published results in 1961. I asked about price bases and conversion coefficients, but 'K' said this difficult matter was handled by TsSU. Their replies to my questions about the structure of transportation investment in the seven-year plan were similarly vague. I asked about the use to which steam locomotives, especially in the FD class, will be put when diesels and electric locomotives take their place. They said: (a) The change will be gradual and many will be used until they wear out; (b) some will go to industry or to branch lines, and (c) some will perhaps be sold, for example, to China. 'K' said they had found in Western Europe after the war that gauge changing was no problem with FDs, though it had been with some older series. This led them to ask about diesels and electric locomotives in this country, and I went over the ground I had covered for 'C'. They twitted me about our lack of unified policy—I replied defending our system, and was told of their proverb: 'Measure seven times, but cut only once'.

In the field of current railroad construction,

'K' said there would be no early construction of a line from Vorkuta to the northern Urals, because Pechora coal was needed in Leningrad. He said there was no early prospect of a line eastward from Vorkuta to Igarka, because the traffic would be too light to justify it, and also because it was more sensible to reach up into northern Siberia from the south, by way of the big rivers (this had been the main conclusion of the dissertation I'd heard defended two years before). He said a certain Siberian trunk line was being built, but that not all the grain-collecting lines in Kazakhstan would be widened—only those that will be part of main lines.

I WENT to see these men again, after the encounter with Semenov. When the last package I had mailed ahead to myself arrived at the Embassy, I decided to use the 1958 *Transport Statistics* it contained for a final gesture on the exchange front. Therefore I phoned 'L', and, though he was out that day, one of his colleagues arranged for him to call me back in the evening, and we set up an appointment for 10 a.m. the next morning. I began with further attempts to pin down the outlook for transportation sector investment, seeking to learn whether this sector would be a net provider of funds to the central budget, or a net drain on the national pool of investment funds. Unfortunately, they merely repeated in several ways the counter proposition that all profits are pooled in the central budget and then assigned to investment projects, not on the basis of profitability, but on the overall basis of effectiveness.

Next I reported my difficulties with the Academy of Sciences presidium. I said someone had to make the first move, and that I wanted to make a first move here and now. At this I pulled out the new statistical material, which I knew was eagerly desired by 'L', who had told me earlier of their difficulties in obtaining it. In turning it over, I said with great seriousness that it would be interesting to see what the next step in exchange might be. He had previously given me three minor items, two of which I already owned, and though I was careful not to speak explicitly of them as poor recompense for th material I had left with him, I did refer to th desirability of 'solid material', comparable t what I was giving him. I added that I knev what they wanted, and that further steps i our exchange might follow in due course.

Neither of us had mentioned one basic diffi culty in the release of transportation statistics namely, classification for security reasons, bu I went on to hazard the view that the lon tradition regarding the military importance c railroad information was now obsolete, in viev of contemporary rocketry. I referred to th way generals always prepared to win the pre vious war, and said that perhaps transporta tion economists could urge this view in th necessary quarters. One man demurred mildly to the extent of saying that economic growt potentials depended partly on transportatio capacities, and had some military significance too. The institute director was present for th latter part of the interview, and I think the were all impressed with the seriousness of m offer. I ended by suggesting that they shoul tell Semenov about it; the director said h would.

One evening I was able to attend a party a Moscow University, arranged so that the stu dents in the economics faculty could meet wit young workers from a Moscow factory. Ther was a welcoming speech by the handsome thirty-two-year-old dean, another by a leadin worker, and one by a Chinese graduate stu dent. Then there was an hour of amateur per formances: operatic excerpts of solos sung b young people, some poetry recitations, a bo doing a Russian dance, and a short skit by tw students acting out a married couple's argu ments. The level of performance was reall very high. Next there was a dance in crowded room to a small student band playin US and South American music. The Kom somol girl who had taken me in hand prove to be a good dancer. The quarters were ol and shabby, and the young people were no elegantly dressed (though some of the boys ha very narrow pants and long hair), but ther was gaiety and the people who talked with m radiated self-confidence.

It seemed clear that the standard of livin in Moscow had risen substantially since Jun

1957. I had wondered then how much I was being influenced by balmy weather, but found this time that even in December gloom, people's clothes had improved and the range of available consumer goods had widened. There are many more new ugly apartment buildings than there were two-and-a-half years ago. I saw quite a bit of fluorescent lighting outdoors, and some neon signs outdoors, brightening the winter darkness. People were queuing up for apples and oranges, sold from sidewalk stands, and cut flowers were also available at a few kiosks.

The old couple in one apartment I visited had acquired a cat and three window plants since my last visit; there was a cat also in another apartment I visited. The old folk hope to get a second room soon, since they say their one room is crowded for four people now (daughter and grand-daughter living with them). By contrast, a childless couple I called on had two rooms (plus kitchen and bath) because she had retained her maiden name and the housing authorities (permitting one room per household) didn't realise they were one family.

A documentary colour film of Khrushchev's visit to the United States was being widely shown, and the audience reaction I caught was limited to occasional 'ohs', and 'ahs'. The commentary emphasised police attempts to keep enthusiastic workers away from Khrushchev, and the scene was frequently blanketed in the foreground by newspapermen, but the general tone was positive nevertheless. Nikita Sergeevich made some remarks on his return about how passenger automobiles would be handled in the USSR, and on the basis of discussion with my interpreter I think we should translate his phrase, not as 'taxi pools', but as 'rent-a-car services'. It seems that some 12,000 people in Moscow had rented a car at least once in 1959, and that the system would be extended. However, my interpreter thought the charges were beyond the reach of ordinary people, and agreed with me there would be peakload problems on holidays and during the summertime.

The Intourist interpreter readily left me to myself, making it easy to slip away for private visits without state supervision. For example, I had two talks with a middle-aged couple who were shockingly frank about the starvation that decimated their city during 1941–43 (she demonstrated with gestures that the fingers of one hand could encircle her neck as she lay at home waiting for the meagre rations he brought), and on another occasion had tea with a university student and her family, in return for my having brought some books to her from an American she met last summer. All such encounters were marked by warmth and hospitality. There were also many pleasant conversations in hotel dining rooms and waiting for buses. If this report has seemed a bleak one, the bleakness does not relate to ordinary Russians, but to Russians in their official capacities. My first exposure came at the end of a long 'thaw', while this recent one came after over two years of tightening up, and perhaps it is not surprising that my reaction should have been somewhat negative. But revulsion is not enough; the system will not wilt under our disapproval.

TOWARDS A THEORY OF CONSPICUOUS PRODUCTION

Michael Polanyi

DURING the decades before 1917 in which Marxist socialism had grown into a world movement, any discussion of the way the future socialist system would function was banned as unscientific utopianism. As a result, when the bolsheviks achieved supreme power, the original aspirations of pre-Marxian socialism emerged in their pristine crudity as the principles of their new economic system. Lenin had declared a few months before: 'The whole of society will become a single office and a single factory . . .', and the Soviet Government put this programme into effect by deciding to direct all economic activities centrally in the form of a single comprehensive economic plan.

This decision both satisfied the deepest hopes of the revolution and appeared obviously rational. Once the state had legal control of all enterprises, it would decide the allocation of resources and determine production to the public advantage. Government by the people would govern economic life for the people, and being fully informed at every moment of all the particulars of the economic situation, it would take into account all these particulars in every single economic decision. Thus it would establish a brotherly and scientific co-operation among men in place of self-seeking, impersonal, chaotic commodity production. How could it be otherwise?

Yet this idea, so plausible and exhilarating, is quite absurd. Its internal contradiction has caused the convulsive course of internal Soviet history, leading up to the present method of conducting economic life which can be understood only as an outcome of this contradiction.

The first battle between socialism and reality was joined in 1920. Central direction made its full impact during the second half of that year and extreme measures of centralisation continued during the last two months of 1920 and up to March 1921. The attempt at suppressing all commercial relations and the very use of money, in favour of a central allocation of resources and distribution of products, was bitterly sustained until economic disaster en sued. When production fell nearly to zero, th troops mutinied, workers struck and Lenin wa forced to restore commerce throughout th economic system. Then production recovere and rose to pre-war level.

At first, Lenin had frankly declared that h New Economic Policy was a retreat from a ras effort at establishing socialism, but soon th myth of the party's infallibility was restored b describing the drive towards central direction a an emergency measure due to the war. It ha since been known as 'war communism'—i spite of the fact that its principal measure were issued at a time when fighting had ceased and that the consequent collapse was mani festly cured by reversing these measures.

For the Soviets this falsification of histor was a matter of routine and they did not in fac deceive themselves. They never repeated th experiment of totally suppressing the market i favour of a central direction of industry. Bu curiously enough, the covering up by the Soviet of the decisive defeat suffered by the origina socialist programme has been accepted through out Western literature. Distinguished scholars o Soviet affairs up to this day use the term 'wa communism' and describe its policies (extend ing up to March 1921) as desperate expedient to which the Soviets were compelled to reso in their struggle for survival—without eve mentioning any possible doubt of th interpretation.[1]

Two reasons seem to induce the Weste mind to submit to such deception. First, th adoption of a scientific attitude towards histor makes us reluctant to ascribe any great publi events to mere error; they must be historicall justified. And second, we still lack a clea understanding of the utter folly of attemptin the central direction of a modern industri system. These remain indeed the main obstacle to a complete understanding of the presen

[1] Cf., e.g. Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk Under Sovi Rule* (Harvard, 1958), p. 7.

ystem of economic management in the Soviet mpire.

WE can see this from the history of the movement which Ludwig von Mises arted in 1920 by attempting to prove that entral economic direction is impossible. He rgued that without a market, productive ources cannot be allocated economically and ence you cannot run a modern economic stem as a single enterprise. What Mises said as true but he failed to prove it so. This ecame apparent when the Soviet government ut an end to the NEP and got its Five-Year lans going, as a system of state owned dustries. By 1936 the argument of Mises me under fire by F. H. Knight, himself a assionate supporter of the system of private nterprise. He said that Mises was wrong in sing market theory to deny the possibility of entral direction. The government could satisfy l the requirements of economic theory rectly. Governmental direction could indeed rpass the market by including the processes of xation, taking account of social costs, as well s correcting other imperfections of the market. he objection to this system was—Knight eclared—not economic but political: it inolved the total suppression of liberty. This rgument was given powerful expression by ayek's *Road to Serfdom* (1944). Mises himself en denounced (1947) the Soviet government r wickedly doing that which in 1920 he himself d affirmed to be impossible.

Churchill spoke on similar lines against socialm in his election addresses of 1945, and this gument has indeed become the predominant terpretation of the Soviet system by Western inion. It forms our warning to newly developg countries. We tell them that they could get ch by the Soviet method only at the cost of crificing their liberty. This theory may actually vour communism, for it may appeal to local ites who might expect to become the planners oducing wealth by enslaving their fellow citins; while many of the latter, borne down by ject poverty, may think opulence cheap at the ice of liberty. We should be the last to spread is view—the less so since there is little truth it.

Mises' original thesis, though true, cannot be upheld on its own grounds, for it does not explain why resources can be allocated economically within one enterprise without establishing a commercial network between individual users, and why this cannot be done between a number of industrial plants. This can be explained only by assessing the limits of administrative feasibility. F. H. Knight was right in denying that economic theory could prove the necessity of the market, but he went widely astray by suggesting that the market could be replaced by administrative action guided by the marginal theory of productivity. This feat would immeasurably exceed the capacity of any administrative machinery.

For my part, I have argued (1948) that the possibility of replacing market operations by central direction must be categorically denied in view of the intrinsic limits of administrative control. Wherever a number of units are formed to achieve a joint purpose by mutually adjusting themselves to each other, this mutual adjustment cannot be replaced by the directives of a superior authority.

This principle has, in its most general form, nothing to do with the claims of individual freedom, or indeed with human affairs. It applies to a sack of potatoes. Consider how ingeniously the knobs of each potato fit into the hollows of a neighbour. Weeks of careful planning by a team of engineers equipped with a complete set of cross-sections for each potato would not reduce the total volume filled by the potatoes in the sack so effectively as a good shaking and a few kicks will do. Passing on to human affairs, take a soccer team of eleven mutually adjusting at every moment their play to each other, and pit it against a team each member of which has to wait before making a move for the orders of a captain controlling the players by radio. Central direction would spell paralysis.

This is not to place mutual adjustment generally above central direction. These two principal ways of ordering human affairs have each their proper functions. A hierarchic order controlled from one centre is proper to a task which can be subdivided by stages into consecutive details. Consecutive stages are then

assigned to descending tiers of authority, down to the individuals actually handling the task of the organisation at the base of the pyramid. This is how a million soldiers are directed to carry out a single strategic or tactical manoeuvre decided upon by their supreme commander. And in spite of modern attempts at mitigating its hierarchic structure, this is how the distribution of resources and tasks within an industrial enterprise must be organised. Any attempt to replace lines of authority, fanning out by successive stages from one centre, by allowing individuals to adjust themselves mutually for going into battle or for working a mine, would result in total chaos. Anarchists in Spain trying to dispense with the lines of command in armies and to run railways without time-tables have proved (if proof were needed) the madness of such ideas.

The impossibility of replacing the market by central direction is but a particular instance of the fact that no process of mutual adjustment can be so replaced. The Soviet experiment of 1920 was a sustained attempt to replace the market by central direction, and it did spell complete paralysis. The Soviets have never forgotten this lesson and never repeated the experiment. Their present system, which does function, cannot, therefore, be centrally directed—as it pretends to be—and our problem is to find out how it does function in reality.

THREE qualifications must be borne in mind in applying these principles. The first two will be made in order to block irrelevant side-issues, the third, on the contrary, to broaden the scope of my thesis.

1. I submit that we can distinguish in practice between the decisions which *determine* a man's task and the circumstances which *condition* his performance of it. While a centrally directed hierarchy determines the tasks of each subordinate, it allows and may even require the execution of these tasks to be conditioned by mutual adjustments between subordinates, for example between neighbouring units in the line of battle. But it still remains true that any hierarchic order is instantly destroyed the moment its subordinates determine their tasks by mutual adjustment, and that the converse holds equally.

2. When I say that mutual adjustment through a market cannot be replaced by central direction I have in mind *the useful functions* of the market. Economic science has during the past decades developed complex theories of the intrinsic limitations to which a market is subject. I accept these limitations, of which I could give a list here—and accept also any other limitations I may not know of. My argument assumes only that the market does perform vital functions in a commercial economic system, and affirms that these functions cannot be replaced by central direction.

I emphasise this, for the discussion on central economic direction has been obscured by the battle between the partisans of laissez faire and the critics of the market. There was a tendency on both sides to assume that this issue involved a decision between capitalism and socialism, or more precisely, between market relations and central direction. This is not the case. Shortcomings of the market do offer a prima facie case for intervention by the public authorities, whether by legislation or administrative action, while it is also true that public authorities can often do little about such defects, with which we then have to put up. In any case, these functions of the public authorities are a necessary corollary of the market, as they serve to regulate, guide, correct and supplement the market, without ever trying to suppress and replace it. I shall describe these public functions as 'overall planning', and whenever I speak of a market *I will mean a market within a framework of overall planning.*

3. Public agencies charged with distributing scarce commodities arbitrate between rival claims by some system of licensing according to rules determining priorities. Since such a process mediates the mutual adjustments of individual initiatives, it forms part of overall planning. The allocation of public expenditure between numerous rival government departments (absorbing between themselves a considerable part of the national income), is commonly determined by this kind of mutual adjustment.

Central agencies can be used for the mutual adjustment only of few centres, the relations of which change but slowly. Yet even where a

nterprises are nationalised, distribution of investments by the interplay of rival pressure roups—each supported by its own mixture of conomic and political arguments—can thus eplace the capital market.[2] Mises failed to oresee this (admittedly cumbersome) possiility of mutual adjustment between rival capial allocations and declared therefore that ublic ownership would render economic life n a modern industrial system altogether npossible.

By 1948 it was, of course, easy to see this istake. I argued also that the mutual adjustments required *for the running of enterprises* were many million times more complex, more apidly changing and far more dependent on ubjective valuations than the mutual adjustments *for allocating investments to them,* and I oncluded that publicly owned enterprises must herefore operate through a market even though his may be heavily overlaid by a pretence of entral direction.

THE following features of Soviet economics seemed to confirm that such was actually he case in the Soviet Union:

1. First, there was the fact that accounting in erms of money was introduced and has been nforced since the early thirties. The standard extbook of economics published in 1951 abounds in arguments to justify the use of money within a system of central direction. These excuses show clearly that money was introduced in opposition to a strong ideological eluctance, and we may conclude therefore that it does play a role that is indispensable to he conduct of economic life. And we may conclude further that, since money can be effective only by offering the opportunity for alternative choices to its users, managers of enterprises using money must be making choices which essentially control the course of economic life. I shall amplify this point later.

2. Next, the wholesale adoption of Western echnological processes may be seen to introduce a set of concealed market relations within the system of central planning in Russia. For the rationality of such manufacturing processes was originally based on the comparative costs of resources and prices of products in a market economy. Insofar then as a technical process was transplanted unchanged, this act engrafted the network of commercial relations which originally justified the technical process, even though failing to take into account the difference in the relevant value relations.

3. Another feature which, from the start (1935), made me suspect that central planning could not be a coherent act of central direction, was the official applause given to 'overfulfilment'. This attitude is inconsistent with any effective coordination of productive efforts. If a bridge is planned, the over fulfilment of one pillar is not taken to compensate for the underfulfilment of another.

4. There was also a growing volume of evidence that illegal transactions between enterprises were playing a major part in Soviet economic life and served as the covert basis of an ostensible superstructure of central planning.

5. Lastly, there were reports that the plans are worked out by first issuing directives to enterprises in a preliminary form and requesting them to suggest modifications to them, a continuous flow of exchanges being maintained between the top and the base of the hierarchy. In such a system the initiative could pass over more or less to the enterprises, and to this extent the directives eventually issued from the centre would be merely an aggregate of the individual plans made by enterprises operating a network of mutual adjustments at the base.

I still think that these symptoms do suggest that the economic system of the Soviets is not operated by central direction, and I shall come back to them later in this connection. But first I must give full weight to some indications which speak to the contrary, and have indeed quite rightly been raised as objections to my view that the Soviet economy is based on camouflaged market operations. There are two such objections.[3]

1. Reliable descriptions of the conduct of

[2] Bela A. Balassa. *The Hungarian Experience in Economic Planning* (Yale, 1959), p. 79-83, gives a vid description of the bargaining and pressuring tween rival government departments seeking invest- ent allocation in Soviet Hungary.

[3] See Peter Wiles in *The Soviet Economy* (London, 1956).

Soviet enterprises, of which Janos Kornai's *Overcentralisation in Economic Administration* (1959), gives perhaps the most detailed and recent account, leave no doubt that enterprises do receive detailed instructions which closely determine their programme of production. Managers strive strenuously to fulfil these targets so as to earn the substantial premia awarded for such achievements. These are an essential source of their income, while the profitability of their enterprises is of secondary importance to them. This situation does not seem to allow effective scope for the operation of market relations.

2. If it be true that the Soviet system is a distorted market economy, its productivity should be found to be defective to a degree corresponding to this distortion. For one thing, the cost of the top-heavy bureaucracy ruling the system should markedly depress its yield. Yet all indications seem to suggest that its productivity is rather higher than that of a Western market economy.

I SHALL take up the second point first, by asking the question: Could it not be that the distortions of the market actually favour production? This may sound absurd, until we recall a paradox that has often puzzled Western observers. Berliner voiced it in his study *Factory and Manager in the USSR* (Harvard, 1957, p. 326).

> The elements of inefficiency are so striking that they may create the impression that Soviet industry is grossly ineffectual and scarcely to be taken seriously. Such an impression would fly in the face of all we know about Soviet industrial performance.

Ely Devons says it even more forcefully in his review (*Manchester Guardian*, 22 October 1959) of Kornai's book.

> It adds up to a damning indictment of detailed central planning. Indeed, as one reads of one inefficiency after another, one begins to wonder how the system produced anything at all. And yet according to figures given by Kornai production in Hungarian light industry doubled between 1949 and 1955.[4]

Most curious of all perhaps is the fact that the great many shortcomings of which Kornai com plains are invariably identified and condemned by comparison with a capitalistic market. He takes these commercial standards unquestioningly for granted.

A first hint towards the solution of these conundrums is thrown out by Kornai when criticising Stalin's praise of the Soviets' seller's market. Stalin says that: 'with us in the Soviet Union the consumption of the masses is constantly growing, outstripping the growth of production and thus stimulating production'. Kornai replies that this may stimulate the planners but it does not induce enterprises to do better work; rather it induces laziness, negligence, disregard of the buyers' requirements.

But why should the superior authorities responsible for directing enterprises on the lines of a minutely detailed plan be highly satisfied when production is generally disorganised? The answer may be found by evoking the picture of a sellers market operating through a system of fairly rigid prices, as we had in England during the years immediately following the last war. Let us bear in mind in this connexion that chronic suppressed inflation has been observed throughout the Soviet empire ever since the inception of the Five-Year Plans in 1928, and also that the Soviet government can keep prices rigidly fixed and may, in any case, disregard any inflation of profits in the allocation of investments, thus avoiding an inflationary spiral even while it puts the economy under a powerful draft. The consequences will be as follows:

1. Full employment, to the very limit.

2. Defective co-ordination between resources supplied to factories and consequent waste of resources.

3. Defective timing in the supply of resources, resulting in stoppages and waste of capacity.

4. Reduction of consumers' satisfaction by their being forced to buy what happens to be

[4] The problem is raised likewise by Andrew Shonfield (*Observer*, 14 June 1959). He speaks of the 'hideous and cumbersome paraphernalia of central planning' and writes: 'Yet . . . Soviet industry continues to pour out more and more goods'.

vailable. More particularly, the satisfaction iven by any given parcel of commodities is owered by reduction of assortment, slowing own of innovation, and erratic distribution nder pressure of demand.[5]

5. These factors tend to reduce costs of roduction and distribution.

The favourable production statistics of countries with suppressed inflation suggest that its timulus to productivity measured in physical rms (along with the high level of employment) nds to offset the impairment of physical productivity caused by the defective co-ordination nd timing of productive supplies. So planners ming at high production statistics may well be atisfied when production is disorganised by an xcessive pressure of aggregate demand!

But their statistics are misleading; economic roductivity must be judged by the creation of conomic value. Products are not goods by rtue of their bodily existence; as such they are merely potential goods. Their value as goods epends on their aptness to the recipients' eeds. To value a list of goods at our own arket prices is to assume that they are elivered to recipients as aptly as goods are rmally delivered in our particular state of the arket. I shall call this their *normal market alue.* In a sellers' market the same products ave a *lower value,* which we may call their *tual value in this market,* or simply their *tual value.*

It is difficult to measure the actual value oduced in a sellers market. But we may ughly estimate the possible reduction in tual value by comparing prices paid for a s discriminating allocation, such as a meal om a single fixed menu, with that of a meal om a rich *à la carte* choice; prices of clothes dered in advance for delivery at specified ervals, compared with the same clothes rchased at the users' convenience; prices of iforms compared with a normal assortment suits, etc. *From such examples we may timate that the value produced by satisfying s discriminating users may be less than one lf the value of the same physical goods tisfying a normal market demand.*

[5] The quality of products also deteriorates, but it y be assumed that this is taken into account in ntifying a given parcel of commodities.

Once this reduction is taken into account, the real value of the total yield of a sellers market is likely no longer to appear higher, but substantially lower than that of a normal market. The planners' satisfaction with the increased output of a sellers market then appears to be based on a statistical delusion.

THIS delusion is intensified by the myth of a centrally directed economic system. Central direction aims at replacing commercially justified production programmes by production targets. It would thus extend 'target production' from the field of public services, to which it necessarily applies, to the much larger assembly of more mobile enterprises serving individual needs. The result is then as follows:

1. The process of mutual adjustment by central authorities, which is barely manageable in respect of a set of comparatively few and fairly steady public interests, becomes altogether unmanageable when extended to a much more numerous set of productive centres supplying more flexible needs.

2. Such an extension would be all-embracing and eliminate the commercial milieu within which the costs of a limited number of rival public interests can be weighed up against each other (as could still be done fairly well for the production of diverse armaments in wartime).

3. Public authorities can be kept informed by public opinion of the strength of rival public interests, but they have no similar guidance concerning the preferences of individual consumers; the latter can be established only by making competitive offers to serve the consumers and accepting their choices as guides to production. To set production targets centrally is to forgo this guidance and miss the predominant purpose of production.

Factors 1. and 2. render it doubtful, if not impossible, to ensure that targets are mutually compatible, and certainly make it impossible for them to be chosen with due regard to relative costs. Factor 3. tends to reduce greatly the value of targets as satisfiers of consumer needs. The situation resembles in outline that of suppressed inflation, with which it is usually combined. The stoppages due to the setting of

incompatible targets and to manifestly uneconomic choices of targets are counteracted by a concomitant reduction of costs due to the disregard of consumers' choices. Once more, therefore, as in a sellers market, *total production measured in physical units may increase, even while its total actual value is reduced below that yielded by a system of normal market relations.*

The ideology of central direction blinds the public to this negative overall result of target production by acknowledging physical units as goods, irrespective of the satisfaction they give to their recipients. Hence statistical results which in a normal market would be signs of much increased material satisfaction are accepted as such in circumstances where they actually give no increased satisfaction. The illusion of increased productivity is also reinforced by the basic socialist urge to exalt collective achievements at the expense of individual interests. This urge suffuses the process of production by a satisfaction of collective pride which compensates people as citizens for the corresponding loss of their satisfaction as individuals. We may call this *a system of conspicuous production.*

THE wastefulness of conspicuous production is reduced to the point of allowing an accompanying increase in physical productivity, by the effect of two factors.

The first of these is the presence of the crude commercial standards that I have already mentioned. These standards are imposed in the first place by a technology borrowed from a market economy, and are sustained further by the existing system of prices. Though prices are relatively inflexible and sometimes appear arbitrary, they cerainly give (as I have said before) an indispensable measure of guidance to economic decisions. Actually, the total value of products, assessed at ruling prices, is extensively used to define production targets, and this would hardly be done if prices did not give some guidance for assessing the approximate equivalence of alternative products. It is also clear that commercial considerations are strong enough to enable a prevailing excessive aggregate demand to produce the characteristic symptoms of a sellers market.[6] We should remember, also, the widespread illegal transactions which often prevent the incoherence in a system of targets from causing stoppages or other blatant wastage. Taken together, these commercial factors (technology, prices, and black marketing) may be said to form a *para-economic framework which effectively reduces the arbitrariness and incoherence of target production.*

The second circumstance that additionally reduces the inherent wastefulness of target production consists in the fact that the aims of target setting are far more restricted in practice than they appear in the theoretical image of central direction. The vision of a scientifically conducted economic life in which all particulars are simultaneously balanced against each other by a single directing centre and so made to serve the best interests of society as a whole—the original aim of socialist planning—has been abandoned in practice, ever since the first attempt at its realisation collapsed in 1921. The process now called central direction has accepted everywhere as its starting point a previously established commercial network, and directives issued after that time have also been always based on an actually existing network of supply and demand flowing between enterprises.

What is more, as Kornai makes emphatically clear, no binding directives are issued for more than three months ahead. And even so the range of these quarterly plans is in effect usually much less, since they are decided with a view to the results of the previous quarter, reports of which become available only after the final rush for the fulfilment of quarterly targets is over. Plans for such short periods can prescribe only small changes. Nor do these prescribed percentage changes vary discriminatingly for each enterprise. All enterprises are kept under pressure to expand production, and this pressure is subject to variations only in accordance with overall planning. 'Planning' consists therefore—apart from the founding of new enterprises—principally in ordering a small percentage of expansion (or improvement) of production of existing enterprises for the next two or three months

[6] Balassa, loc. cit., p. 95, describes price-guided choices in investment, production, exports and the labour market.

To this must be added a final and decisive restriction on the setting of targets. At the end of each quarter some enterprises will be found to have exceeded and others to have fallen short of their targets. Their immediate superior authority will reward the former and penalise the latter, but will itself be said to have fulfilled its own target even if its subordinate enterprises have only fulfilled their targets *on the average*, with under-fulfilments balanced by over-fulfilments. Consider also that the superior authority's knowledge of the present productive capacity of its enterprises rests principally on their last reported achievements. It therefore need do little else—nor can it in practice do little more—than fix the next task of each enterprise in proportion to its last achievement. Journal tells of managers worried at having their targets raised, if they are found doing too well, and mentions also that the authority above will tend to reduce the next target of an enterprise if its performance has lagged behind in the previous period.

Here we see emerging the essential formula of so-called total economic planning. The target of the next two or three months is fixed by adding to the results of the last period a small percentage of expansion. Thus the planning authorities merely impose the continuous general expansion on an existing network of mutual adjustment, as established within a prevailing para-economic framework. This ubiquitous pressure is graded as the 'overall planning' of economic progress, such as it is under capitalism for the purpose of the industrialisation of new areas. But all detailed directives—which are the characteristic feature of Soviet planning—are determined by the local successes and failures of individual enterprises in fulfilling demands made on them in proportion to their last successes or failures, which themselves had been achieved in response to previous demands fixed in the same way in proportion to still earlier outputs, and so on indefinitely.

This is not central direction but a ubiquitous central pressure, which forces enterprises to operate constantly to the limits of their capacity and to widen this capacity from quarter to quarter by a process of trial and error.

BUT there still remains the question how can enterprises rely on each other to supply them with raw materials, semi-finished products, machines and spare parts, and all other requirements of production? We must accept the fact that enterprises are prevented from attracting these supplies by offering to buy them at competitive prices. For even supposing that they might circumvent the prohibition against such procedure, they would not find prospective suppliers readily responsive to buying offers, since the primary interest of these lies in fulfilling their targets (and earning the attached premia) rather than in increasing their income by profitable sales. A black market can function therefore only marginally, and the main contractual lines must be established non-commercially by superior authorities responsible for the continued operation of the whole group of enterprises which mutually rely on supplies from each other.

We may ask then: does not the establishment of such supply-links by a superior authority contradict my thesis that the network of economic adjustments between enterprises must be left to their peripheral mutual interaction? Does it not entail, indeed, the kind of central planning which I have declared to be impossible and non-existent?

The second question is the more important and also the easier one to answer. Whatever the procedure may be which induces enterprises to supply each other, it does not centrally direct their production. The production of each enterprise is determined primarily by its response to a ubiquitous expansionist pressure from above, as described in the previous sections. The ability of superior authorities to secure delivery of resources by one plant to the other will doubtless affect this response, but cannot be said to determine it, let alone to do so in the light of a consideration of all possible alternative allocations of resources in conjunction with all possible alternative programmes of production. The function of the superior authority can be only to mediate between enterprises striving to fulfil their pre-given targets, by satisfying the increased supply claims of each expanding enterprise from the increased production of all other,

also expanding, enterprises. Though the authorities who thus continually expand the network of supplies between plants frequently have to grade the priorities of rival claims, it still remains true that both the supplies becoming available and the demands made for them, have their origin locally within the several enterprises responding to a universal production drive. To this extent, then, the superior agencies whose function it is to expand from quarter to quarter —as best they can—the network of supplies, are acting as the agents for the supply claims of enterprises and are exercising their authority on behalf of these by binding other enterprises contractually to service them.

This is not central planning, but neither is it a system guided by a market, for targets are not set in response to a commercial demand made at competitive prices. Output is demanded as part of a desire to produce more, and the availability of resources is then taken into account as a limit to the expansion of productive capacity. The mutual compatibility of targets is secured up to a point by the para-economic standards inherent in technology and a system of not altogether uneconomic prices, and, in any case, targets only represent fairly monotonous increases on the last actually achieved figures. The task of effecting a corresponding expansion in the network of supplies is therefore also very monotonous as compared with the speed and complexity of re-adjustments in a modern market.

Even so, the adjustment of supplies is the field of notorious failures. It is largely because of the wasteful failures of this system of supplies that Western observers have been so puzzled by seeing the vast flow of goods produced by Soviet enterprises. These wastages (stoppages and misuse of resources) will, of course, tend to reduce production, but the damage will be counteracted, as we have seen, by a stimulus to physical output due to the fact that production is carried on unhampered by close attention to the demands of ultimate consumers. The fallacy of identifying certain physical objects as such with economic goods, and of equating their real value with their normal value, is the gold mine of conspicuous production, which pays for this double extravagance.

I HAVE tried to show that the absurdities of conspicuous production form a system which the Soviets hit on in their fierce endeavour to act out as far as possible the original vision of a universally planned, strictly non-commercial economy. An integral part of this system is its way of testing and rewarding the fulfilment of targets. In the absence of an effective profit motive, productive achievement must be assessed either in terms of physical quantities or of values at controlled prices. But with all its shortcomings, commercial profitability does offer a more rational measure of economic efficiency than any set of such quantities can do. Whatever indices of this kind are tried, they give results that are scandalous in the light of obvious economic standards. Kornai's book presents a systematic study of these anomalies of target-production.

They are of two kinds. First, enterprises will use the margin of freedom granted by any given set of efficiency tests to meet the tests by short cuts, the possibility of which the superior authorities had overlooked. Thus they will earn important premia by manifestly wasteful methods. If such practices are then blocked by making tests more specific, the operation of enterprises will be so narrowed down that at the next turn of some unforeseen situation, they will be unable to take the obviously requisite line of action.

Consequently, tests are continuously readjusted in an attempt to make them sufficiently stringent and yet not excessively restrictive; and a result of which we see wastages caused by efforts to circumvent tests alternating with wastages due to the paralysis of obviously necessary operations. Kornai regards this situation as an internal contradiction of the system; I would consider it rather as a marginal outcrop of the great conflict between the vision of a centrally directed economy and the necessity of deciding true economic actions by the direct mutual adjustment of the participant units; a necessity to which the system covertly submits, but only up to the point required for producing physical objects, which are falsely identified as goods of normal value, in view of their conspicuous appearance.

IF I cannot curb the current urge to understand the follies of men 'from their own point of view', I may try at least to anticipate some of its manifestations.

It will be said that Soviet Russia is too poor to serve its consumers more delicately. Certainly, poor populations everywhere are supplied with less varied choices, for this is cheaper. But this is no justification for putting every effort into producing a great bulk of goods with little regard for people's wants. There is no need to incur the wastages of target production in order to manufacture cheap goods. Ideological passion alone can justify such a system.

It may be objected that capitalism starves the collective interests of society and that the Soviet system restores this balance. Perhaps it does, though its authoritarian structure renders its assessment of collective satisfaction dubious; but even so, the major purpose of economic life remains the satisfaction of individual needs, and the aggregate of these individual satisfactions is not and must not be administered as if it were collective satisfaction. This error, once more, is purely ideological.

Finally, we may ask: If central direction is impossible and its alleged practice mythical, is there any difference left between the Soviet system and capitalism? The difference is that the profit motive is largely replaced by a scramble for target premia; to this extent the conduct of enterprises is integrated towards the achievement of public recognition, and made less responsive to consumers' preferences; and again to this extent, *targets* are produced in place of *commodities* and the consumer is despoiled for the sake of serving the rulers' prestige.

This system is not directed centrally, but is ordered, like commercial production, by the mutual adjustment of individual peripheral efforts. Yet the manner of mutual adjustment differs from that of a market and justifies calling it a system of conspicuous production. Its propagandistic advantages for sustaining the claim of having achieved socialism are prodigious. The Soviet government could hardly survive the reduction of the system to straightforward marketing. Yet once we recognise what is actually going on here in the name of socialism, the whole exercise appears trivial: a pitiful simulacrum of the Messianic vision which had inspired a century of revolutionary aspirations.

Mehr denn je stehen die osteuropäischen Vorgänge für Deutschland und die gesamte Weltöffentlichkeit im Vordergrund des Interesses. Wer ständig und zuverlässig über die Entwicklung in Osteuropa und in der Sowjetunion unterrichtet sein will, liest

OSTEUROPA

Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsfragen des Ostens. Herausgegeben von der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde. Schriftleitung Dr. Klaus Mehnert.

OSTEUROPA bringt laufend aktuelle und sachkundige Informationen über alle von Moskau beherrschten oder mit ihm verbundenen Gebiete und erscheint seit Januar 1957 monatlich. (Einzelpreis DM 3.–, Jahresabonnement DM 30.–.)

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DEUTSCHE VERLAGS-ANSTALT STUTTGART

ON PROFESSOR POLANYI'S THESIS

The Editors invited a number of economists to comment on Professor Polanyi's article. Their contributions follow.

Ely Devons

PROFESSOR POLANYI'S article deals with such a wide range of issues, both in the theory of comparisons between administrative and market systems, as well as in the interpretation of actual Russian economic experience over the last forty years, that it is impossible to deal with them all in a short comment. I shall confine myself to a few disjointed points of criticism where I think Polanyi's analysis inadequate. But first I should make it clear that on two of Polanyi's major points—the impossibility of the kind of centrally planned economy which was the Utopian dream of many socialists, and the important effect on the statistical measurement of Russian progress of target planning—I am, in general, in agreement with him.

My points are:

1. Polanyi uses two principles of organisation—the hierarchical and that of mutual adjustment. He then argues that one *or* the other is appropriate to particular fields of human affairs. This 'all or nothing' attitude which he appears to take of which principle is applicable or appropriate, is in my view mistaken. I would argue that, in fact, most systems are run on a mixture of the two principles, and that the really important issue is to get some theoretical framework which will deal with both together, and enable us to understand how the 'mixture' can be, and is, varied. We may then be able to argue about the relative efficiency of different mixtures in different circumstances, and at what cost superior efficiency is obtained.

2. Polanyi's example of the football team illustrates my point. He takes this as a case of 'mutual adjustment'. But in fact 'mutual adjustment' on the field of a random collection of football-players, even if each one was outstanding, would not produce good football. The eleven players must be trained beforehand by a manager or captain to operate as a team, and they must play within the framework of a strategy laid down for them administratively. And one of the central issues of football management and training is how to obtain the right mixture of central direction and mutual adjustment (initiative).

3. Having established that complete central direction of a modern economy is impossible, Polanyi seems to me to conclude that administrative direction cannot have, and does not have, any role to play in an economic system, and that attempts at such direction are merely sham imitations of what would happen under a market system more effectively anyway.

Here I disagree fundamentally with Polanyi and I base my disagreement on thinking about the British war economy, which has striking similarities with the Soviet system. I have no doubt that the British war economy (a) was not centrally directed by a perfect, single, coordinated plan; (b) was run by administrative direction in which mutual adjustment between the parts took place administratively, (c) was very little influenced by prices, market behaviour or money. Also that it was not a mere sham administrative imitation of a market system, but produced a drastically different, and much more effective, collection of goods for prosecuting the war than would have been produced under a market system. If this is so then it follows that there are *some circumstances* in which an administratively directed economic system (and quite a complex one) is more effective than a market one.

If we could get clear in our analysis of the war economy what these peculiar circumstances were, which made 'administrative direction' superior, we might then surely apply this understanding to the analysis of the Russian system. I myself think that this would be a more profitable approach than an attempt to decide the issue on first principles.

4. All the criticisms and exposures of the Russian system such as those given in detail by

Kornai and others, can be paralleled in the British war-time experience: bottlenecks, stupidities, waste, inefficiencies and holdups. Indeed it can be argued that a 'planned system' always appears crazy at the periphery. But it is a mistake to conclude that it *necessarily* follows from this that the system would be more successful if run on the market principle throughout. Undue concentration on the 'periphery', which is characteristic of Kornai's analysis, and for many of the points made by Polanyi, may mislead us about some of the essential features of the system. Polanyi, to my mind, pays too little attention to the important role of the administrative direction of the total amount and distribution of investment; and other aspects of the Russian system, which seem to me to differ fundamentally from the Western market system, are barely mentioned. Three to which I would attach considerable importance are: (a) the choice of managers and entrepreneurs, (b) the transmission of approved technology or methods of production throughout an industry or the economy as a whole, (c) the setting up of new firms and factories. Whether one calls the way in which the Russians handle these three 'planning' or not, it is clear to me that they work very differently in the Russian system from the way they do in the West or would do in a Polanyi market system, and that these have important consequences for the development of the economic system.

I hope my criticism of Polanyi's argument will not be misinterpreted. I am not arguing that the Russian system is organised *completely* by administrative direction. On the contrary, my main thesis is that both the Russian and the Western systems use the market principle and the administrative principle, albeit in substantially different proportions. I also agree with Polanyi that some features of Russian administrative planning action are merely a sham for what is in reality copying, or attempting to copy, and then inefficiently, what would happen in a market system. But my central criticism remains, i.e., that the two can be combined, and the proportions in which they are combined does make a difference. If we could agree on this, we might then try to get clear, both from Russian and other experience, in what circumstances it is an advantage to change the proportions, what these advantages are, and at what cost they are obtained. I return to my earlier argument. If economists would only establish clearly why a price and market system was not appropriate to the British war economy, we might get some agreed understanding of the conceptual framework, at least, that we should use in analysing Russian experience. Of course, if Professor Polanyi and others were to argue that a market system would have been superior during the war, and that administrative direction and planning was one gigantic error, then the argument must proceed on a different basis.

The above points, although in my view fundamental criticisms of Polanyi's argument, deal with only a few of the issues he raises; were there more space I would like to comment on some of the others too.

Gregory Grossman

PROFESSOR POLANYI has once again caused us to re-examine certain basic principles of the organisation of society's economic affairs. The time could hardly be more appropriate. In the communist world today—and perhaps in many an under-developed country tomorrow—no economic issue can command greater practical urgency, theoretical complexity, and professional partisan commitment than that of the proper degree of decentralisation (or centralisation) of economic life. The conceptual and terminological guises which often hide it from view ('role of the law of value', 'use of mathematical methods in economics', 'principle of personal material interest', etc.) as well as the epithets and euphemisms which it spawns ('revisionism', 'administrative methods') only serve to underscore this issue's burning and timely importance.

But what exactly is this 'central direction' by means of which it is impossible to run a modern industrial system, as the author asserts? Professor Polanyi does not offer an

explicit definition of the term: regrettably so, for by providing one he might have sharpened his own argument and also steered the subsequent discussion away from some likely pitfalls. If I understand the author correctly—and I hope I am not being unfair to him—by 'central direction' he means essentially the system represented by war-communism (and at the moment we need not be concerned with Polanyi's thesis that it was not war but communism as a philosophy that brought it into being). That is to say, a system in which production targets are assigned to enterprises in minute detail, materials are centrally rationed, 'commercial relations' and the use of money are minimised or entirely eliminated, and there is no or hardly any accounting and calculation in money terms. All this may be underpinned by a 'single comprehensive economic plan', which of course war communism lacked. So understood, central direction is certainly a foolish way of running a whole economy under any circumstances short of a desperate state of siege, and perhaps even then. And I doubt that Polanyi could get much of an argument on this from economists on both sides of the Elbe.

But central direction may fall considerably short of such an *absolute* form, and the resulting partial vacuum of coordination of economic activity need not be filled by market relations alone for the system to work at all. This indeed is the Soviet case, on which more below. (A further problem arises when one tries to define the 'central authorities'; there is a manifold and complicated gradation of authorities, and even the central ones, however narrowly defined, are dispersed among many offices and committees.) Polanyi's instances of the covert operation of the market in the Soviet economy are not entirely convincing. Thus, simply because enterprises keep accounts in money terms and even exercise some choice does not yet amount to the presence of market relations to any decisive extent. It is even harder to see why the taking over of western technological solutions should 'engraft' into the Soviet economy a 'network of commercial relations' (presumably as an institutional system)—any more than the importation of bananas into London transplants the tropical climate to the banks of the Thames. Though the technology was developed in the West and in a market context, Soviet power stations or steel mills are run and supplied by central direction.

This is not to say that certain areas of activity in the Soviet economy are not guided by market or quasi-market principles. Polanyi could have well cited in this connection, *e.g.*, a substantial portion of agricultural production, some of the production by cooperatives, and even a part of the activity of state enterprises (*e.g.*, some consumer goods output by local industry, some distribution). The labour market can also probably be characterised at the present time as a market in the conventional sense. Nonetheless it would be stretching things to say that it is these activities, and the illegal operations that Polanyi mentions, that save the centrally directed Soviet economy from paralysis.

Given, therefore, less than absolute central direction (which we agreed would be impossible to achieve) and only minor significance of market relations, how then is a passable degree of internal balance or coordination (or 'mutual adjustment' in Polanyi's terminology) achieved in the Soviet case? Generally speaking, in three ways. (1) In the large, by central planning and direction which in its coordinative aspects relies chiefly on the so-called material balances. It is a crude but not ineffective device, and it is employed at various levels. The fact that annual changes for most commodities are quite small, as the author observes, is neither an indictment nor a negation of centralised coordination. However, we should note that the method of balances is also important in long-term planning where the changes are not small. (2) The narrower the area of the economy coordinated in this centralised fashion, the easier the job. Hence the tendency towards a kind of economic particularism tinged with autarky, the creation of relatively self-contained sub-economies, whether ministerial or (more recently) regional with a sort of barter relationship supervised by Gosplan among them. As the economy expands this tendency may grow, reinforced as it is by supply uncertainties.

(3) But the method of balances, even with advanced mathematical techniques, cannot

provide adequate coordination of a fineness that accords with the full range of goods produced and required by a modern economy. In the Soviet case such coordination 'in the small' is accomplished—quite imperfectly—by a variety of means, such as inter-enterprise contracts (which in themselves do not yet amount to market relations), one-time orders, the juggling of prices and 'indicators' by central authorities, crack-downs and campaigns, the sense of responsibility of the managers, the above-mentioned occasional market relations, and in the last resort by the party which coordinates by knocking heads together if things get too far out of hand. This arrangement works quite poorly, in large measure because the lower levels lack the correct signals (especially prices), sufficient information, and proper incentives to adjust mutually. (If they had the signals and the incentives this would amount to a market supplementing the less-than-complete central direction—but how well the two systems of coordination could coexist remains to be investigated.) Nor does the Soviet economy allocate its resources (in the technical economic sense) very efficiently, we may surmise. It works poorly on both scores, but it works.

N. Jasny

ANOTHER grave in the cemetery of fabricated terms: This writer has spent years on the subject; not only did he not reach the stage of inventing new terms; he did not even reach definite conclusions on the problems under discussion.

Professor Polanyi seems to be quite satisfied with capitalism. At least he does not mention such well-known defects (to name only a few) as permanent unemployment, the greatly excessive costs of advertising, or the seasonal character of the automobile industry, artificially created by releasing new models of each car at the same time every year, with the resultant losses in capacity and in effective utilisation of manpower. Not only does Professor Polanyi grant the possibility of planning under capitalism; he believes that a kind of 'framework of overall planning' actually operates.

To reach this conclusion, the concept of planning must be stretched to include such measures as prohibition of making fires in forests.

Lenin's ill-fated attempt to introduce communism overnight, undertaken in the early days of Soviet power, plays too great a role in Professor Polanyi's reasoning. There is little in common between the policies of those days and Soviet planning of 1960. Incidentally, Professor Polanyi is correct in objecting to the interpretation that the communist system introduced by Lenin in 1918–20 and known as War Communism was forced on the Bolsheviks by war conditions. But he speaks of the operation of a 'single comprehensive economic plan' in 1920, although no trace of such an operational plan exists.

Professor Polanyi apparently believes that a central economic plan is incompatible with market economy. Since a certain amount of market economy cannot be denied in Soviet planning, he has to deny the existence of a central economic plan, and speaks of a 'theoretical image of central direction'.

On the other hand, Professor Polanyi makes a great effort to minimise whatever is done to improve Soviet central planning. It is certainly a great improvement in planning when, rather than setting all targets in detail in Moscow, the individual enterprises are drawn into the planning work. Professor Polanyi says of this arrangement: 'In such a system the initiative could pass over more or less to the enterprises, and to this extent the directives eventually issued from the centre would be merely an aggregate of the individual plans made by enterprises operating a network of mutual adjustments at the base'. Indeed, much of what Professor Polanyi has to say of planning is odd. There is, for example, the information that for sacking potatoes no planning is needed; a few shakes will suffice. Elsewhere he writes: 'Planning consists therefore—apart from the founding of new enterprises—principally in ordering a small percentage of expansion (or improvement) of production in

existing enterprises for the next two or three months'. This is in line with no need of planning in sacking potatoes. However, Professor Polanyi says also that 'the mutual adjustments required *for the running of enterprises* (in a planned economy) are many million times more complex than those of the mutual adjustments for *allocating investments to them*'.

Planning is certainly not that easy; Soviet planning would not have been such a graveyard of failures over a period of 35 years if the statement were correct. Much more justified is his opinion that central direction is difficult, although I am unable to visualise something 'many million times more complex'.

The relation between planning and market economy seems to be: Full market economy with a trifle of planning under capitalism, and central planning with as much of market economy as is believed compatible with central planning in the USSR. Both systems have grave defects. One of the defects of the Soviet economy may be that a bigger dose of market economy may be compatible with central planning than is believed in the USSR.

The comparison that should be made is between Soviet central planning, highly imperfect as it is, and an unameliorated capitalism. Judging by results (at least with reference to such an important item as rates of growth), the decision is hardly so irrevocably against central planning as it appears to Professor Polanyi. The next step would then be to weigh the improvements possible under both systems. Here, too, the decision may turn out not so definitely against central planning as seems to be implied in Professor Polanyi's paper. He acknowledges that production rises in the USSR faster than in capitalist countries. But according to him this production is merely an 'illusion', 'a system of conspicuous production' (the new term).

Soviet production is not production of goods but 'target production'. A great volume of goods is produced 'with little regard for people's wants'. The conclusion might have been different if Professor Polanyi had examined the list of goods supplied to the population. Such 'illusions' as the sputniks are also outside Professor Polanyi's vision. There is no denying that there is a great deal of chaos and waste in the Soviet system, but the fact that in spite of these defects Soviet production expands more rapidly than the economy of the capitalist countries is of course a serious matter, indicating that not everything is rosy under capitalism either, that planning need not be perfect to be effective. Professor Polanyi would dismiss the Soviet rates of growth with the consideration that this is 'conspicuous production', production badly tied in to demand. He argues that output in a seller's market has a smaller value than output in response to a 'normal market demand'. But the rates of growth in the USSR mean that there is more and more of this 'conspicuous production'. Moreover, the features of the 'seller's market' are diminishing. Hence, according to Professor Polanyi, Soviet production, as 'conspicuous production', grows even more rapidly than the volume of output itself.

Soviet retail trade, for example, increased by 150 per cent in real terms in the eight years from 1950 to 1958 (this is of course quite an achievement), and the acuteness of demand relaxed considerably over the period. Hence, in Professor Polanyi's opinion, the expansion of retail trade was even greater than 150 per cent during the given period. The amounts additionally sold consisted not only of 'illusions', but of meat, milk, fish, and other consumer goods, some of which, a relatively small part probably, admittedly had a reduced value owing to poor adjustment of supply to demand. To offset this there is the great advantage that costs involved in trade are very low in the USSR. Consumers are at a disadvantage with reference to that part of total purchases (not too great a part), which is poorly adjusted to demand, but they profit from the small retail margin on *all* goods they purchase.

Professor Polanyi's paper is an attempt to kill something of vast importance and great vitality by giving it a bad name. The trick is good when it succeeds. But success in this case is very doubtful.

Alec Nove

IT seems to me that Professor Polanyi has made a valid point of great importance, by stressing the statistical growth-consequences of a concentration on fulfilling output targets. The argument can be stated in one of two ways, which reinforce each other. On the one hand, goods are produced which do not correspond to the requirements of the user, and which therefore are 'worth' less than a more desired assortment of products would be worth. On the other, the efforts of the producers (and of the lower rungs of the planning hierarchy) to adapt output to the statistics of growth injects exaggeration into these statistics. This is because factories can produce a vast number of different commodities, old and new, which are imperfectly comparable and can only be approximately aggregated, and there is room for 'manoeuvre' for intelligent managers anxious to obtain the best statistical results, on the basis of which they obtain material rewards and improve their promotion prospects. Of course, in all economies an unwanted commodity, once manufactured, is part of production statistics. However, as Professor Polanyi rightly says, the incentive to produce for the purpose of reporting an increase in output, rather than for satisfying demand or making profits, is a special feature of the Soviet system, and therefore aggregate statistics of Soviet output tend to overstate, relatively to ours, the use-value of what is produced.

It is also true that many people imagine centralised planning to be all-embracing in a way in which it is not and cannot be. But here I do somewhat part company with Professor Polanyi. He takes the utopian dreams of the war communism period as his 'standard' of centralised planning. It did not work. It could not work. But then, if one's criterion is something that is manifestly impossible, it is easy to prove that it does not exist. Surely any serious theory of any planning, including centralised planning (in the sense that all major goals are set by the central authority), must now take it for granted that not all 'micro'-actions of enterprises can be prescribed by the centre. A great western monopoly, such as I.C.I. or Du Pont, is centrally controlled and planned by its headquarters, yet one cannot possibly run businesses of such a size without leaving a range of autonomous decisions to factory managers on the spot. Naturally, these managers, though subject to orders from headquarters, will generally be doing this year very much what they were doing last year. This is also the case with Soviet enterprises. But why should this be an occasion for surprise? *Of course* factory A, Soviet or 'capitalist', is generally equipped to produce some one commodity, and, subject to major investments or retooling, will not greatly change its activities in the short run. Surely the central planners, unless mentally deranged, will build their plans on this assumption? [1] Why does Professor Polanyi suppose that this shows that planning is mythical or unreal? Central orders play their most essential role when something new is to be done, in other words, primarily when an investment decision arises. Similarly, why does the fact that there is 'continuous flow of exchanges between the top and bottom of the hierarchy' show the non-existence of centralised planning, save in the impossible sense he gives it? If some writers on planning have pictured the central authority issuing orders in some kind of vacuum, with perfect knowledge and all-round coverage of all eventualities, the fault lies with these writers, since they were describing a non-existent world. It is certainly true that many decisions nominally taken by the centre are a response to applications made to them from enterprises, or are unavoidable technical consequentials of other decisions. But how could it be otherwise?

The Soviet economy suffers from difficulties inherent in seeking to replace flexible market and contract relations by administrative direction. These and other difficulties are the subject of numerous books and articles, by Kornai, and also by other economists in a number of East European countries and in the

[1] They also assume that, for familiar reasons, managers will often tend to conceal their potential productive capacity and to hoard stocks; this is one explanation of the encouragement to over-fulfil plans, even though overfulfilment looks like bad planning from a perfectionist standpoint.

USSR itself. Critics in these countries have been urging that more power be given to enterprises to make necessary operational adjustments, that the system of prices, institutions, and managerial rewards be substantially altered, and also that econometric techniques (notably linear programming) be adapted to Soviet conditions and used to ensure more rational resource utilisation. Those who write about such matters (for example, Nemchinov, Novozhilov and Kantorovich, in the USSR) do not oppose central planning. On the contrary, they assert that, for instance, linear programming is peculiarly well adapted to the task of finding an economically rational means of fulfilling given objectives, which are assumed to be decided by the central planning and political authorities. I am far from asserting that these attempts will succeed in overcoming certain weaknesses which are deeply embedded in the Soviet economic system, above all when it comes to the satisfaction of consumer demand. My point is only that these criticisms and discussions take place within the framework of centralised planning, and can hardly be properly understood if one adopts unrealistic criteria.

I am also not happy about the treatment given by Professor Polanyi to 'war communism'. Undoubtedly Soviet historians tend to distort the truth in attributing its economic excesses wholly to the civil war. But surely the civil war did have something to do with them? To take a simple example, while the Soviet ideologists believed that private trade was wicked and decreed a state monopoly of grain purchases, it was no part of their ideology to take the grain for nothing; the fact that they confiscated grain surely did have some connection with the effect of the war on production of consumer goods. Indisputably, the utopian muddle-headedness of many communists made the economic situation worse at this time, but the extraordinary circumstances of the civil war surely contributed to the muddle-headedness, part of which was a confused way of making a virtue out of necessity. We have examples of this species of mental process nearer home. Obviously the Labour Party would not have introduced rationing in times of peace, but in the early years after the war found itself emotionally and ideologically committed to the superiority of rationing by coupons over 'rationing by the purse'.

Finally, I would like to stress that I am in full agreement with many of the other points very well made by Professor Polanyi, and believe that his article is most stimulating and that there should be much more discussion of the realities of planning, including a careful study of the extent to which reforms at present under discussion could eliminate some of its major difficulties. Nor should we forget how far our own economic system is from the free-enterprise, market-orientated model of the textbooks.

Francis Seton

MUCH of Professor Polanyi's closely argued case rests on his distinction between 'central direction' and 'mutual adjustment' as alternative principles of ordering human affairs. We may readily agree that none of them can function in unadulterated form, and it is easy enough to follow his conclusion that a social system which adopts 'central direction' as its be-all and end-all must be either unworkable or false to its ideal. But while placing the Soviet system firmly in this dilemma, Professor Polanyi neglects the corollary that Western systems can escape it only if they do not make a similar fetish of 'mutual adjustment'. Indeed, this is precisely the fallacy he appears to impute to them at times. By contrast, I should like to submit that neither of his principles provides the ultimate criterion to mark off one social order from another, and that none of them can be identified with the 'Messianic vision' of any economic system known to history.

Professor Polanyi rightly asserts that some human purposes are more efficiently served by central direction, and others by the mutual adjustment of independent agents. But does this not suggest that social systems should be classified by the kind of purposes they choose

to pursue, and not by these, largely derivative, means to their fulfilment? The crucial dividing line seems to lie between the systems devoted to single, preconceived, and fixed purposes (maximum growth, 'classlessness', or the winning of wars), and those giving priority to the diversified, spontaneous, and ever-changing aspirations of individuals. It may be common experience that the 'target-oriented' systems of the first kind use more central direction than the 'liberal' systems of the second, but neither law of nature nor article of faith dictates that it must be so. There is no reason of principle why a community of free individuals should not agree to signal their wishes to some central authority in order to get an optimum programme computed and carried through by central direction—or why a dictatorship should not elect to push its subjects towards an imposed objective by means of generalised performance criteria and incentive schemes, with substantially less reliance on direct controls. There can be centralised democracies and decentralised target economies. The fact that the Soviet Union seems to be moving in the direction of the latter, may presage a more efficient pursuit of its original purpose rather than its betrayal or degeneration, just as the use of public works in slump conditions may strengthen rather than weaken a system of private enterprise. What matters, surely, is the *end* to which central direction or mutual adjustment is geared, and not the mere fact of its operation or predominance in this or that social system.

It can of course be argued that the means adopted towards chosen ends are inseparable from specific social attitudes and habits of mind, and that these may in turn react upon the ends and cause them to be modified, abandoned, or perverted. This is substantially the reasoning behind von Hayek's indictment of socialism and Parkinson's tilt at bureaucracy. It is also what Professor Polanyi seems to have in mind when he accuses the Soviet system of slipping into the production of *targets* in the guise of commodities. Few would deny that this is an ever-present danger in human affairs; but does it threaten 'mutual adjustment' economies any less than those which are centrally directed? The very success of such economies in serving Man the *consumer* may create a situation in which his urge for security as producer, or for personal distinction as citizen, begins to overtake his craving for additional goods. This may divert such systems into the production of *employment stabilisers* or *status symbols* in the guise of commodities, and convict 'mutual adjustment' of the same tendency towards perversion of purpose which Professor Polanyi has so well described in the Soviet case.

To the extent that we have already travelled along this road, our commodity prices will be fashioned by many influences besides those of the 'sovereign consumer', and cannot pretend to the universal validity as yardsticks of economic growth which Professor Polanyi appears to claim for them. This does not of course exonerate the Soviet price system from producing misleading growth-indices and distortions of its own, but it does suggest that any attempt to distil from present-day realities a statistical expression for the *ultima ratio* of output growth can hardly be more than an academic exercise. All one can do is try to measure such growth in *physical terms* and leave the assessment of its usefulness or otherwise for subsequent consideration. Thus, if the output of each and every product were to double from one year to the next, there would be an important sense in which the total volume of production could be said to have increased by 100 per cent, even though it would not follow that our happiness, contentment, or security had also doubled as a result. 'Conspicuous production' in the Soviet Union occurs because such an impression is fostered by propaganda and the structure of incentives, and not because output-growth is measured in constant prices—as indeed it is practically everywhere. (It remains true of course that the particular prices used may give undue conspicuity to the production of *some* goods and play down that of others.) There are strong indications at present that Soviet propaganda and incentive structure are shifting away from 'conspicuous production' towards 'conspicuous cost-reduction' and 'conspicuous innovation'. Thus 'conspicuity' is being oriented towards purpose, rather than purpose towards 'conspicuity', and Professor Polanyi's *conspicuous production*, even in the heydays of Soviet target-chasing, may turn

out to be a mere misnomer for *productive conspicuity*.

It should hardly be necessary to state that I fully share Professor Polanyi's predilection for systems of the Western sort. But in doing so I should prefer to base myself on their predominant tendency to seek advance through the reconciliation, rather than the suppression, of diversity in human purpose, and not on their presumed adherence to any particular mechanism for achieving this, which time and circumstances might well render inappropriate or self-defeating.

Andrew Shonfield

PROFESSOR POLANYI'S analysis of the clandestine and inefficient manner in which the Soviet system uses the techniques of the market in the distribution of goods reminded me of two points that were made by Oskar Lange, the Polish planner, when I visited him last year. His first point was made in the course of some derogatory comments on the ideological bias of the traditionalist Soviet planners in favour of a condition of suppressed inflation: 'Many of our comrades seem to think that socialism has something to do with queuing', he said. He insisted, like Polanyi, that the only way to reduce the waste of resources, of which queuing was the most obvious expression, was to allow market forces much greater freedom to determine prices.

His second point was that all the important purposes of central planning could be achieved if control were exercised over a fairly small, critical proportion of investment expenditure. He indicated that control of something under half of fixed investment (conventionally estimated at 25 per cent of the national product) would suffice—but that central control over the disposition of this part of the country's resources would have to be complete, absolute and effective. He was talking of long-term capital investment with a high component of technical innovation.

It is this element in Soviet planning—involving ideally, on Lange's calculation, no more than some 10 per cent of the national product—which Polanyi's description does not touch. He leaves one to infer that it is subject to the same process of ideological pretence and muddle-through as the rest of Soviet economic life. Yet there is a good deal of evidence that Russian planning, during the Stalin period, consisted in setting out a medium or long-term production programme for a few major industries which were judged to be crucial, and then leaving the other branches of production to adjust themselves to the needs of the pace-setters as best they could. Incidentally, Lange, who opposed this crude form of planning, now says that he thinks it was, after all, perhaps the most effective way of creating the basic structure of a modern industrial society quickly.

Admittedly the problem of maintaining central control over this crucial sector of investment becomes more difficult as a society advances and economic needs increase in complexity. Soviet economists are plainly groping for new techniques and investment criteria—as witness, for instance, the decision to revalue the whole capital stock of the USSR at current prices. What is clear meanwhile is that similar long-term programmes of priority investment have been applied in recent years to automation, to the vast programme of conversion from coal to oil, and to the development of plastics and other chemicals. I do not therefore feel that Polanyi's formula 'no central direction but a ubiquitous central pressure' adequately describes the case. It is true that the enterprises which are not governed by the simple quarterly adjustments of production are probably a comparatively small minority, but in a period of rapid technological change they may nevertheless determine the pace of progress—real progress which can be translated ultimately into goods that consumers want—of a whole society.

To the objection that such planning of capital investment, by concentrating on a number of priority projects, is bound to be arbitrary and may be ill-conceived, the reply is that there is no known means by which capitalist enterprises can avoid the same risk of waste. A company starting to put up a steelworks

today is in fact taking a bet on the state of the market and of technology in a whole range of products other than steel in ten years time.[1] The trouble, as I see it, is that capitalist enterprise—unless it is very big indeed—shows strong disinclination to take such bets, unless it is supported by public funds or by guaranteed orders over an extended period. It is here that the Soviet exponents of 'conspicuous production' do after all have a major advantage. Since more production is their goal, the constant improvement and cheapening of the tools of mass production engage their full attention. Their capital investment plans are not inhibited, either, by anxieties about trade recessions. There is a big advantage in being able to take such decisions without thought of possible market fluctuations. Under capitalism, demand for capital goods is subject to especially violent changes as a result of the trade cycle; in consequence the machines that we use tend to cost more, since the engineering firms making them have to hedge against the risks, adapting their prices to the expectation that their capacity will be under-employed for long periods of time. With the security given to the capital goods industries by a system of planned investment, there is the opportunity to develop mass production methods and long output runs in the machine tool industry, for example—as the Russians have done.

But the main point is that public funds are made available by the Soviet state to test or back a new technological hunch more readily than private investment is forthcoming for similar purposes in a Western society. This must have an effect on the pace of technological advance, unless it is assumed that the Russians are going to have a particularly low proportion of good hunches. That seems an implausible assumption.

[1] I assume that it takes 3-4 years from the point of decision to bring the new plant into full operation, that it is amortised over 20-25 years, as is normal in Britain, but that with the help of larger depreciation allowances for tax purposes in the earlier years, the plant is in fact written off more rapidly.

Peter Wiles

THERE is more joy in heaven over one that repenteth . . . Professor Polanyi's partial recantation of the views expressed in 1955 at Milan is very welcome. There, on what can only be described as the Hegelian principle of 'the real is the rational', he ascribed to the Soviet economy a market system, on the ground that otherwise it would be irrational (incorrect) and therefore could not rub along (incorrect); but it did rub along. To my protest that every report, refugee and official, pro- and anti-communist, coming out of the country indicated that here was a command not a market economy, he could make, as I remember, no reply, as the debate was then closed.

Since then Professor Polanyi has studied more deeply the affairs of his native country. He has not discovered anything that a Sovietologist did not already know in 1955, but he has come to accept the facts: Communist economies, except in Yugoslavia, are command, not market, economies. However, he is still not *au fait* with input/output and linear programming, nor—it would appear—with more general Sovietological literature. So there are still a number of misunderstandings, albeit less radical than those of 1955. We still await the ultimate and deeper *samokritika*.

Professor Polanyi is entirely right to castigate the widely accepted fallacy that the system of so-called "War Communism" was caused purely by the civil war. It did indeed represent a genuine attempt at pure communism, in the short peace of 1920 as much as in the preceding battles of 1918–20. But he builds far too much on the failure of this system. After NEP, Stalin retained money under the Five-Year Plans for accounting purposes only, not as a criterion of resource allocation; money was not "active" inside the nationalised sector, but only in its relations with other sectors. Notably consumers and workers were to be guided mainly by the price mechanism to buy from and work for the nationalised sector in such a way as to help it fulfil its plan. That is, the plan was drawn up first, then the prices and wages were fixed so as to ensure that these two free elements would co-operate. So it is highly misleading to say that the Soviets

" never repeated the experiment of totally suppressing the market in favour of a central direction of industry." In all transactions between nationalised establishments, and in the allocation to them of land and capital, this is just what they did repeat. Professor Polanyi seems to confuse money with the market: in some of these transactions money did indeed pass, but it was " passive money," mere accounting money—an absolutely vital concept for Sovietology, without which one enters the field at one's peril.

Then the " limits of administrative feasibility " are greatly exaggerated. Already we can centralise as much as Stalin did, if we are willing to accept the inconveniences and irrationalities. Computers, and the mathematics of " activity analysis " (nowhere mentioned), threaten us with much more: centralisation without tears, a convenient and rational, but marketless, economy. Or, strictly, it would have a notional or electronic market, operating with shadow prices in a central office. Would Professor Polanyi take that as refuting or confirming his views on the market? One cannot say, but it would certainly refute his views on administrative feasibility. To use his own metaphors, an economy is still a sack of potatoes or a soccer team; but he offers no evidence that it isn't turning into an army. Indeed, it is no joke but a very serious criticism to say that were he familiar with *American* football he would not have compared the economy to an unplanned team game.

In other words, if by market we mean a place where relative values are settled, we shall by definition always *want* one of those (though Stalin has already shown we don't *require* it). But such a market may not be a decentralising institution at all. The individual enterprise, it is true, can rationally administer its resources " without establishing a commercial network between individual users " [sc. its employees], but it cannot do so without an exterior market, to which its internal administrative decisions are constantly referred. Similarly a whole economy could abolish the commercial network, and use either an exterior market (world prices) or a notional, electronic market. Many firms (ICI, General Motors, US Steel, Bell Telephone) already produce more than whole nations. If they can administer their affairs, as Professor Polanyi admits they can, without an interior commercial network, the day is not so distant when a nation will be able to follow suit.

There is not room for more than a protest at the factual picture painted of a communist economy, with its " pretence at central direction." The *political* bargaining process for more investment funds is correctly stated to take the place of a capital market. But once that is admitted it is hard to see where to stop. Current production, rightly distinguished by Professor Polanyi, is in fact also operated by a central plan, in which the centre fixes broad lines, and *subordinate authorities* fill in details, leaving (until recently) much room for political bargaining between these authorities, little for the influence of the consumer. To assert that current production cannot be centrally planned is quite simply and brutally to fly in the face of communist fact. Even when, as under the *sistema zakazov*, the consumer may order the details to his taste, he is still bound to an overall target value of purchases and to a particular producer; there is no competition and no true market. It may not be War Communism, but it is certainly still " central direction."

Finally, much of Professor Polanyi's confidence in the superiority of capitalism seems to rest on a confusion between absolute levels and rates of growth. He is very right that the Soviet system is irrational, chaotic, wasteful, and over-standardised, but he does not see that this is a mere handicap, not a brake. The *introduction*, that is, of such a system lowers the level of (useful) production, but this is only a once and for all loss. The growth of production thus distorted at 6 per cent per head per annum is still growth at 6 per cent, and still two to three times as rapid as Western growth. The handicap is rapidly overcome in the course of time.

This simple distinction contradicts all Professor Polanyi's optimism. Nor is such a débacle surprising, for his whole paper seems to have been written not to test a hypothesis, but to defend one: to save what can be saved of that grand metaphysics of the free market which, born with von Wieser and Böhm-Bawerk, made then its contribution and has by now served its turn.

VIEWS AND REVIEWS

SOVIETICA : PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

George Lichtheim

FOR a variety of reasons, Germany—to be exact, the Federal Republic—Switzerland and France are currently the main centres of study devoted to the philosophical side of Soviet Marxism. Of these, Germany (with Austria) is making the biggest contribution to the detailed investigation of what is actually going on among Soviet philosophers. While Professor G. A. Wetter's great work on *Dialectical Materialism* (published in an English translation in 1958) still stands unrivalled as a general introduction to the subject, his colleague Professor J. M. Bochenski has lately placed the German-language public under an obligation by his editorship of a series of studies published under the general title *Sovietica* by the East European Institute of the Catholic University of Freiburg, Switzerland (not to be confused with its non-denominational namesake in Western Germany). The resulting confrontation of Leninist ideology with what it is not unfair to describe as Thomist dogmatism lends a special flavour to a debate which would be of interest to philosophers under any circumstances. The works here under review can, however, stand on their own feet and sustain critical reflection quite apart from any theological interest they may have for some readers.

Dr Bochenski—himself the author of a well-known introduction to dialectical materialism, the first edition of which appeared a decade ago—sets the tone with a summary exposition of the latest authoritative compendium of Soviet philosophy, the *Osnovy Marksistskoi Filosofii,* published in 1958 by the Philosophical Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. His brief analytical exegesis of this massive work (*Die Dogmatischen Grundlagen der Sowjetischen Philosophie,* Dordrecht-Holland, 1959), sets itself the limited aim of acquainting the reader with the theoretical skeleton of the Soviet textbook, and achieves its purpose well enough in less than 70 pages of text, rigorously subdivided into numbered sentences or 'theses'. This quasi-mathematical procedure at least has the advantage of reducing the voluminous Russian text to a slim handbook, whose perusal should enable even the philosophical layman to discover at a glance what the current official line is on such intractable subjects as the nature of causality (No. 6.21—chapter and verse of the Russian original being indicated by decimal points), the relationship of quantity to quality (7.24), or the definition of logic (10.13). If this sounds a trifle forbidding, the practical value of such a compilation to the student must nonetheless be considerable. For the advanced graduate there is a rather more technical study, Dr Nikolaus Lobkowicz's critical edition, in the same series, of some recent Soviet writings on questions of formal logic (*Das Widerspruchsprinzip in der Neueren Sowjetischen Philosophie,* Dordrecht, 1960): again a handy volume of some 80 pages, but so densely argued and highly concentrated as to call for considerable mental effort. Here, too, the text is based on translations—in this case of lectures and conference reports published in Moscow, Warsaw, and Prague in 1958–59—and the diligent reader is offered a bonus in the shape of explicit and implicit 'contradictions' (in both senses of the term), brought to light by a comparison of the respective contributions made by the Russian, Polish, and Czech participants in the various debates. Not surprisingly, the non-Russian writings are shown to display a level of sophistication considerably superior to the official Soviet contributions (and a cast of mind correspondingly less rigid, and closer to the Western standpoint).

Neither Professor Bochenski's analytical summary, nor Dr Lobkowicz's critical edition of recent texts, can compare in importance with the third recent publication in Freiburg's *Sovietica* series—Dr Siegfried Mueller-Markus's monumental study of the post-war discussion on modern physics in the USSR (*Einstein und die Sowjetphilosophie,* Dordrecht, 1960): a work whose sheer size and weight are enough to awe the non-specialist. And this is only the first volume! Its more than 450 pages are based on what, to a layman at least, looks like an exhaustive acquaintance with Soviet sources,

not to mention general scientific and philosophical literature in several languages. A German physicist, the author appears to have spent ten years in the Soviet Union as a prisoner (in 1945–55), and to have come out in a frame of mind noteworthy for its charitableness (a circumstance attributable by his own account to a religious conversion undergone while there). He has at any rate put his experience to good use. Few scholars combine professional expertise in modern physics with philosophical training and comprehensive knowledge of Soviet literature, plus first-hand acquaintance with conditions of scientific work in the USSR. If the American authorities are wise they will see to it that his treatise is made available to students who cannot follow the German text.

WHAT then emerges from these learned studies, whose almost simultaneous appearance cannot fail to raise the prestige of Sovietology, and to hearten those of its practitioners who have occasionally shown signs of sensitiveness at the pin-pricks directed at them by representatives of older and more established academic disciplines?

Little needs to be said about Dr Bochenski's conscientious summary of the official 1958 textbook. It is evident enough by now that the intellectual framework of *Diamat* has successfully resisted the feeble liberalising tendencies of the post-Stalin era. Insofar as the new compilation differs from the standard productions of the Stalin epoch, the changes are either of a formal nature, or else they disclose an unavowed tendency to bring doctrine into conformity with current political slogans, e.g., in the stress placed on peaceful co-existence and the possibility of non-violent advance towards universal 'socialism', i.e., the gradual spread of Soviet influence. Some of these emphases are clearly unorthodox and may conceivably cause worry in Peking. By contrast, the strictly philosophical sequences are safely Leninist and contain nothing that has not been official teaching for the past three decades, i.e., ever since Stalin had Lenin's 'philosophy' codified in terms of the party's propagandist needs. This approach excludes those elements of Marx's thought which never formed part of Lenin's theorising, and conversely it lends emphasis to elements in Leninism which go back to the Populist tradition: notably the overriding concern with scientific materialism as an alternative to religious 'fideism' and philosophical idealism. In all these respects the new textbook is ultra-Leninist and makes not the slightest concession to 'revisionism'. Nor could it have done so without in effect renouncing the ideological foundations of Soviet 'Marxism'. The revisionists are essentially Westernisers, and it is the autochthonous Russian character of Bolshevism's peculiar world-view which stands in the way of any significant watering-down of Leninist doctrine.

To the professional philosopher, Dr Lobkowicz's critical edition of some recent Soviet writings will be of greater interest. There has clearly been some progress since Dr Alexander Philipov published his *Logic and Dialectic in the Soviet Union* (New York, 1952) with its appalling picture of academic subservience to the party line in logic—a 'line' largely determined by Stalin's eccentric and uncontrollable incursions into the field (which occasionally worked in favour of the academicians, as in 1946 when he suddenly decreed the reintroduction of formal logic into the schools' curriculum, thus catching the official party ideologists flatfooted). The grovelling 'confessions' prevalent in those years are no longer standard, and it has become possible to conduct debates on Hegelian and Aristotelian logic in terms familiar to the rest of the world. Indeed the principal change has been in the intellectual level of discussion and in the quasi-elimination of politically motivated abuse, at any rate among Soviet writers and East European communists themselves—the outside world may still be treated to charges of deliberate falsification.[1]

What this particular conference report brings out quite clearly, is the change in atmosphere which today enables 'formal' logicians to criticise Hegel (and by implication Engels and Lenin) in the name of their particular intellectual discipline, without immediately incurring

[1] Cf P. N. Fedoseev's speech at the April 1958 session of the Institute of Philosophy of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, as reported by G. A. Volkov (in Lobkowicz ed., p. 33 ff). Here 'our opponents from the bourgeois and revisionist camps' still come in for the customary abuse. A different but related symptom of intellectual helplessness becomes apparent when another speaker in the same discussion artlessly refers to 'present-day bourgeois metaphysicians such as Croce, Bochenski, Wetter, Merleau-Ponty, Hook and many others' (op. cit., p. 38): a weird collection of names clearly held together by nothing save the need to demonstrate the truth of the 'two camps' doctrine.

harges of heresy from the more orthodox arty philosophers. The other notable feature f the 1958 discussion was the marked cleavge between the Russian hosts and their guests rom East Europe. The Czech philosopher-hysicist E. Kolman even went so far as to riticise an important formulation of the ialectical logic of change in Engels's *Anti-Duehring*—an unprecedented display of indeendence, though he was careful to buttress his emarks with an orthodox appeal to other lassical texts. This procedure may be regarded s typical for those representatives of East uropean Marxism (such as Kolman and chaff), who combine genuine attachment to he Marxist classics with a sophisticated awareess that the world has not stood still since ngels and Lenin tried to harmonise philoophy and science, and who in consequence are nxious to 'develop' Soviet Marxism so as to ender it more flexible and less sterile. Their omewhat eclectic attitude to modern science learly has something in common with the corresponding efforts made by Catholic philosohers to bring St. Thomas up to date—which ay be the reason why the *Sovietica* editors at reiburg show a certain tenderness for the vident desire of these Polish and Czech neoMarxists to bring their Soviet colleagues up to ate. Materially, the dispute still hinges on the elative autonomy of formal logic, as disnct from the pseudo-Hegelian 'materialist ialectic' sponsored by Lenin. In other words, concerns the claim of non-party scientists to vade the close control of the party philosohers; the latter of course have the advantage f combining the guardianship of orthodoxy ith close proximity to the seat of political ower. In this respect the situation has not ltered. The most one can say is that both ides are now working for an accommodation, hereas formerly the party propagandists mply laid down the law and expected the cientists to follow suit.

IN far greater detail (and also unfortunately at a considerably higher level of abstraction), these problems reappear in Dr Mueller-Markus's comprehensive account of the debate ver Relativity which raged in the USSR from 951 onward, reaching a climax early in 1955 hen the editors of *Voprosy Filosofii* (the fficial journal of philosophy) bowed to the evitable and pronounced Einstein's critics istaken. Since it is impossible here to attempt even the briefest summary of a controversy involving some of the most complex issues in modern physics, the general reader must be referred to Professor Wetter's masterly survey which manages in a few pages to cover substantially the entire ground laboriously churned up in Dr Mueller-Markus's tome.[2] Only the barest generalisations can be offered in this space:

(1) The 1951–55 controversy began as a sequel to the *Zhdanovshchina* already triumphant in biology, and then—to the complete surprise of the party hacks among the philosophers, who were sure they could repeat Lysenko's easy triumph over his demoralised opponents—turned into a victorious counter-offensive on the part of the physicists. The climax came in 1954, when a special conference of 'philosophers' (i.e., party propagandists) and physicists witnessed the rout of the former, after a split in which the fanatical last-ditchers were abandoned by their more moderate colleagues. Since then, rejection of Relativity is no longer acceptable in official quarters, though Einstein—and Western physicists generally—may still be blamed for various philosophical heresies. Officially, Soviet science now sets itself the task of correcting Einstein's philosophical mistakes and finding an acceptable intellectual framework for his theory and for modern physics in general.

(2) While the controversy showed that some of the orthodox party zealots simply did not understand the concepts they were trying to criticise, the victory of their opponents was in the end determined not by intellectual arguments, but by the socio-political standing of the leading mathematicians and physicists. The latter, after some preliminary theoretical skirmishing in 1951–52, took advantage of the changing political climate in 1953–54 to launch a counter-offensive against their opponents, who were freely charged with hampering the development of Soviet science (and by implication of Soviet industry and atomic energy utilisation). Given the social prominence of the leading physicists, who today occupy an almost unshakeable position in the USSR, this argument proved decisive.

(3) The currently standard philosophical interpretation of Relativity theory—principally supplied by two mathematicians, V. A. Fok and A. D. Alexandrov—represents a compromise between the naive fundamentalism of the party ideologists (A. A. Maximov, I. V.

[2] Cf. *Dialectical Materialism*, p. 416 ff.

Kuznetsov, V. Stern and others) and the 'physical idealism' laid to the charge of Western philosophers and physicists. No Soviet writer has yet been found to argue that the official *Diamat* stands in need of revision as being incompatible with modern science. On the contrary, the argument of Einstein's defenders is that, properly understood, Relativity—like all other recent scientific advances—cannot fail to confirm the basic truths of dialectical materialism as formulated by Lenin. Thus, e.g., Einstein's unification of space and time into a single four-dimensional continuum is treated as confirmation of Engels's (and Lenin's) view that space and time are 'forms of existence of matter' (and not, as Kant thought, categories imposed upon reality by the mind).

This apparent flexibility on the part of the more enlightened party ideologists—plus those scientists who continue to speak the language of *Diamat* with apparent conviction—is in the last resort rendered possible by the ambiguity of the official philosophy, which tries to do duty as a scientific explanation of the empirical world without relinquishing the claim to represent an all-inclusive picture of Reality with a capital R. In technical terms, *Diamat* is both a method and an ontology. Its fundamental concepts, notably that of 'matter', are sufficiently elastic to leave room for fresh developments in science without yielding anything of their philosophical purity. The resulting ambiguity enables Soviet writers like Alexandrov to claim with apparent conviction that the progress of science can never yield results incompatible with dialectical materialism, and that the practitioners of *Diamat* are enabled by their philosophical training to avoid the errors of 'physical idealism' and other Western heresies already stigmatised as such by Lenin in 1909 (in his *Materialism and Empiriocriticism*). In short, science and 'materialism' are declared to be inherently inseparable. The problem of squaring these assertions with the actual procedures of philosophy and science is solved in practice by reinterpreting the basic dogma from time to time in such a way as to make room for those advances in thought which Soviet science cannot do without—always under the control of the party ideologists, who are required to have the last word, on the tacit understanding that they will in the end swallow any innovation which has sufficient weight behind it. This particular 'dialectic' is, however, one for which no acceptable formula has yet been found.

KARDELJ ON CO-EXISTENCE

A. V. Sherman

Socialism and War is a curious little book.[1] Ostensibly it is designed to condemn Chinese bellicosity as bad Marxism-Leninism, but its underlying aim is to restore Yugoslav communism's respectability in the eyes of Soviet and European communists. Though it can tell readers of *Survey* nothing about Chinese policies they did not already know, it does show what Tito is trying to achieve.

For several years after the Tito-Cominform split of 1948, the Yugoslav communist leaders believed that sooner or later Mao would be forced to adopt a position similar to theirs, and thereby provide them with the measure of international communist approval they need to maintain party *esprit de corps*. Having reluctantly abandoned this hope after the Chinese anti-Titoite drive which began in 1957 and has continued unabated ever since, they have now adopted a new position, that Khrushchev has been a Titoite all the time without knowing it, and that this should give him and other European communists common ground with Yugoslavia. Khrushchev disclaims the honour. On 2 September 1960 *Pravda* explicitly dissociated itself from the Yugoslav critique of the Chinese position, and censured Kardelj harshly for playing the imperialists' game of 'slandering People's China for its alleged bellicosity'. *Quod licet Jovi non licet bovi*. The Soviet dialecticians explained that there is a basic difference between their own position and Kardelj's argument, which was designed to give the opposite impression. He had tried to show that the Soviet and the Yugoslav doctrinal attitude to war and imperialism were in fact alike.

The book sets out to instil this thesis. It is

[1] Edvard Kardelj, *Socijalizam i Rat*—Kriticki Osvrt na Kinesku spoljnu politiku (Socialism and War. A Critical Survey of Chinese Foreign Policy), Belgrade, 1960.

an unreservedly 'People's democratic' work—written by Marxists-Leninists about Marxists-Leninists for Marxists-Leninists—and does not aim at a wider audience. Its method could be described as outquoting the Chinese, with occasional appeals to reality to reinforce their interpretation of what Marx, Engels, and Lenin really meant. It then claims that Khrushchev, though on the right road, has not gone far enough along it in the direction of encouraging active coexistence, as outlined by the Yugoslavs: 'What is new is the appearance of a world socialist community, which cannot be developed to its final form if war and differences between nations in general are not removed from the globe . . . forces of this young socialist community have already developed so far that they can decisively affect world development as a whole . . . they can probably prevent war . . . if they fight for this. . . . In essence the socialist policy of coexistence means nothing else but a policy of preventing the destruction of coexistence through war. This and nothing else is the meaning of the Yugoslav policy of coexistence'.

Kardelj's main thesis can be summarised as follows. First, that though imperialism and capitalism are as wicked and dangerous as ever, the growth of the socialist camp and growth of progressive forces inside the non-socialist camp increase the chances of peaceful transition to socialism and decrease the possibility of war. 'The ever more powerful presence of the socialist camp in international relations increasingly shapes the course of events by introducing new democratic and socialist elements in international relations, including mutual respect among nations and democratic relations between them, all-round cooperation and rapprochement, promotion of international division of labour and world economic cooperation, abolition of exploitation in international economic relations, organised aid to under-developed countries.'

Secondly, that Chinese doubts of the possibility of peaceful coexistence are both 'absolutely non-Marxist and unscientific' and dangerous, since they undermine the unity of the 'peace camp', discredit socialism and the peace-campaign in the West, and increase the possibility of war.

'I do not mean that the Chinese critics of coexistence openly and consciously declare themselves in favour of war . . . but the logic of the Chinese position which identifies a world war with the revolution and with class struggle . . . leads to the conclusion that war is inevitable', Kardelj writes, and goes on to discuss the adverse effects (from a communist point of view) this has on Western public opinion as a whole, workers included. He complains that if the Chinese openly declare that the duty of peace campaigners in the West is to fight for the abolition of nuclear weapons and for coexistence, while inside the communist camp the peace campaign is exploited for purely political ends, nuclear armament continues, and the possibility of peaceful coexistence is discounted, the campaign will lose its support in the West.

Thirdly, he complains that the Chinese attitude arises from China's economic and political backwardness and the egotism of her new rulers. 'Those socialist states which would have to bear the brunt of a third world war fought with modern weapons cannot share the Chinese view', he suggests. 'The principles of Marx, Engels, and Lenin condemning every attempt to impose socialism from outside by war should be followed. . . . It should also be made clear that no socialist country, merely by being socialist, becomes automatically immune from egotism. Everyone knows that deformations, errors, and other undesirable tendencies can afflict not only the internal development of a young socialist community but also its foreign policy, particularly when narrow-minded nationalism and great-nation chauvinism have not yet been outlived. Because of this the classics of Marxism did not exclude the possibility that socialist countries might wage an unjust war. Practice confirms this possibility.'

Kardelj begins by pointing out that Chinese attacks on Yugoslav concepts of coexistence were really directed against the Soviet policies too, and goes on to criticise Soviet policies towards Yugoslavia and the West for their similarity to the Chinese. Besides the usual complaints about the harmful effects of Soviet pressure on Yugoslavia, he blames Stalin's policies for the creation of NATO and the isolation of the Soviet bloc from the rest of the world, whereas during the subsequent years of affirmation of the coexistence policy the socialist camp has been strengthened and the 'forces of war' weakened. The cruellest cut of all is a chapter devoted to drawing parallels between the Chinese leaders and Trotsky, which, incidentally, gives Stalin grudging credit.

The book is a marathon of quotationeering which would be difficult to surpass and which Marxologists and Marxographists alone can

appreciate; it has been brought up-to-date as far as the War of Words between Khrushchev and Mao over coexistence this April. Besides confirming that you can prove anything by quotations from the 'classics', it re-states Yugoslavia's present orientation. By and large it corresponds to that outlined in the Party Programme, *The People's Way*, published in 1957. It claims full Yugoslav membership in the 'camp of peace and socialism' and hostility to the 'imperialist camp'; it coincides with the Soviet belief that a large-scale war is not needed to overthrow capitalism and what is left of imperialism. This still represents a considerable regression from Tito's neutralist period which began in late 1950 and continued till well into 1955.

Socialism and War gives no more of a clue than *The People's Way* or other Yugoslav Communist Party policy statements as to why their present position is so much more hostile to the West and lenient towards the Soviet Union and its satellites than it was a few years ago, during 'High Titoism'. I think the answer has to be deduced from internal power needs. Open denunciation of communism as practised everywhere outside Yugoslavia had some extremely unsettling effects on their own power, leading on the one hand to 'bourgeois liberalism' and on the other to some resentment within Tito's party which found expression in renewed sympathy for the Cominform. Since Stalin's death, therefore, both sides have tried to keep the Moscow-Belgrade quarrel within bounds, in order that Tito may not be forced to denounce Soviet policy inside the USSR and the satellites to justify his own existence, nor tempted to undermine the loyalties of communists elsewhere. Now, Titoism has reached its new equilibrium, in which the communist world is fundamentally sound, but slightly confused and in need of Yugoslav guidance, the capitalist world is wicked, but nevertheless bound for socialism whether it believes it or not, and at the same time is sufficiently close to a state of proleptic grace to be permitted to give economic aid to the under-developed countries, Yugoslavia included.

However, the book under review prefers to turn its Marxist analysis on its communist sister-states and to leave its readers to assume that its own foreign policies are unaffected by domestic considerations and remain the fruit of pure reason and benevolence. It is a sobering thought that four centuries after foreign policies ceased to be settled by Papal bulls they are mulled, or at least rationalised, by long-winded sophistry of this kind.

THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION

S. V. Utechin

THE book under review [1] contains eleven essays on various aspects of Soviet education, each being the fruit of six months' research by a young scholar; they were presented, before publication, as papers at a special seminar held by the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich. In the Introduction the editors stress the need for 'serious, painstaking research' in the field of Soviet education, and state that 'the collection of essays presented in this volume has been drawn up with this purpose in mind', thereby inviting a more exacting judgment than might be applied to a less ambitious undertaking.

Taken as a whole, the book is disappointing; partly, no doubt, because it appears at a time when its subject-matter is undergoing profound changes. At such a time it was imperative for the authors and editors first to make up their own minds, and then to make clear to the reader, whether they would describe the situation as it existed before the current series of reforms, as it is now, or as it is intended to be after the completion of the reforms, or any combination of these. As it is, the decision is left to the individual essayist, and the general reader will in some cases find it almost impossible to discover what stage is being discussed; for example, in W. K. Medlin's essay on the teaching of history, the pre-reform curriculum is presented in such a way that the reader may easily infer that it is supposed to remain in force for the foreseeable future. In fact, a completely different curriculum has been introduced.

The quality of the contributions is very

[1] G. Z. F. Bereday and J. Pennar, *eds., The Politics of Soviet Education*, London, 1960.

uneven. The most original, and in this reviewer's opinion the most valuable, is that by Mr N. Dodge on recent changes in the training of secondary school teachers. It is largely based on information collected by the author and by a group of American educationalists during visits to the USSR in 1955 and 1957. Mr Dodge makes a detailed analysis of the curricula both of Pedagogical Institutes and of those university courses which are designed to train teachers. He comes to the conclusion that 'all Soviet secondary school teachers now receive preparation in their special fields of study. . . which is more thorough than that of most teachers trained in the United States today'. D. Burg (who is one of the most recent Russian émigrés), in his essay on foreign language teaching, combines generally adequate factual knowledge with that understanding of the reality which comes from personal experience. (To a lesser extent this is also true of B. Rubin's essay on Moscow University.) The apparent contradiction between the amount of time spent on foreign languages at school and the fact that few people in Russia know foreign languages is well explained, and the formula is advanced that in Stalin's time foreign languages were meant to be 'taught but not learned'. An interesting mistake made by Mr Burg arises from his acceptance of the widely held conviction among educated people in Russia (based on the state of affairs in the big cities) that English is now the foreign language most widely taught in schools: in fact, official Soviet statistics show that German still comes first. R. Karca (another émigré from the USSR), in his introductory essay 'A General View of Soviet Education', shows acute understanding of the human element in contemporary educational problems, but his essay is marred by factual errors.

Several of the papers (on party control in education, anti-religious education, extra-curricular activities, and selection and training for advanced studies) contain much useful information gathered from Soviet sources, but are less than adequate in interpretation, lacking both historical perspective and feeling for the actual situation. Thus J. Pennar, writing on party control, says that 'the Komsomol may occasionally also take positions contrary to party policy', giving as an example that 'as early as 1925 the Leningrad branch of the Komsomol passed a resolution refusing to submit to the decisions of the 14th Party Congress'. To imply that this action by Zinoviev's underlings has any relevance to the present is ludicrously anachronistic. R. V. Rapacz's paper entitled 'Polytechnical Education and the New Soviet School Reforms' is perhaps the least satisfactory. The author is evidently greatly attached to 'progressive' ideas and practices widely accepted in American education, and therefore takes an uncritical attitude towards Khrushchev's aims and efforts reminiscent of the admiration displayed by modernists for the Soviet educational antics of the 1920s. A strongly-held view can be an advantage if it is brought to bear on facts that have been clearly seen and correctly presented, but in this case the prejudice is combined with such a cavalier approach towards Russian general and educational history and contemporary problems that the reader can but admire the author's temerity. To give only two examples: no party programme was adopted by the Bolsheviks in 1917, and the RSFSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, established in 1946, cannot be credited with designing the school curriculum in the early 1930s. It is only fair to say that similar mistakes occur in some of the other essays. It really won't do to state in a publication purporting to be a scholarly study that 'there are no boarding schools for out-of-town pupils' in the Soviet Union; that 'at present the network of seven-year and secondary schools covers only the European part of the country and the Caucasian republics'; to include the educational theorist Kapterev among historians; or to say that Novosibirsk oblast had 16 schools in the 1954–55 academic year.

Of the two chapters of a primarily sociological character, 'Class Tensions in Soviet Education' by G. Z. F. Bereday, and 'Selection and Training for Advanced Studies' by M. G. Field, the former is the more contentious. It starts with a general observation that two opposing tendencies, towards equality and towards increasing inequality, are at work in Soviet society. This is undoubtedly true, but what is open to doubt is the author's contention that the egalitarian tendency has its origin not only in communist ideology but also in the early practice of the communist regime. Mr Bereday even speaks of Stalin abandoning in the 1930s the principle 'from each according to his ability to each according to his need' (which in fact is assigned in communist theory to the stage of full communism). Taking at its face value the old Trotskyite fairy tale of the glorious egalitarian era of 'the Revolution',

he is greatly concerned about the danger of sectional interests finally destroying its achievements. This is a very one-sided view of history. The destruction in 1917–18 of a particular system of inequalities did not mean the elimination of inequality as such, but the substitution of a new set of inequalities for the old. Stalin merely once again altered the pattern. The many interesting examples of inequality in education, drawn mostly from the unpublished materials of the Harvard Refugee Project, are thus presented against a distorted background.

Facilitating cooperation between recent Russian émigrés and foreign scholars working in the field, and between "area specialists" and subject specialists, has been one of the main tasks in the organisation of Sovietological studies since the war, and the problems involved are by now well known. This book is the result of a conscious effort to demonstrate the advantages of both kinds of cooperation, but it would not be fair to judge their potentialities by this particular product.

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